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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine those 
economic views of Chernyshevskii which arose from his 
attempt to give a solution for the agrarian problems of 
mid-nineteenth century Russia. 
Because Chernyshevskii was not a professional econo-
mist but a polemist, his writings cannot be understood 
without a detailed knowledge of the social and political 
conditions of his time. Accordingly, the first part 
of the thesis is devoted to an analysis of these 
conditions. 
In Part one, chapter one is concerned with the crisis 
in Russian feudalism, chapter two with the effect of 
forced labour on the Russian rural economy, chapter three 
with the condition of the gentry and the serfs, chapter 
~ with the causes of the reform movements, and chapter 
~ with the government's steps towards reform. 
In Part two Chernyshevskii's economic arguments in 
support of the abolition of serfdom, and his schemes for 
redemption payments, are analysed. Chapter one deals 
with his polemic against Tengoborskii on the superiority 
of hired labour over serf labour. Chapter two discusses 
his redemtion schemes. 
In Part three Chernyshevskii's dialectical theory 
of social development and his views on the commune are 
considered. Chapter one deals with his polemic against 
Vernadskii on the superiority of ~ ~ v.:ner::.:;nit.> 0'{(;1 
communal ownership over private ownership of the means 
of production. In Chapter two his theory of social 
development is analysed. 
Part four contains Chernyshevskii's critique of the 
political economy of his time, and his theory of socialist 
production. Chapter one presents his criticisms of the 
laisse~-faire principle. Chapter two is concerned with 
his discussion of the scope and nature of political economy, 
and his "hypothetical method". Chapter three deals with 
his classification of labour into productive and unpro-
ductive labour. Chapter four examines his criticism of 
the Malthusian theory of population. Chapter five is 
concerned with Chernyshevskii's attitude towards different 
social formations with particular reference to capitalism. 
Chapter six discusses his theory of socialist production 
and his theory of the 'toiling masses'. 
P~TO~ 
Economic, political and social conditions during 
Chernyshevskii's time 
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CHAPTER ONE CRISIS IN RUSSIAN FEUDALISM 
If one attempts to-day to analyse the historical events of 
the second and third quarters of 19th century Russia, one's first 
task is to discover the forces that were at play in the social, 
political and economic life of Russia at that time. I have chosen 
to concern myself with this particular period because it coincides 
with the development of Chernyshevskii's central economic ideas 
and because it marks the time of his greatest impact on the progres-
sive radicals in Russia. The radicals and later the populists 
found a constant source of inspiration in Chernyshevskii's formula-
tions of the economic questions of his time. There were, of cours~. 
" I 
other influential groups,of which the liberals were the most 
important. Kavelin and Chicherin mainly spoke' for this group. 
Apart from this there were the Slavophils and the Westerners of the 
Vernadskii persuasion. All these groups advocated their own cure 
for the social malady of Russia, either a romantic therapy (the 
Slavophils), a liberal one (Kavelin and Chicherin) or a prescrip-
tion derived from classical English economic theory and practice, 
often without taking into account the profoundly different 
historical circumstances of Russia. An attempt will be made in 
the main body of the thesis to show that Chernyshevskii's analysis 
of the agrarian question, the burning issue in the economic sphere 
in Russia at the time, was illuminating and his suggestions for 
solving it realistic. An attempt will also be made to evaluate his 
critique of classical political economy, the body of the dominant 
contemporary economic doctrines which guided t~e formulation of 
the official economic policies in western societies. 
The economic conditions in the period under review are 
characterised by a form of feudalism whose principal feature'was 
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serfdom. Some industrialisation was admittedly in progress, but 
on most counts the second quarter of the 19th century in Russia 
can best be termed a period of economic feudalism with its 
attendant crises, which, however, did not as yet issue in any 
fundamental social change. 
There is some controversy over the meaning of feudalism in 
general and Russian feudalism in particular. If one leaves aside 
the juridical notion of feudalism and defines its nature in 
economic terms, one will be involved ina pardox, which is 
particularly apparent in the definition given by M. N. Pokrovskii, 
the well-known Marxist historian. In his view feudalism is a 
system in which there is a self-sufficient 'natural' economy by 
contrast to a moneyed 'exchange economy' that has consumption as 
its object.(l) This definition, as Dobb.has pointed out, is in 
line with the classical concept of feudalism. In the case of 
Russia, the two indicators of a state of economy which is basically 
non-feudal - the revival of commerce and production for market 
existed as early as the 16th century. Pokrovskii was therefore 
impelled to argue that the 16th century was the period of the 
dissolution of feudalism in Muscovy. But, curiously enough, the 
very basis of economic feudalism, enserf;-'ment of previously free 
or semi-free peasants, took place in the late 16th century and at 
the very beginning of the 17th century during the reign of Tsar 
Boris Godunov. 
In this context, Russian feudalism can be seen, paradoxically, 
to decline from the l6th.century and at the same time to become 
the main factor in giving the economy a strong feudal character 
from the late 16th century onwards. The only way to understand 
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the situation is to define feudalism as a social system in which 
servile labour is the dominant productive force.(2) Marx 
attempted to explain the paradox with reference to other stages 
in the history of human society. The feudal system of production 
contJras-ts, on the one hand, with slavery in that "the direct 
producer is here (in feudalism) in possession of his means of 
production of t~ mat~rial labour conditions required for the 
realisation of his labour and the production of :his means of 
subsistence. He carried on his agriculture and the rural home 
industries connected as an independent producer," whereas, "the 
I 
slave works with conditions of labour belonging to another." At 
the same time serfdom implies that "the property relation must 
assert itself as a direct relation between rulers and servants, 
so that the direct producer is not free": "a lack of freedom 
which may be modified from serfdom with forced labour to the 
point of a mere tributory relation" (3). Under capitalism, on 
the other hand, "labourer is no longer, as in slavery, indepen-
dent producer and he is alienated from his means of production 
and from the possibility of supplying his own means of subsistence. 
Again, the labourer, unlike a slave, has a contractual relation-
ship with the owner of the means of production: legally he is 
both free to choose his masters and change his masters. His 
obligations are only limited to the terms of his contact." (4) It 
is surprising to note that M. N. Pokrovskii, Marxist though he was, 
should have committed himself to such an ambiguous characterisa-
tion from the Marxist point of view of an epoch of Russian history. 
In the period under review, the two obligations of the peasants 
in Russia to the landlords, viz. the obrok (money payment) and 
7 
barshchina ~orced labour) constituted the very basis of Russian 
feudalism. Sometimes the obligations were wholly as obrok and 
sometimes wholly as barshchina, in other cases a combination of 
the two were demanded. Production for market was carried on to 
some extent. Actually, this was a feature not uncommon in other 
forms of feudalism, but, as in all varieties of feudalism, Russian 
feudalism remained at a very low level of technology. Although 
with the advent of factory production in the late 18th century, 
due to the needs of the economy and the exogenous influence of 
the industrial revolution of the west, the rural economy based on 
serfdom started to decline. The net result of these mutually 
exclusive trends of economic activities - one submerged in the pool 
o 
of stagnation and the other endeavouring to set a new pace of prod-
uctive activity in Russia spe1t a crisis. This crisis became more 
pronounced in the middle of the 19th century i.e in the period , 
with which·this study is concerned. The causes for this crisis 
have been attributed by many thinkers entirely to certain minor 
factors taken out of the context of the totality of factors; for 
example Pokrovskii.and another Russian historian, Rozhkov, reduced 
the problem to one of imbalance between internal and external 
trade. (5) .But such partial exap1anations are clearly unsatisfactory. 
In fact, to find a satisfactory reason for the crisis of the 
economy of serfdom, the entire socio-economic structure of Russia 
must be analysed. 
The basic sector of the economy of serfdom in Russia was 
agriculture. Before the 18th century, a preponderantly natural 
economy prevailed in ·the barshchina dominated sector. The economic 
units were self-sufficient and did not produce any surplus for "market 
.. 
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elsewhere. In the 18th century the sale ofrurplus products in 
the market became necessary for the landlords and the primary 
producing barshchina units of the economy started to loose their 
self-sufficient closed character. (6) A growth of trade oocurred 
in the 18th century, and in many cases the landlords sent not 
only food crops to the market but also redirected production to 
flax and wool. In this connection, it may be remembered that all 
the units of the barshc~ina dominated economy did not behave in 
the same way. Their behaviour depended on the size of the estate, 
on the extent of internal consumption and the magnitude of forced 
labour available to the landlords: all these factors determined 
the inclination of the landlord to send goods to the market, 
which means that small estates ~nt very few goods to the market. 
Barshchina obligations were dominant in the fertile black-
soil areas of Russia. However, in the non-black-soil regions, 
which were unfertile, in the 19th century nearly half of the serfs 
were in obrok and many of the peasants pursued seasonal work in 
factories and trading concerns in the towns and in the cities. This 
led the landlords to increase the peasants' obligations in money 
terms in many cases, because, as Liashchenko observes, the land-
lords took advantage of the legal right to the person of the serfs, 
i.e to a share of all money which the peasants earned inside or 
outside the estate. (7) 
In different spheres of the economy and in different parts of 
the country, the transformation from a natural economy to a money 
economy did not take place at the sametemp~., ,In the villages, an 
important element helped the money-trade relations to take a firm 
root: it was the growth of the social division of labour. It 
became the foundation on which the wide development of commercial 
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'PJDductLonin the first half of the 19th century took place. 
Though this penetration of the money-trade economy was felt 
in most areas where agricultural production was carried on, there 
is no way to determine precisely the volume of goods that entered 
the market for sale and the volume that remained for the purpose 
of internal consumption. Therefore the ratio of the two, 
nationally or regionallY,rOannotbe computed. At the time only 
rough approximations were carried out to establish the degree of 
penetration of money-trade relations in the rural sector. Although 
precise calculations of different magnitudes and ratios of crops 
for different purposes would have been the best indicator of the 
extent of the transformation of the natural economy to a money 
economy, yet even rough approximations which show a trend sharply 
deviating from that in the past are sufficient to indicate the 
symptoms of change. I. D. Koval'chenko made the following observa-
tion in this connection: "The manifestation of crnmnercialisation 
in.agriculture in Russia (throughout the history of serfdom) and 
in the first half of the 19th century in particular came up against 
great difficulties. There was no correct figure or even an 
approximate estimate of the extent of commercialisation in this 
respect. So, the investigation has always been dependent on tracing 
an indirect path, for ascertaining the degree of marketability of 
the products in that period." (8) This approach was as follows: 
firstly, a calculation was made of the demand for crops for con-
sumption by the non-agricultural population, for the breweries and 
for export. Secondly, a calculation was made of the surplus over 
need in one region and the deficit in another. Finally, there was 
the extent of transportation of crops where in every transaction 
'the respective pluses and the minuses' were calculated. In 
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Koval'chenko's view, this particular method has the advantage of 
dealing with commercial crops only and so an approximate estimate 
of the penetration of crops into the market for trading objectives 
alone could be made. (9) Elsewhere he again asserts that "the 
dynamics of transportation of crops by riverproves the quick 
development of commercial production in the sphere of agriculture 
in the first half of the 19th century." (10) 
As has been mentioned earlier, production for market was to a 
greater or lesser extent in existence in Russia from the very 
beginning of feudalism. But the volume of production for market 
gradually increased to such an extent that the economy could be 
considered to be 'transforming from a natural economy to a money 
economy'. (11) According to' \. Liashch~nko, the non-black soil 
agricultural regions based on obrok obligations were more advanced 
in the process of transformation than the central agricultural 
regions based on barshchina obligations. This phenomenon was not 
. ... .. / . 
unique in Russia/since in other countries, e.g.England and France, 
the process of disintegration of feudalism occured at different 
rates in different regions. 
Though economic changes came slowly in the barshchina • 
dominated landlords' economy, this sector of the economy was the 
main producer and supplier of agricultural products for the market. 
There is an estimate that out of the total volume of crops that 
went into the market, 90% came from landlords' estates and 10% 
from the peasants themselves. (12) This shows that peasant economy 
was definitely at the subsistence level. 
There has been some controversy among economists and economic 
historians about the role of production for market in the breakdown 
of feudalism (and hence in the rise of capitalism) in Russia. The 
\ , 
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controversy centred mainly around the role of spontaneity in such 
a transformation and the social ~asis for production for market. 
On the one hand, there is the opinion' ;~f M. A. Rozhkov who held 
that all types of production for market are organically transformed 
into a capitalistic type. According to him, "the development of 
a money economy led to technical improvements which made servile 
labour disadvantageous to the nobility, the peasants and the state 
itself, and it called forth a replacement by hired labour; the 
replacement of servile labour by hired labour signified precisely 
the abolition of serfdom." (13) This statement clearly shows 
Rozhkov's belief in an automatic change of the mode of production 
arising mainly from the comparative advantage of hired labour to 
the landlords. On the other hand, one should mention the opinion 
of N. A. Tsagolov, another Soviet economic historian, who maintained 
that development of agriculture for market in an economy based on . 
serfdom was quite distinct from the development of production 
simply for market. Production for market may exist in several 
different kinds of socio-economic formation and it is only if prod-
uction for market is the sole reason for production that t.he_sooio-
economic formation· is capitalism. He asserts that production 
under feudal landlordism cannot spontaneously be transformed into 
a capitalistic form and that production of goods for market takes 
place under the most diverse methods of production: but this does 
not signify that each of these means of production can grow into 
capitalism organically and spontaneously. He further contends that 
the transformation from feudalism to capitalism - a transformation 
from a system in which the landlords owned the peasants to one in 
which the workers are free and the master owns only the means of 
production - cannot be spontaneous. (14) 
The transformation, then, of a natural economy into an economy 
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for market, or the existence of a mixed economY'are neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the breakdown of 
feudalism. It follows that the growth of commercial agricultural 
production based on serfdom is not a transformation of the mode 
of production. The Russian landlords had a considerable control 
over commercial goods and they traded for profits employing in 
many cases hired labour, but that feature alone did not make them 
capiWlists. 
Pokrovskii once referred to the existence of 'capitalistic 
barshchina
' 
in many estates in Russia which actually means that 
the landlords in these estates produced only commercial crops 
with the help of forced labour. But the very expression Ie 
'capitalistic barshchina
' 
is a contradiction in terms. (15) 
Firstly, because the peasants were not in a contractual obligation, 
whatever may have been the form of obligation (i.e barshchina); 
secondly, because they were not free to choose their masters, nor 
had they any freedom to change them: only if the workers are in 
a contractual obligation as free men is the form of production 
capitalistic. Perhaps, however, Pokrovskii had some different 
notion of capitalism. Surely, he did not imply anything 
resembling Sombart's view. (16) Sombart characterised as capitalistic 
any society in which there was production for profit and thus thought 
that the essence of capitalism existed from the ancient time, and 
not from the 17th century. This view of capitalism subsumes widely 
different forms of society under the term capitalistic and is 
unilluminating. It amounts to saying that there never was a non-
capitalist society. 
'. If/"we shift our attention from this controversy to the actual 
crisis of feudalism in Russia, it must be recalled that by the . 
l3 
middle of the 19th century, Russia was still one of the most 
backward countries in Europe. The main reason for this back-
wardness was serfdom. In the first two decades of the 19th 
century certain factors contributed to the rise of aspirations 
among landlords to increase their agricultural production. The 
growth of towns, the rise of home demand.:, the higher prices of 
crops, all encouraged a concern for technical improvements and 
greater agricultural production. But a certain downward trend 
of agricultural prices in the third decade of the century 
dampened their enthusiasm and the improvements that the landlords 
were considering were not put into effect. As a consequence, 
the new economic opportunities were not seized by the rural sector 
of the Russian economy. In themsence of the technical improve-
ments needed to intensify production, the economy of serfd0m was .. 
. ., ' 
in a sorry state,with insufficient capitaL. and productivity of 
labour to adjust itself to the fluctuations of price in the 
commodity market. The problem was further aggravated by the general 
economic crisis in Europe in the third decade when an oversupply of 
goods caused a Sharp decrease in the market price of commodities, 
including all varieties of crops. 
The lack of initiative among the landlords in improving their 
methods of production in the face of fluctuation of prices has an 
economic explanation. In the existing conditions they could 
produce a surplus even if the price was falling, because of the 
peculiar nature of the labour cost, especially in the barshchina 
dominated sector. In fact the labour element in the prime cost of 
production was an indeterminate factor because it was never computed 
in money terms, and thus the cost of production too was indeterminate. 
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If the price was low the landlord tried to extract more labour 
from his peasants by force in order to keep his income within 
a reasonable range of oscillation, whereas i~ the price was 
high he could·af~ord to be liberal in getting the required 
amount of forced labour. But there is a snag in the first case: 
if the landlord wanted to get the desired level of surplus by 
more forced labour, the very nature o~ this kind o~ labour led to 
less marginal productivity per additional labour hour spent, and 
as the price was low the surplus would be less than the desired 
level. Hence the exploitation o~ the serfs to thel'utmost and 
the ensuing crisis. The concept of economy and diseconomy in 
production were not at all important, if not irrelevant in an 
economy based on ser~dom as there was no way o~ computing the 
cost of production. 
Some of the well-known Russian economists, notably M. P. 
Zablotskii and L. V. Tengoborskii held similar views. Zablotskii 
was of the opinion that the question of the cost of production in 
an economy based on ser~dom did not arise and he even doubted 
whether the landlord needed to earn the 'compulsory rent'. The 
landlord could not curtail his production when the prices in the 
market were low because he had to sell at whatever price the goods 
could be sold. Although the level o~ price was a consideration 
with the landlord, it was not the main concern because he had ln 
possession the chief weapon - the legal right to exploit the 
peasant at will. So, according to Zablotskii, the problem was 
not in the fluctuation of prices but in the system of the economy 
itself which could not adapt itself to the new conditions, could 
available 
not rationally allocate the resources, ;. . to itself and was 
not capable of calculating the cost of production. In short, it 
was totally incapable of transforming itself to a rational, that 
is, the capitalist mode of production which takes account of all 
these factors. (17) L. V. Tengoborskii agreed with ZabLO. tskii 
that "the actual system of our rural economy excludes the 
possibility of determining the cost of production in some way", 
that "it removes one of the definite moments of market price 
because of this and comprises one of the main reasons of 
significant changes of prices." (18) But he did not go further 
to assert that serfdom itself was the key to all the problems 
and that price fluctuations and other maladies of the economy 
were just secondary effects •. He even held the view that a con-
tinuous improvement of the national economy could bring the 
rural economy out of the blind alley into which it had been 
driven. Tengoborskii was an ardent supporter of serfdom some-
what after the manner of Baron von Haxthausen and Chernyshevskii 
devoted much of his energy in an attempt to refute his views.(19) 
From the above itcis evident that the crisis of the economy 
of serfdom should be sought in the prevalence of barshchina 
rather than in that of obrok, as the former served better for 
forcible utilisation of labour for productive purposes. In the 
obrok dominated areas the increase in the amount of such obliga-
tions did not equip the landlord with more productive power but 
with more money income. 
In the middle of the 19th century, Russia needed a growing 
tempo of production not only in the agricultural sector but also 
in the industrial sector. The framework of obligations of peasants 
in the agricultural sector was not however undergoing a transfor-
mation in the direction that would help this to happen/i.e from 
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barshchina to obrok. Manpower for industry had to come from the 
peasants in obrok. There was not a sufficient increase in the 
proportion under obrok to prevent a manpower lag and thus a 
productivity lag in the industrial sector. The lack of significant 
change affecting the framework of obligations in the direction 
appropriate to the economic needs of the time is evidencm by 
the small change in the proportion of peasants under the two obligations, 
that is, barshchina and obrok, between the 18th and 19th centuries. 
I.Ignatovich has given an exhaustive appraisal of the situation in 
quantitative terms. (20) Between the 18th century and the 19th 
the proportion of peasants under obrok increased only slightly. 
In 12 of the non-black soil guberniias the percentage of obrok 
peasants increased only from 55 to 59.9 and in all the black-
soil provinces taken together it increased only from 26.1 to 
28.8 (21). It should be noted that the increase in obrok was 
less in the black-soil regions. Overall, in the 19th century, 
the proportion of barshchina labour was greater than that 
under the obrok form of feudal obligations. But if one takes 
the data on separate guberniias, a striking difference in the 
percentage of each obligation is.revealed. For example, in 
1858 in the Kostroma guberniia the serfs on barshchina were 
12.5 and the percentage in Tambov was 78. If one takes into 
account the dynamics of the change in the percentage of obliga-
tions in separate guberniias, the growth of obrok is not visible 
everywhere. Thus, for example, in comparison with the 18th 
century, the percentage of barshdina peasants increased in the 
19th century; in Voronezh from 36 to 55, in Orlov from 66 to 
72, in Penza 48 to 75. (22) 
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The rise in the proportion under obrok obligation was least 
evident in the black-soil regions, that is, the most fertile 
areas in central Russia. It is worth mentioning here that in 
New Russia and in the Ukraine the percentage of barshchina 
peasants was 95 everywhere, and in some isolated cases it even 
approached a hundred per cent. 
The above findings of Igna1tovich point to on~fact, that is, 
that the obligations of the peasants did not move very greatly 
in the direction of tributory relation towards the landlord. In 
a developed market system, with the rise of factory production, 
the rural economic set-up needed a re-orientation,especially in 
the sphere of production relation. Even if spontaneity does not 
playa decisive role in economic progress, particularly in a 
transformation from one mode of production to another, at least 
it paves the way for the interaction of decisive forces in this 
transformation. It could be regarded as quite natural, economically 
speaking, if the shift of emphasis in the obligation had gone the 
other way as the result of such spontaneous development. If the 
percentage of obrok peasants had increased significantly in 
proportion to the other category, a necessary condition for the 
establishment of an independent peasant economy would have been 
ensured and the landlords would have been forced to hire for their 
production to a greater extent. This would have also been instru-
mental in solving to some extent the manpower lag in the growing 
industrial sector. As a consequenoe,the passage to capitalism 
would have been easier and less painful. This does not" imply 
however that the change would have come automatically. History 
shows that such changes are always painful. 
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Tsagolov presents a quantitative assessment of the same 
problem and his findings are similar to those of Ignatovich. 
According to Tsagolov, side by side with the rise of the obrok 
system in agricultural production by serfs, the scale of 
utilisation of barshchina labour increased. This is confirmed 
by the increase of the number of barshchina man-days which was 
noticed everywhere in the 19th century. (23) 
The growth of the obrok system, according to Tsagolov, did 
not mean that peasants involved in it were gradually freeing 
themselves from the direct control of their masters, as one 
might expect in such circumstances. Which kind of obligation 
existed was to some extent due to their different type of 
profitability for the landlords with the different types of soil. 
It is well-known that the growth of the obrok system was more 
pronounced in the non-black soil regions and that, in course of 
time, this system did not evolve into a relationship of tribute 
between the landlord and the peasants, when the latter could 
enjoy comparatively more freedom than the barshchina class. This 
is shown by the fact that the amount of obrok obligation increased 
considerably (to be precise - nearly 500%) in the course of 
hundred years. According to the estimate of N. P. Oganovskii, at 
the beginning of the 18th century the obrok per soul was one ruble. 
It became two rubles by the middle of the same century and five 
, . 
rubles at the beginning of the 19th century.(24) While there was 
also a rise in the price of crops during this period, the increase 
in the amount of obrok was always far ahead of the increase of crop 
prices. 
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We have outlined the crisis within the institutional set-up 
of the economy based on serfdom. Without the abolition of 
serfdom nothing could be done. The stagnation of the rural 
economy was so complete that even the rise in the number of free 
peasants during the period under review made no impact on the 
level of agricultural production. 
There was another feature which started to show with striking 
regularity in the middle of the 19th century: the failure of 
harvests and famine conditions in the villages. Zaionchkovskii 
quotes a landlord of the province of Tula who stated that "during 
famine in the winter the condition of the peasants and their 
families is horrible. They eat all sorts of filth - acore, 
plant roots, swampy grass, straw - all these go into their food. 
They even cannot buy their salt, become almost poisoned;· 
terrib le diseases attack them ••• " (25). This served to enhance 
the critical state in which the agricultural economy, and indeed 
the entire economy of Russia found itself. 
Side by side with the sharpening of the economic crisis, a 
discontent of the peasants grew also. The discontent exceeded 
simple protests, and open.revolts by peasants against their 
masters and their.regional centres of administration became chronic 
affairs. This could not but aggravate the economic crisis because 
of the reluctance of the peasants in revolt to work on their 
, .. 
masters estates. ·ProductionEll, innUmerable man-days were lost, 
sometimes the estates were completely burnt down. Police reprisals 
followed with the army often in the wake. Chaos spread to many 
parts of Russia leading to greater economic stagnation. 
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CHAPTER TWO EFFECT OF FORCED LABOUR ON THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 
The middle of the 19th century in Russia saw the beginning 
of industrial progress on capitalist lines. This century is 
everywhere in Europe noted for the swift changeover from 
manufacture by hand-operated machines to machines operated by 
power. Though the ground for this development was prepared in 
England 1n the 18th century, outmoded economic theor~es prevented 
full scale industrialisation then. There were two main differences 
in the state of production in England and in Russia during 
-the 19th century. The first was the volume of production. 
England, the pioneer of the industrial revolution,marohed forward 
far ahead of her competitors, to say nothing of Russia which 
was far less advanced than other European countries. The second 
was the nature of labour. In England, though the conditions of 
the workers were appalling, labour was free; whereas the manufactur-
1ng establishments in Russia were run mainly on serf-labour, except 
in those very rare cases when the free manufacturers and the 
workers were the same persons~ One important event in the economic 
life of England was instrumental in speeding up the tempo of 
industrial activity in Russia. It was the disappearance of the 
doctrines of mercantilism which involved the prohibition of 
exports of machines abroad. The ban on the export of cotton textile 
and other machines was lifted in 1842, when Smithian doctrine 
took its root in the minds of the English public. Even before this, . 
the English manufacturers found a steady market for the machine 
tools abroad and Russia was one of their important markets. The 
following is an estimate of the volume of imports of machines and 
instruments into Russia in the first half of the 19th century: 
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83pOO rubles (assignates) worth of goods in 1815-16; the 
corresponding figures for 1825, 1840 and 1850 were 828, 3500 
and 8397 thousand rubles assignates respectively.(l) As a 
consequence of this, the manufacturing establishments where 
manual labour was used were transforming themselves into power 
driven factories. At the same time a significant change in 
the structure of the working force in the industries was taking 
place, that is, servile labour was being replaced by 'voluntary' 
labour. (2) 
In spite of such an opportunity for industrialisation in 
. - . . - . 
Russia, it le,gged- far behind other industrialised countries in 
terms of its productivity and consumption. According to an 
estimate for the period 1840-1850, the per-capita production of 
cast iron in Russia was 8.7 Russian pounds*, the corresponding 
figures for England and France were 23.1 and 37.5 pounds res-
pectively in the same period; the per-capita consumption of cotton 
fabrics in Russia was 0.87 pounds (Russian), whereas the correspond-
ing figure for other industrial countries of western Europe, that 
is, England, France and Germany was 8, 3.1 and 3.07 pounds res-
pectively. (4) 
Although productivity and consumption in Russia were relatively 
small, compared with England or France'or even Germany, the number 
of factories and the number of workers employed showed a consider-
able increase inpthe first two quarters of the 19th century. 
Whereas in 1804, the number of factories was 2402 with 95pOO workers, 
the same figures for 1825 were 5261 and 2lqOOO respectively. Between 
1828 and 1860 the number of factories increased to almost three 
* 1 Russian pound = 0.90 English pound 
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times as much as in 1825, even excluding the mines, mills, 
distilleries and breweries; and the index of the number of 
workers became 270 in 1860 taking 1825 as base. One strik-
ing development could be noticed in the character of the 
working force during this period. As Liashchenko pointed out, 
the trend moved increasingly and inevitably to hired labour. 
Whereas in 1804 the percentage of hired labour in the total 
labour force in the factories was 47, the corresponding figure 
went upto 50 in 1812, 58 in 1820, decreased to 54 in 1825 and 
in 1860 reached 87. (5) Another estimate by Blum on the shift 
from forced labour to hired labour gives a somewhat different 
picture: (6) 
Year No. of Workers No. of. Hired No. of Forced Workers Labour 
1804 224,882 61,000 (27%) 163,282 (73%) 
1825 340,568 114,515 . (34%) 226,053 (68%) 
1860 862,000 479,000 (56%) 383,000 (44%) 
In this estimate the total number of workers is strikingly 
different from Liashchenko's figures. The.proportions of the 
two classes of workers are also very differently estimated. In 
another estimate made by Pazhitnov for 1860, based on the infor-
mation of Department of Manufacture and Internal Trade, the 
number of factories in European and Asian Russia taken together, 
excepting Finland and Poland, was 1~388 and the number of workers 
was 565,142. According to an estimate for 1857, there were 
1~542 factories with a working population of 560,364 workers. (7) 
These discrepancies are not surprising, because in the first half 
of the 19th century in Russia, there were no reliable statistical 
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data available to the administration. Computing was done on 
the basis of information returned from regional administrative 
units which in most cases were rather chancy. The vastness of 
the country, and looseness of administrative links coupled with 
the inefficiency of officers at all levels made a dependable 
collection of data virtually impossible. As a consequence, any-
one who wants to go deeply into the facts of Russian economic 
life in this period finds wide deviations in the values of 
variables in different estimate's. In this situation the best 
method for the investigator is to place no importance on the 
exact magnitude of the figures given and to deal with the general 
trends seen in the figures. 
A gradual change in the structure of the working class can be 
taken as one of the indicators of the transformation of the Russian 
economy towards capitalism. There is also another indication of 
capitalistic development. According to an estimate by Tugan-
Baranovskii, of the total 5599 factories in 1832, 862 (14%) 
belonged to the nobility, whereas by the end of the forties the 
nobility owned only 500 «5%) of the total of 10,000 factories.(8) 
These estimates indicate both that capitalist enterpreneurs were 
considerably increasing in number and that there was adecrease in 
the enterpreneurial activities of the nobility. 
Side by side with large scale industries, the position of the 
handicraft or the kustar industries during the same period needs 
examination. In spite of the rise of capitalist production, the 
kustar industry held its sway in small scale commodity production 
and trades in towns and handicraft and cottage industries in the 
villages. The increase in the volume of employment due to the 
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growth of industries created a demand for consumer goods which 
the large scale industries were incapable of meeting. The 
kustar industries were utilised to supplement the large scale 
industries. The low labour cost of the handicraft worker, low 
overhead cost, and smaller depreciation of assets put this 
decentralised form of manufacture at an advantage over the 
centralised production in the sphere of consumer goods, particularly 
cotton textiles. Whereas previously the kustari;had adopted their 
own policies of production and disposal of goods through inter-
mediaries, in the middle of the 19th century the 'putting out' 
system of work (as it was called in England~ also called the 'tonya' 
system in Japan, became cammon. 
At the head of the kustari stood a master with hundreds of 
workers. He purchased raw materials in large quantities and 
distributed them partly to his own factory and partly to the 
kustari to be utilised in the small production establishments. 
The finished goods were then handed back to fue master. Economically, 
this system helped the workers to specialise in a trade and since 
this system was most prevalent in the cotton textile industries, 
weavers constituted the first artisan class. According to Lenin, 
this tonya system was the pre-condition for the development of 
future capitalist factories, for the accumulation of capital by the 
masters and the formation of a group of skilled workers specialised 
in a trade. (9) 
Such were the conditions of industrial activity, both large 
and small scale in the middle of the 19th century in Russia. A 
question that arises here.QollJ.¢er~-:s.che state of the working class 
. '. during this period. In the first stage of-the development of 
capitalism in England the working class had to suffer immensely; 
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their conditions of work were unbearable; there was growing 
pauperisationamong them and in many cases they went so far as 
to break up the machines and set ·fire to factories and establish-
ments •. The theory that, because England was first in entering 
the arena of capitalism, the normalisation of the conditions of 
the working class in the absence of any example or previous 
experience, was bound to take a long time, and that the develop-
ment of capitalism in other countries would not therefore follow 
the same agonising path, is not confirmed if one examines the 
condition of the working class just before the abolition of 
serfdom in Russia. Moreover, it was not merely the lack of 
experience that reduced the English working class to the:state it 
found itself in: the influence of'laiss~-faire' attitudes and 
policies became dominant in the ruling class, which prevented the 
government from effecting working class.legislation. 
It is necessary first to examine the working conditions in 
Russian manufacturing establishments before 1859. A special 
commission was formed in that year consisting of representatives 
from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
with Stackel'berg as chairman. Its object was to effect a com-
plete transformation of the system of legislation concerning 
industry. The findings of the commission were published a year 
after the abolition of serfdom. An examination of the recommenda-
tions of the committee reveals the prevalent conditions before 
1859. For the first time the employment in any manufacturing 
establishment of children below the age of 12 was prohibited. 
Workers of both sexes within the age group of 12-18 were allowed to 
work up to a maximum oe12 hours a day, out of which two hours 
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were to be set apart for breakfast, lunch and rest. Night-shift 
work by persons below the age of 18 was prohibited. (10) If 
the beginning of the 19th century is taken to coincide with the 
beginning of industrialisation in Russia, industrialisation was 
attended by appalling working conditions. There was no organised 
working class movement; there was no question of bargaining 
between the employers and the workers because of the bondage of 
the latter within the institution of serfdom, and there was no 
intervention by the state to improve matters during the reigns 
of Alexander I and Nicholas I. Russian autocracy was altogether 
afraid of industrialisation on western lines lest it gave rise to 
a mass of disaffected workers. The negative attitude of Nicholas 
I towards the industrialisation of the country is well-known to 
all students of Russian economic history. Pazhitnov describes 
the state of affairs in this way: "Workers and even children are 
exhausted by back-breaking work 16 hours a day. The statistical 
committee of Yaroslav considered the conditions of the workers in 
the factories where men, women and children had to work for l4! 
hours a day and live in barracks to be typical. No measures were 
taken to guarantee the health of the workers and while they 
perished,the capitalists received 60% return on their capital. 
More often than not, the administration does not take any measures 
to guarantee the health of the workers and where measures are 
taken for various reasonS they 'are:: ineffective!'(ll) 
I 
The measures referred to by Pazhitnov were in most cases 
haphazard, piece-meal attempts at amelioration: the Russian 
propertied classe~whether the nobility or the merchants, or 
the big or medium investors of capital could afford not to take 
them seriously since labour was cheap and easily replaceable. 
27 
There is some controversy among historians about the extent 
of pauperisation among the working class in Russia in the period 
under review. On the one hand, there is the view that the very 
nature of primitive accumulation of capital in Russia led 
inevitably to a growth of pauperisation amongst the masses on a 
wide scale. One author contends: "The period of primitive 
accumulation is genetically connected with the previous stage of 
economic development - the period of the pre-capitalist money 
economy, the economy of serfdom. That is why in the period of 
primitive accumulation many of the vestiges of the eQo.omy.of-serfdom 
based on forced free labour within the system of servitude, were 
preserved. Naturally these traces of the past are preserved 
a~ost exclusively in the sphere of national economic life which 
took precedence in and almost entirely dominated the rural economy 
in the epoch of serfdom. • •• But the influence of the tradition 
of the serfdom was not limited and never is limited to only a 
direct preservation of the methods of the old rural economy in the 
period of primitive accumulation: it goes further and penetrates 
into the sphere of swiftly developing modern industries. Here it 
manifests itself in an extremely crude method of exploitation of 
the hired workers. Excessively long hours of work, extremely low 
wages, the absence of any sort of provision for old age·, sickness 
or accidents leading to the loss of working ability, persecution 
of workers who take part in strikes or fonn their organisations: 
these are the things to which this method led. The result of 
this exp~oitation is the extreme poverty of the labouring masses. 
Two circumstances exercise a particularly strong influence on this 
gross exploitation and on increasing pauperism: . the absence of any 
organisation of the working class and the existence of speCUlative 
enterprises. (grunderstvo)." (12) 
" 
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There is no doubt that in the first stage of the develop-
ment of capitalism in Russia, the working class could not 
organise itself because of the absence of both the objective and 
\ 
subjective preconditions. The lack of political freedom and 
civil right coupled with the oppressive rule of the Russian 
autocracy made it well-nigh impossible for any section of the 
Russian population to form an association amongst themselves. In 
fact, at this time the working class did not even realise the 
need for such associations. As a consequence, only sporadic 
unorganised agitations took place among the Russian rural and 
urban workers. The upper classes/of course, enjoyed some 
political freedom. OBe ,author called it a "freedom 
analogues to that of England in the 17th and 18th centuries, which 
was only vested in the exploiters themselves, while the mass of 
the people in England or in the 19th century in Russia were 
deprived of this freedom." (13) 
The speculative industries referred to by the same author went 
side by side with primitive capitalist accumulation. It was, 
according to him, "an echo of servile tillage". "The essence of 
the servile economy consisted in predatoriness, in the crude seizure 
of the fruits of 'other people's labour' without.any payment. The 
same imprint of predatoriness, easy profit without labour is to 
be found in the speculative industries, but there is an important 
difference between the method of exploitation here, and that in 
serfdom, in as much as here more energy, enterprise and adroitness -
these newly acquired practices of the capitalist era - are needed~(14) 
Another viewpoint. is expressed by an author named Terner in a 
book published in 1861 under the title "On the Working Class and the 
Measures for Guaranteeing Their Welfare." He states: "Russia till 
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now has not known either factory production or pauperism in 
the real sense. Our entire rural and town population were 
at a much lower stage of welfare than the greater part of 
European countries. But we have not had as yet pauperism and 
a proletariat which appeared as a dangerous sore around the 
most luxurious development of the country and other classes of 
the population." (15) In the estimate of the same author, in 
1856 out of a total population of 57 million in Russia, only 
5,200,000 resided in cities and towns (less than 10%). He 
asserts that as a result, "the present moment represents the 
most favourable one for the introduction of those institutions 
for the working class" which by their nature, "would prevent 
the very birth of pauperism" (16). The favourable conditions 
were supposed to have been,first,that Russian society was at 
the 'very beginning' of the malignant development of capitalism 
which was far advanced in Europe; secondthat" Russia could take 
account of the experience of other countries and avoid its 
Qberrations, and,third, and most importantly, that there had 
survived in popular customs the idea and the practice of the 
working association - the artel. The author concludes that 
because of the small size of Russia's city population, and the 
actual absence of pauperism, at least in the form which it was 
found in western Europei one "could avoid impoverishment by taking 
certain reasonable arid inexpensive precautions. (17) 
The discussions of the controversial question as to whether 
a proletariat was already in the process of formation in 19th 
century Russia and as to whether there was an economic basis for 
such a process, led to the view of some that a proletariat was 
evolving in the womb of feudalism itself. Pankratova states: 
"The process of primary accumulation dragged on right up to 1861 
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and was completed in the first decade after the emancipation of 
the serfs, when the industrial transformation was completed. 
After studying trade relations in all their ramifications, it 
is particularly important to show the process of the growth of 
trade of the hired labour force within feudal-servile Russia 
and to determine the extent and the sources of the appearance 
of hired workers, their specific weight and place in production ••• 
But the essence of the problem of hired labour as the most 
important factor in the rise of capitalist production is not in 
the magnitude of its expansion. The proletariat arising within 
the feudal method of production was a huge new productive force. 
Simple cooperation and manufacture could not have arisen if 
the small producers had not attained a high level of working 
skill of productlve and technical habits, if they had not 
possessed the ability to work collectively, or learnt to use 
comparatively differentiated instruments. 
The expropriated small producers could be quickly transformed 
into skilled factory hands and then into trained hired workers, 
because even before this time they were not simply ruined 
peasants but were experienced 'hands' possessing certain 
productive and technical skill& These skilled forerunners of 
hired labour (the 'pre-proletariat'· according to Engels) were the 
most important element of the new productive forces, which ripened 
with feudal society." (18) 
It will not be out of place here to mention the role played 
by the government in the development of industries in particular, 
and economic development in general during the 19th century, 
especially in the immediate pre-reform days. The Russian 
autocracy was never keen to develop industries on western lines, 
and thus be instrumental in creating a proletariat. The very idea 
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of such a proletariat haunted the Tsarist bureaucrats during 
the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I. The fiscal policies 
that were adopted during the first part of the 19th century 
were directed towards guaranteeing the privileges of traders 
and merchants who came from the rank of the nobility. But 
the same fiscal policies, with their emphasis on high tariffs, 
were at a later date a boon to the industrial entrepreneurs 
and the swift industrial growth in the second half of the 
19th century was greatly aided by the preceding favourable 
fiscal policy. 
In the early 19th century the tax structure of Imperial 
Russia was very regressive. That is, the poorer section of 
the population whose incomes were very low had to contribute 
proportionately more to the state treasury in tax than its 
richer counter-part. As a consequence, revenue to the state 
treasury was extremely limited. The main sources of revenue 
were the oppressive poll-tax from the landlords' peasants and 
the taxes from the state peasants. The income from tax on 
business profits was negligible, firstly, because the rate of 
investment of capital in the country was extremely low and, 
secondly, because the property-owning classes were not at all 
taxed as they might have been. Apart from the direct taxation 
of the peasants, there was another source ofmvenue which the 
government drew on freely to increase its income, namely, 
indirect taxes and fiscal tariffs. The fonner increased the 
burden of taxation on the poorer section of the people, that is, 
of workers and peasants. The regressive nature of the tax 
structure put the rich propertied class in an excessively 
privileged position. 
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In 1823, during the reign of Alexander I, Kankrin was 
appointed Minister of Finance. He remained in this position 
till 1844 during which time he pursued such a reactionery 
policy that Nicholas I, himself an arch-~eactionary, had to 
remove him. Kankrin was charged with the responsibility for 
economising on state expenditure and rationalising the dis-
organised finances of the state. He fulfilled his task so 
puntilious1y that he aroused the dissatisfaction of Nicholas 
himself. 
Kankrin was anything but a protector of industrial progress 
in Russia. When he spoke against serfdom. as many serfowners 
did themselves, it was because the continuation of serfdom was 
fraught with the danger of a revolution. But he was even more 
afraid of a city proletariat and pauperism, and for this 
reason he opposed the general development of factory production 
in Russia. He disapproved of industrial development to the point 
of resisting the introduction of joint-stock companies, private 
commercial banks and opposed the improvement of industrial 
techniques and machines. He was even opposed to the building of 
railways. But ironically enough, during his tenure an office 
for advice to the manufacturers was established, technological and 
forestry institutes were brought into being and the mining acts 
were re-written. The effec~.o~ hi~ tariff policy was also favour-
able to the government. 
The tariff policy pursued by Russiangovernment during the 
first six decades of the 19th century was especially important to 
the development of industry in Russia. Throughout his period of 
office, Kankrin followed a policy of high tariff rates. This was 
not because he wanted to protect nascent Russian industries but 
because it was profitable to the state treasury. There were six 
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tariff revisions during his ministry - 1825, 1830, 1831, 1836, 
1838 and 1841. The effect of these revisions was that high 
duties were substituted for import prohibitions; many taxes 
were lowered; the home trade was given a boost and the revenue 
increased from 11 million rubles in 1824 to 26 million rubles 
in 1842. Production in cotton industry was almost doubled 
during this period and the m.nnber of people employed increased 
from 47,000 to 110,000. (20) 
But while Kankrin followed the policy of high tariffs in 
order to increase revenue, the nobility was putting pressure on 
the government to lower tariffs because the continuance of a 
high tariff policy deprived them of important items of luxury, 
such as perfumes from France, wines from France and Spain. As 
a result of this pressure, the tariff duties on some items .-
started to come down and,after Kankrin's departure, a new tariff 
structure was introduced in 1850 which put the tariff policy of 
Russia almost on a free-trade basis. 
The year 1850 may be taken as the line of demarcation 
between the policy of high protection and the policy of freer 
trade. In the new tariff of 1850, many prohibitive duties were 
removed and duty remained only on 25 goods (which included sugar, 
iron and alcoholic drinks). The import duty on the rest of the 
items was lowered and the export duty on all items of exports was 
altogether removed. This created a tremendous impetus for the 
Russian producers to increase production and to export more at the 
same time, as well as to import the necessary tools and machines 
for factory production. Thus, the new policy of 1850 created the 
opportunity to reorganise Russian industrial production. Machines 
could be imported to equip factories and exports of agricultural 
commodities could earn much needed capital. But after a short 
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period of time it was found necessarr to ):"evisethe .ta,J'iff 
system and so a new policy came into effect in 1857 which 
helped to a considerable extent develop home industries. The 
tariff policy of 1857 singled out, in the first place, some 
foreign firms that were less dangerous competitors to the home 
producers. A low tariff was imposed on the goods of such 
foreign producers. This tariff was principally designed to 
obtain a fixed revenue rather than protecting any home industries 
because the competition with such foreign firms was not stiff. 
But one distinct feature of the tariff policy of 1857 directly 
.h~lped the Russian manufacturers: the moderate tariff on 
imported food, raw materials,instrumentsand machines helped 
the manufacturers to get the supply of both working and fixed 
capitals. The subsequent tariff policies of the second half 
of the 19th century represented to a greater or lesser degree . 
confirmation of the policy of 1857. 
Speranskii, one of the most gifted of all tsarist administrators, 
had suggested, during his tenure of office, measures that would 
have given impetus to the national industries. One such measure 
.. 
was to reformulate the tariff policy in line with the tariff policy 
of 1857. But no proper attention was given to this at the time 
on the grounds that the recommedations were impracticable •. In 
fact, the tariff policy of 1857 was only a partial fulfilment 
of the proposals by Speranskil. 
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CHAPTER THREE CONDITION OF THE GENTRY AND THE SERFS 
(a) Condition of the nobility 
The highest position in the table of ranks of Russian society 
was occupied by the nobility. It was the backbone of Russian 
autocracy. Before the days of Catherine the Great, the nobles 
had had themselves to do military service. But the nobility 
demanded concessions as a reward for their contribution. So. in 
1762 they were exempted from military service and were allowed to 
send their serfs on their behalf. Consequently, a period of 
unrestricted opportunity to enjoy the fruits of the labour of 
others dawned. The nobility were able to lead a life of luxury 
and conspicuous consumption which encouraged further exp10ita-
tion of the serfs in proportion to the growth of consumption. 
Actua11~ of all the landlords, only a minority could be said to have bee • 
. '- greatly privileged. There were large differences in the 
economic power of the landlords resting as it did on the number 
of serf _ souls owned. The following table will indicate the 
extent of the serf~owning strength of the nobility. 
Character of No. of % of all No. of % .of all average no. 
ownership serf- serf- revision revision of revision 
owners owners soulS souls souls 
owned 
without land 3633 4 12045 1 3· 
less than 21 41016 .40 327534 3 8 
souls 
21-100 souls 35498 34 1666073 16 47 
101-150 " 19930 19 3925102 37 197 
501-1000 " 2421 2 1569888 15 648 
over 1000 1382 1 3050540 29 2207 
souls 
(source: Blum. J. -"Lord and fu:!sant in Russia"- page 369) 
As the above table indicates, 1 per cent of all the serf-
owners owned 29% of all the serfs whereas 78 per cent of serf 
owners owned less than 100 souls. The latter category of serf 
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- owners (i.e possessing less than 100 souls) were economically 
hard-up, and possession of less than 100 souls in the condition 
of Russian serfdom could not guarantee much economic advantage 
to the landlords, to say nothing of prosperity. It was quite 
natural, that the serfs in smaller estates had to face more 
onerous conditions of existence than those in larger estates. 
On the one hand, the smaller serfowners had to maintain the 
assumed dignity of the landlord, and,on the other, their 
resources and revenues were too limited to maintain an economic 
position which was compatible with a dignified existence: the 
result was more and more extortion from the peasants and even 
~ 
mortgaging of the peasants, which was of doubtful legality but 
very common in Russia at that time. 
The big landlords, possessing thousands of 'souls' and 
owning vast tracts of land~led lives of such luxurious affluence 
that, by comparison~the tales of ~edieval barons pale into 
insignificance. They included the Sheremetev family, Prince 
Yusupov, B. A. Kanukin and others. Their attitude at different 
points of time is illustrated by some interesting stories about 
the Sheremetev family. The Decembrist N. Turgenev told of a case 
where a serf wanted to buy his freedom for 600,000 rubles and a 
two-storied house (a rarity in a Russian village of that time). 
But Count Sheremetev refused this request. (l) On another occasion 
Count Sheremetev refused an offer of 200,000 silver rubles from 
a peasant for the latter's freedom, but later gave his freedom for 
just a barrel of oysters. The story goes like this: one day 
Count Sheremetev was sitting at breakfast and felt a strong desire 
for oysters. But there were none in the house or anywhere near it. 
By chance the peasant in question arrived with a barrel of oysters 
and offered it as a gesture of goodwill to the master. Sheremetev 
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was so delighted that he liberated the man on the spot and 
invited him to join the table as his guest.(2) On another 
occasion a rich St. Petersburg serf merchant offered the Count 
one million rubles for his freedom. The answer was revealing. 
He said: "keep your money, since for me there is more blessing 
in owning a man like you than in receiving an additional million 
rubles."(3) Such incidents were not exceptional. The mentality 
of the big landlords has been described by one author in the 
following manner: "these ironhearts (the nobles) are proud that 
among their serfs there are millionaires whose hearts and lives 
they can destroy with one word since these unfortunates completely 
depend on the whim'of the lord and his overseers. They are proud 
when they see serfs descend from magnificient carriages, products 
of their own energy, and kneel down until their foreheads touch 
the ground. And for all this, the nobility had to take only the 
trouble to be born." (4) As has been pointed out earlier,' such 
privileges were only the prerogatives of the great landlords; 
the small landlords often lived in straightened circumstances. 
Since the autocratic government was a champio~. of the 
institution of serfdom, it endeavoured in all possible ways to 
help the nobility to preserve their status. To ameliorate the 
condition of the small and medium.sized landlords, they offered 
generous loans. The security for these loans was nothing else but 
the 'souls' themselves. The history of serfdom in Russia is full 
of paradoxes, but nothing is more paradoxical than the idea of 
mortgaging human beings as movable property. The facility of such 
credit was not used by small and medium landlords' alone, even rich 
landlords of the stature of Count Sheremetev and Prince Yusupov 
freely indulged in borrowing on such security. Whereas the 
former stratumt,~of nobility needed loans for their subsistence, 
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the latter used them for the provision of luxury. If we look 
at the extent of borrowing by the nobility from the government 
agencies, from the second decade of the 19th century until the 
time immediately prece"ding the abolition of serfdom, a rise of 
staggering proportions can be seen. The following table gives 
the figures. 
Table Showing the Indebtedness of the Nobility. (5) 
No. of.revision %.of all Amount borrowed from State 
Year souls mortgaged revision credit institutions 
(in millions) souls. (million of rubles) 
1820 1.8 20 110 (assignat) 
1833 4.5 37 950 ( " ) . 
1855 6.6 61 398 (credit rubles) 
1859 7.1 66 425 ( " " ) 
So, by the end of the fifties, the Russian nobility had 
already mortgaged 66% of their valued possessions to the. 
, . 
government credit institutions. This is an estimate only of 
borrowing from the government agencies of credit. How many more 
hundreds of millions were borrowed from different private sources 
is difficult to ascertain. The question that generally arises 
in the minds of impartial observers is how the nobility could 
hope to maintain their extravagance in the face of such a decrease 
in their earning capacities. The usual consequence of non-repayment 
of lvans isronfiscation of the mortgaged property. As the above 
table shows there was not the slightest trace of nobility repay-
ing the loan. On the contrary, with the passage of time the debt 
gradually increased. This borrowing policy would not have been 
uneconomic if the money was invested in increasing production on 
the estates. Then the net return out of these investments would 
have repaid the debt with its interest. But the l~a~s were rarely, 
if ever, employed for economically profitable purposes; most of 
them went towards financing the consumption of the nobility -
39 
in some cases, especially in the case of great landlords, in the 
consumption of the most conspicuous nature. It is interesting 
to note Blum'_' s connnent in this respect: "The usual landlord, 
whether he borrowed from a government institution or from a 
money lender, rarely employed this laon for capital improvements 
on his property. Instead he used it for consumption. The 
improvidence and profligacy of the Russian nobility is familiar 
to every reader of the great Russian novels of the 19th century. 
There is no question that in these faults lay much of the 
explanation for their ever increasing indebtedness. Moreover, 
the lenient policy of the governmental lending agencies 
encouraged excessive borrowings and extravagant spending. These 
institutions granted extent ions and postponements freely and 
they rarely foreclosed, since their raison d t,:tr~ was to save the 
properties of the dvorianstvo and not to take them away. 
Delinquents were allowed to remain in possession, so that loans 
often amounted to outright gifts from the state." (6) 
The nobility knew that the government wanted to perpetuate 
the institution of serfdom and that the government needed the 
nobility to realise this policy. That is why they borrowed 
indiscriminately and the government p~sued the most 'uneconomic' 
loan policy. The government wanted the nobility to stay: "I 
love the gentry, I consider it the first support of the throne," (7) 
Tsar Alexander II said. Similar statements came from all the 
emperors. The nobility was conscious that it was the lifeblood 
of Russian autocracy. ,Such was in brief the economic condition 
and character of the Russian nobility in the 19th century, before 
the days of abolition of serfdom. 
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(b) Condition of the serfs in the 19th century. 
In Russia under serfdom there were three types of serfs that 
need our attention and we shall not be concerned with other types 
in the present study. Firstly, there were the state peasants 
whose ultimate master was the government, and whose obligations 
were due to the state; secondly, there were the peasants of the 
landlords whose obligations were due to the landlords mainly in 
the form of obrok or barshchina. Finally, there was the class 
of house serfs (dvorovye liudi) who had neither land Ror equip-
ment of their own, nor had they any usad'ba. They used to stay 
with their masters and went wherever: the masters went. The 
following is a breakdown of the serf population into different 
categories: (8) 
Types 
Palace, Royal and Imperial family and 
house serfs 
Crown (State) of various designations 
Crown of the mining enterprise 
Peasants assigned to private factories 
Landowners' peasants 
Artisans of the Crown mines 
Number 
(in thousands) 
2,019 
18,308 
386 
518 
20,173 
230 
(source: the Census of 1858 - the 13th revision) 
Of these the state peasants and the landlords' peasants 
were the only important groups of the entire serf population 
in Russia not only because of their number but because of the 
important role they played in the economy. 
Reference has already been made to the different types of 
obligations that the serfs in different regions had to fulfiL: 
and it has also been mentioned that a shift in the framework 
of obligations of the peasants took place in the course of time. 
It is a well-known fact that the landlords, in the non-black 
soil regions always wanted to commute labour services into 
money-rents when the agricultural activities on their estates 
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were not very profitable, which was often the case. By the 
middle of the 19th century obrok had assumed a dominant 
position in the non-black soil region. Since the landlords in 
such ar~as were getting a straight forward money-rent, they 
demanded greater amounts of obrok whenever the actual or 
potential earnings of the peasants increased. These increased 
earnings were mainly fromsecsona·l'work in the new factories. 
There was another means by which the landlord could secure more 
income with the help of the serfs. The landlords were 
proverbially known for theirbve of luxury goods. They had to 
buy these and also necessities in the open market. Some of their 
estates were situated in regions unsuited to agriculture and so 
in time they thoughtof establishing estate industries, the 
products of which could fetch, according to their calculations, 
enough money to guarantee the fulfilment of their desires with 
the help of free serf labour. Here is how Rosovskii summarises 
the situation: "The basic skills for estate manufacturing 
were at the disposal of the nobles, particularly in northern 
Russia. What the nobles did, in effect, was to unite the small 
independent part-time producers of the serfs into centralised 
mtate manufactures. Here they produced items which the peasants 
had produced themselves - wool, linen, leather etc. - somewhat 
more efficiently. The estate factory 'developed gradually. 
Probably startill.gon a seasonal basis to occupy idle winter months, 
it frequently grew into a permanent institution where the serfs 
were quartered and fed but paid no wages and by this time their 
land had been taken away~ (9) Working conditions were very poor 
in these estate factories and the workers feared these factories 
like the 'plague', (10)· In many cases the landlords after some 
time abandoned their interests as manufacturers. The serfs who 
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were being utilised as workers in the estate industries were 
required to pay a money rent to their master either on a 'soul' 
. . 
or a tiaglo basis and were allowed to move away from the estate .(10 
Where the opportunities for employment were adequate, this 
procedure became quite effective. Thus the nobility secured a 
steady money income. 
However, in the black-soil regions where barshchina was pre-
dominant the landlords were always keen to keep their serfs on 
their estates. A barshchina serf was a peasant with two places 
of employment, his own land and that of the master. So, a 
barshchina serf was a serf in the classical sense. 
With rising expectations and without the will and energy to 
modernise their estates, the only way the nobility could increase 
their income to meet their desires was by extortions from the 
peasants. There were however, a handful of landlords who.wmted , 
to introduce newer and more modern methods of agriculture, but 
the structure of the organisation of production was such that it 
tended· to be unresponsive to innovations, i.e to agricultural 
measures which would transform the existing tilling system into 
a many-field system, would introduce agricultural machines and 
improve the quality of livestock. Such innovations were incom-
. . 
patible with the presence of forced labour whose productivity 
was significantly lower than that of hired labour. To illustrate 
this let us consider the statement of a Tambov landlord: "If the 
entire crop is threshed in the autumn, then what will the peasants 
and their wives do in the winter? A threshing machine costs money, 
requires repairing and attachment with horses but the labour of 
the peasant does not cost anything" (12). This assertion is 
symptomatic of the economic bankruptcy of the serf system. 
How then did the landlords attempt to get more work from the 
peasants? Zaionchkovskii gives some examples of 'original' 
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methods of getting more work out of the peasants by the landlords. 
"The forced labour by serfs," writes Zaionchkovskii, "was 
extremely unproductive. The desire of the landlord to increase 
the productiv.:ityof servile labour was accompanied by various kinds 
of mockery and torture of peasants. Thus, according to the data 
of D. Morodovits, same landlords alloting work to peasants put 
on turnpikes on their necks so that they could not lie down on 
the ground. There were circumstances when the landlords, in order 
to force a quick completion of the allotted task in harvesting 
~ 
did not allow the peasants to drink water in spite of tremendous 
heat. For the slightest offence they were subjected to merciless 
flogging." (13) 
Flogging was part of the daily routine in a Russian serf's 
life. The landlord had the right to buy and sell peasants along 
with the land or even without land, like herds of cattle. In 
many cases serfs were bought and sold separately from their 
families and once sold never saw the faces of their families again. 
They were treated like merchandise, were displayed at fairs and 
bazaars, and were included in the list of landlords' property. 
Until 1845, the serfs had no right to own or acquire either movable 
or immovable~operty. They could acquire movable property only 
in the names of their masters. After 1848, they were allowed to 
own property only with the expressed pennission and sanction of .. ' 
the landlord. The landlord had the right to take away a peasant's 
land or make him either a house serf (dvorovyi) or a landless 
serf (mesiachnik). In the latter case the serf was deprived of 
all his means of production and had to subsist on a meagre ration 
(skudnyi payok). Whereas the conversion to mesiachnik was a rare 
phenomenon in the 18th century, in the middle of the 19th century 
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the rapacity of the landlords was such that it became almost 
a regular affair. The landlords by law controlled over almost 
every aspect of the life of the serfs. They enjoyed enormous 
legal privileg ~s and could punish their serfs for anything 
which was deemed by the landlord an offence. The permitted 
punishments were: 
1) 40 strokes with a rod, 15 str:6kes with a stick i 
2) keeping the serf in question imprisoned upto two 
months ,; 
3) sending him to a reformatory to live with corrective 
criminal gangs (as he himself was thought to be a 
criminal) ; 
4) remand a serf up to 6 months ; 
5) sending a peasant to the workhouse for a period upto 
3 months. 
According to the law of 1822, the landlords had the additional right 
to send the peasant to Siberia. (14) So, the landlords enjoyed all 
the power and the privile,ges; of the ancient masterf of slaves. 
What rights, if any, had the serfs? The state never, in 
principle, accepted the view that the landlords had the prerogative 
of punishing the serfs to the point of tyranny. The state assumed 
that serfdom was based on a patriarchal relationship between 
master and serf which precluded serious conflict, let alone class 
antagonism. The ironic outcome of this assumption was that the 
state denied the peasant any right to complain against his master. 
Accord~ng to an old law of 1767, the peasant who tried to bring 
a charge against his landlord was subjected to punishment by 
flogging, and transfer . to a forced labour camp. The criminal 
code of 1845 virtually confirmed this: any serf who lodged a 
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complaint against the landlord was to be punished with 50 strokes 
of the rod. In practice, defending as it did the rights of the 
nobility, the government looked upon any protests of the peasants 
against the landlord as a revolt against the state because in the 
logic of autocracy, the nobility was the respresentative of the 
crown. This enabled the landlords to indulge rreely in extremes 
of ill-treatment of their serfs. Some indulged in forms of 
punishment which went beyond the limits laid down by law. Tying 
a hook to a peasant in such a way that any slight movement would 
make the hook pierce his flesh was one such innovation. In the 
province of Riazan, a landlord tied one of his house-serfs to a 
chain to which a wooden stump weighing 30 pounds was attached: 
she had to remain like that for four weeks and received only 
crusts of bread and water. On another occasion the same landlord 
chained one of his serfs to an iron turnpike and kept him in such 
a position for several weeks. Such devices became more and more 
widespread. There were cases when landlords kept their serfs in 
chains for years like dangerous criminals. In one incident a 
Kherson landlord named Kartsov kept his serf in chains for 4 years. (15) 
In fact, the nobility made their own laws for the treatment of their 
serfs; they knew that the officers of the state and the regional 
police would never question the authority of the landlord. The 
government sometimes made a show of intervening into the excessively 
cruel behaviour of the landlords towards the peasants. There were 
indeed a few instances when the regional police authorities wanted 
to take the offending landlord to task, but they never succeeded 
because even if the offending landlord was convicted by a court of 
law, the punishment was rarely carried out or the "punishment" was 
very mild. 
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The condition of the women serfs was particularly appalling. 
Apart from the kind of atrocities inflicted on the male serfs, 
they were also subjected to sexual assaults. Zaionchkovskii 
quotes one landlord named Sprashinskii, of the province of Kiev, 
who raped most of his serf-girls. In the course of an investiga-
tion it was found that 86 of his serf-girls in the age-group 12-14 
were assaulted by him and two of them died while being raped by 
their master. He even seduced his own'daughters born of serf 
women. In estates owned by Count Kochubei, apart from innumerable 
married women,there were nearly 200 serf-girls who were raped by 
the count. Some of the masters as a matter of course carried out-
the 'right of the first night'. The moral degradation of 19th 
century Russia was as much a result of the persisting institution 
of serfdom as its economic crisis. Historically speaking, the 
economic health of a society and its moral, tone are interrelated. 
A decline in the former has always served to undermine the 
, 
foundations of morality and in such circumstances the animal 
instincts of the more powerful always became dominant. 
As regards the state peasants, their position was,in theory, 
better. They were not subject to the arbitrary behaviour of 
individual landlords. Yet the attitude of the controlling agents, 
from the petty police officials to the uezd administrator and 
provincial government,did not, in fact, differ much from that of 
the landlord. Whereas in the case of landlords' peasants the 
master could do whatever he liked, in the case of state peasants 
the officers of the state exerted their power - a no less oppressive 
power ~ while remaining within the bounds of law. The difference 
was a quantitative rather than of a qualitative nature. By an act 
of 26 December 1837, a special Ministry for Crown property was set 
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up. The task of the Ministry was to take care of the'~ree rural 
people" (free here means people not in servile bondage to a 
person) and for managing the rural economy. The second task was 
to set up a rural administration based on the principle that 
the state peasants were under feudal obligation to the state as 
. . 
their master. At the head of the Ministry was P. D. ~_Kise1ev, 
who later became one of the exponents of the reforms of 1861. 
On the basis of this law, the administration of the state peasants 
was totally reorganised. In every province a directorate of the 
Ministry of Crown Property was established with a staff of officers. 
In every uezd sub-directorates were set up which were subordinate 
_ . (16) . _ 
to the provincial directorates of Crown properties./ In the uezd 
officeE, the regional officers and the landlords occupied the main 
positions. It was an elaborate organisation with innumerable 
officials of various ranks and designations. This huge army of 
officers 'supervised' the state peasants. In spite of the law's 
(1837) emphatic assertion that its purpose was to set up a rational 
administrative framework for the state peasants, the net result 
was that the peasants who used to enjoy some autonomy before, lost 
it altogether after the implementation of the new act. They could 
neither understand the complexity of the new arrangement nor did 
they comprehend the new right of self-rule the law was supposed 
to confer on them. 
The net outcome of this reorganisation can best be gauged by 
a statement in 1842 by the Chief of the Third Section during the 
reign of Nicholas I (Benckendorf). He made the following comments: 
"Now it re~ains to decide whether their conditions have improved 
by instituting a new administration over them~ The peasants 
themselves solved this question. The agitation that took place 
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among them in. the last year in the Olonets, Vittka, Perm, Kazan 
regio.s . 
and Moscow/had two main reasons: oppression and extortions by 
the officers of the Crown property, and the desire of the peasants 
to remain under the authority of the regional police as before, 
who, even if did not care for the good of the peasants, at least 
did not cost the peasants so much, because previously the entire 
uezd sacrificed for one police officer or two or three assessors 
but now scores of officers live at the expense of the peasants."(17) 
, So the condition •. of the state peasantry who were 'free' in the 
interpretation of the government was almost as bad as that of 
the landlords' peasants. 
For perhaps sixty or seventy years the plight of the serfs 
in Russia had caused concern among all sections of the thinking 
public. By the middle of the 19th century the raznochinnecheskaya 
intelligentsia, both radical and liberal, a section of the 
nobility and some members of the bureaucracy thought the system 
of serfdom had outlived its existence. They thought it to be one 
of the gravest diseases of Russian society. The economic back-
wardness of the country as compared with the west, the dissatisfac-
tion prevailing in the country, the excesses of the Third Section 
of His Majesty's Chancellory were attributed to this onenalignant 
growth of Russia's body politic - serfdom. The apparent calm 
during the 'iron rule' of Nicholas I was, even according to many 
government officials, an omen of a future explosion, which could 
be averted only if serfdom was abolished. "Behind the ferment 
caused by the great 'thaw' lurked Russia's basic social problem, 
the question of the future of serfdom, the question of questions _ 
"the greatest of all our misfortunes is serfdom", - a high official 
confided to one of his friends, "All other evils of Russian life -
and they are numerous - are connected with this cancer and would 
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lose much of their gravity by its removal." (18) A con-
temporary author viewing the situation in retrospect goes 
further than this. "In Russia, serfdom was even more than a 
social life. It retarded all development, proved a gold 
mine to bureaucracy and bathed on the superstitious homage 
paid to tradition." (19) Even the Russian conservatives started 
to think in terms of doing away with serfdom as the vestige of 
a bygone era, but their voices failed to affect the undisturbed 
surface of the Nicolaian state power. Herzen once said, "There 
was calm on the surface but turmoil within." Chernyshevskii 
appraising the situation in 1852 said, "Soon there will be a 
revolt in our country, and if it takes place, I will certainly 
participate in it. -.. • I am not afraid of either dirt, or the 
drunken peasants or butclEry". (20) Elsewhere he says, "I do 
not value my life at all for the triumph of my convictions~ 
for the triumph of freedom, equality, fraternity and prosperity, 
liquidation of misery and vices; if only I am convinced, then my 
convictions would be justified and they will triumph, and if I 
am convinced that they will triumph, then I shall even not be 
sorry that I will not live to see them triumph and rule, and it 
will be a sweet death if it occurs because of that conviction."(21) 
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CHAPTER FOUR ABOLITION OF SERFDOM AND ITS CAUSES 
One of the first signs of a crack in the apparently stable 
rule· of Nicholas I was revealed during the Crimean war. The 
outcome of this war is well-known. It was an important pointer 
to the critical state of the Russian economic and social 
structure. The war served to explode the myth of Nicolaian 
military might, showed up the paralysis of imperial government 
and brought added misery to the wider masses of the population. 
But historians are not unanimous about the extent to which Russia 
suffered a decisive military defeat. The defeat of Sevastopol 
was offset by the victory at Kars and, in any case, the regime 
was not seriously threatened, in its existence. (1) The allies 
did never intend it to be seriously endangered and they would 
probably have done everything to help it to survive in order to 
preserve politcal reaction in Europe, even while Drcing Alexander 
II to sign the humiliating treaty of Paris. But the regime was 
undoubtedly discredited. "The political and economic structure 
was deeply infected with corruption, ranging from paymasters who 
pocketed every unit's payroll to contractors who made huge 
profits from selling shoddy materials or rotted food to the armed 
forces. At the root of all the weaknesses and abuses was the 
supreme evil of serfdom." (2) Even if Nocholas I did not take his 
own life in disgrace (as the rumour went), the reason of his 
premature demise should be sought in the breakdown of his rule 
against the background of a pointless and futile war. While not 
being seriously threatened, the regime showed no sense of security 
either and Alexander II, in his speech to the Moscow gentry on 
. . 
30th March, 1865, hinted ~:l: it speo ifioally. 
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As the war progressed, the transport system, including the 
railways, snowed terrible weaknesses. Urgent reinforcements 
needed a swift despatch of men and materials to the front. 
The notion of Kankrin that the development of railways in 
Russia would bring more misfortunes than virtues - a notion 
which Nocholas willingly or unwillingly fostered - brought 
disasters. Along with this, the institution of serfdom and the 
peculiar nature of recruitment in the army which enabled the 
gentry arbitrarily to send substitu~s for war service resulted 
in a drastic reduction of fighting capacity. The unwilling 
army of serfs had little to choose between a miserable village 
existence at the mercy of their masters and death in a war for 
a cause unknown to them. Moreover, the army of Nicholas I had 
to fight with that of the industrially emergent countries of 
Europe. Their armies were technically better equipped, well-
trained, and were composed of men who accepted military service 
as a career, professional soldiers, and not an unwilling mass 
of.illiterate semi-slaves with weapons from a past century 
in their hands. The outcome on the field was a foregone con-
clusion and it broughta tragic end to the military dreams of· 
Nicholas, the 'Gendarme of Europe' who successfully waged war 
against European revolutions but who could not withstand the 
onslaught of a more efficient economic order. The defeat and 
the peace terms were thus an indication of the feebleness of 
a regime,dependent on an old servile system. It was in fact 
a defeat of the prevailing economic order in Russia. So, 
"in the minds of the emperor and the hig1erbureaucracy, the 
course of the war and its outcome left the feeling that once 
more the country had been allowed to lag far too behind the 
advanced nations of the west, that some degree of modernisation 
of the economy was indispensable for regaining a strong military 
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position. It seemed clear at the same time that some change 
in the peasant status, must be assigned a very high, perhaps 
the highest priority on any list of requisite reforms." (3) 
According to another author, "it was the interest of the 
government and the governing class alike to bring into being 
new productive forces and serfdom undoubtedly impeded the 
task." (4) The war not only brougltmilitary and economic 
defeat in Russia but it was also a great political blow. The 
Russian autocratic political structure became an object of 
ridicule both inside and outside Russia. (5) The war also 
brought about a_serious crisis in the financial position of the 
government. The fight on the eastern front and the Sevastopol 
campaign alone cost the government 538 million rubles and the 
usual budget in 1857 after the war showed a deficit of 38.4 
million rubles (revenue - 309.4 million rubles and expenditure -
347 million rubles). Budget deficit was a chronic affair with 
the tsarist government. A budget deficit is not by itself an 
oppressive economic factor. Whereas the revenue was 209.8 
million rubles in 1847, the same became (as shown above) 309.4 
million rubles in 1857. The most~significant portion of this 
increase was assessed on the peasants. 70% of the total amount 
of direct taxes came from the peasants in the form of taxes and poll-
tax. _ In addition to these, they had to pay their own share 
of the indirect taxes which comprised 44% of the total revenue. 
Moreover, the government resorted to an increase in its spending 
ability by taking measures that inevitably led to an inflationery 
situation in the country. According to an estimate by P. 
Liashchenko, during the period of 1852 to-186l, 837 million 
rubles were spent by the government through emergency budgets and 
this money came from the following sources: public debt of 
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different categories - 434 million rubles, and issue of new 
paper currency - 403 million rubles. (6) 
The war not only brought about a financial crisis of a 
serious nature~ but also an overall economic crisis. This was 
not caused by the Crimean war alone. Just after the war there 
was a general economic crisis in the whole of Europe. The crisis 
in Russia was therefore also a reflection of an all-European 
economic crisis. The industry was particularly hit by this 
crisis. More will be said about this elsewhere.(7) 
There were other factors at this time that served to undermine 
the structure of the Russian state, namely a new wave of peasants' 
revolts. This was not of course a new phenomenon in the history 
of Russian serfdom. The stories of Razin and Pugachev had the 
power of myths and legends among the people. In the 19th century, 
the number of peasant revolts rose with every decade. These 
revolts owed much to the growing expectation among the peasants 
of their emancipation from serfdom. This led to their outright 
refusal in many cases to perform. the barshchina or to pay': obrok. 
In such cases, the landlords redoubled their oppressive measures, 
which in turn led to a refusal to perform. obligations, and indeed 
to mass risings by peasants .against the authority of the landlords. 
As has been said earlier, the peasants had no legal right to com-
plain against the landlords and the only way to escape from or 
resist oppression was to rise against their masters and the whole 
order which enslaved them. The following table illustrates the 
increase in the number of peasant uprisings from the beginning of 
the 19th century till 1861, the year of the abolition of serfdom. (11) 
Year 
1801-1810 
1811-1820 
1821-1830 
1831-1840 
1841-1850 
1851-1861 
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Number of disturbances (single or prolonged) 
83 (6% of the total) 
124 (8% of the total) 
156 (11% of the total) 
143 (10% of the total) 
351 (24% of the total) 
591 (41% of the total) 
Total - 1448 (100%) 
(I. Ignatovich - Krestianskie volneniya pervoi chetverti 19 veka 
vopr osy istorii - 1950 No.9, p.49) 
In spite of the inadequacies of the method of collection of 
dat4~, the above table is sufficiently revealing of the general 
trend of the peasant mood. Even as early as 1839, the Chief 
of the gendarmes, Benkendorff, had to convey to Tsar Nicholas I 
that, "it is necessary to start somehow and it is better to start 
gradually and oa~tiouslyrather than wait until things should be 
set in motion from below, that is from the people" (8). Benkendorff 
was obviously referring to the need of the abolition of serfdom in 
Russia. After this statement he concluded with a comment that, 
~he condition of the peasantry is a powder magazine (porokhovoi 
pogreb) under the state." (9) 
A special feature of the revolts was that they were most 
severe in the ,central districts and in the Urals, that is, where 
serfdom was at its harshest, where state peasants were virtually 
engaged in forced laboUr. The nature of the revolts varied from 
passive and active resistance to open revolts. Sometimes and 
in some estates the uprisings continued for some years, in other 
cases disturbances recurred in isolated estates. But once a 
disturbance started in one spot, it tended to spread to other 
places till SUbstantial parts of rural Russia became engulfed 
in open confrontation between the peasants and the tsarist 
agencies of coercion which invariably defended the land-owning 
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dvorianstvo. In the words of one author, "from the day when 
the servile system was still in the making, fire had smouldered 
in the Russian village, and several times a hurricane of fire 
had raged through the country, never sweeping the manors clean 
but never quite extinguished." (10) 
Though the position was severe in the central regions and in 
the Urals, the south was not immune from revolts either. The 
number of disturbances was considerably lower here but, 
characteristically, it was on the increase, too. Thus, whereas 
in the west of the Ukraine there was only one disturbance 
between 1823 and 1829, there were 12 incidents between 1830 to 
1840. In the steppe region of the Ukraine, where serfdom became 
established in the thirties of the 19th century, the number of 
peasant uprisings increased with every decade. The uprisings, 
as a rule, and in all regions, had massive support among the 
local peasantry, but where massive action was.impossible, peasants 
resorted to individual terror. According to the data of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, covering a period of 16 years from 
1836 to 1851, there were 139 cases of assassination of landlords 
in their own estates and 70 attempted assassinations. According to 
the same source, 59 attempts were made on the lives of the 
landlords between 1852 and 1859, but the exact figure of death 
is not known. (12) 
Disturbances and terroristic activities became so widespread 
that the word 'revolt' (bunt) became the subject of everyday 
conversation among the panic-stricken landlords. Sometimes, at 
the first sign of insubordination, even the district and local 
police officers hid in their apartments. The landlords became 
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so frightened that they started to see revolts among peasants 
when actually they were voicing their misery in a most non-
violent way. As a result endless complaints flowed from the 
masters to the Third Section and the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. The following examples will show the extent of the 
fear among the landlords and the humiliation suffered by the 
peasants in this connection. A prosperous landlord, 
F. F. Myshetskii complained that his peasants were refusing to 
pay obrok "under the influence of a false understanding about 
freedom and proclaiming themselves free". (13) When the local 
officer enquired, it was found that the peasants only requested 
him to grant delay of the payment of 10 rubles which was in 
arrear of obrok payment. In another instance a landlord named 
Popov demanded that, since his peasants showed signs of agitation, 
immediate measures should be taken to repress them. Actually, 
they silently declined to obey their master's order to cut woods 
in a neighbour's forest. Inanother case a landlord named 
M. E. Chekobinskii made two petitions - one to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and the other to the Third Section: his complaint 
was that his peasants delayed the payment of obrok because they 
expected immediate freedom from the Tsar. An enquiry showed that 
the peasants simply were so poor that they had no means of any 
kind to pay. (14) 
There is some difference of opinion about the causes of 
peasant uprisings. One contention was that in most cases revolts 
or uprisings were manifestations of protest again~the oppressive 
working conditions, rather than rebellion.against serfdom itself. 
Robinson presents this position in the following way: "as far as 
the very incomplete and one-sided records show, active insubordina-
tion most often was a protest against the economic conditions of 
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servile life and less frequently was an attempt by one measure 
or another a complete escape from the system of serfdom.(15) 
But according to the findings of an official investigation of 
the causes of revolts, out of 423 cases, 210 "incidents took 
place because of rumours about the peasants' expected freedom, 
i.e, they are directly related to the institution of serfdom. 
Hard conditions of barshchina accounted for revolts in 95 
estates; the figure for the hard conditions of obrok was 26. 
There were 9 cases of revolts against the oppressive forms of 
collection of arrears, 30 cases for famine conditions and 
absence of any sort of relief measures, 17 cases for forcing 
. . 
the peasants to resettle in other regions and, finally, 13 
cases for the reduction of land allotment to the peasants by 
the landlords.(16) 
Apart from uprisings of peasants en masse and individual 
terror there was another way by which the serfs expressed 
their discontent: they fled from the estates or from the regions 
where they lived. The number of such cases grew particularly 
in the eighteen fifties. This passive protest took a heavy toll 
of peasant lives. They had to walk hundreds of miles in extreme 
weather conditions in fear of being caught, and suffering from 
diseases. One of the notable cases was the flight of nearly 
ten tthousand peasants from Vitebsk. In spite of the scarcity 
of reliable information, there is no doubt that the flights 
sometimes involved whole villages or even groups of villages. 
In 1854 such flights affected ten guberniias, seven in 1855 
and seven in 1857. In 1856 there were nine thousand runaways from 
the guberniia of Ekaterinislav alone. (17) 
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All these manifestations of discontent could not have been 
by themselves instrumental in ushering an em of reform, with 
abolition of serfdom as the most prominent measure, had not 
other equally important factors caused the actions of the 
'Tsar Liberator'. Peasant discontent existed since the 17th 
century, assuming at times the proportions of Russian style 
~jaequeries'. Yet, as has been mentioned earlier, little was 
done to improve the condition of the serfs; if anything, the 
enserfment and oppression of the peasants was growing in propor-
tion to, and as a safeguard of, the growing privileges of 
the land-owning nobility. The situation in the fifties of the 
19th century raised new problems and called for a new solution. (18) 
The Crisis in Industry 
The institution of serfdom, as has been mentioned earlier, 
hindered the industrialisation of Russia, in line with the 
countries of Western Europe. Storch, the economist and tutor of 
Tsar Nicholas I, observed as early as 1815 that the principal 
cause of Russia's inability to develop modern industries lay in 
serfdom. He declared that, "the superiority of free labour over 
serf-labour is even more apparent in industry than in agriculture." 
(19) But at the time no particular importance was attached to such 
declarations. The entrepreneurship in Russian industries was 
rather unconventional. Apart from the merchant capitalists, who 
depended mainly on hired workers and assigned peasants, there 
were two other groups who promoted the industrial growth of the 
country, usually the serf-owner-entrepreneurs and the peasant-se~ 
entrepreneurs. As for the merchant capitalists, after surmounting 
the initial difficulties in the last half of the 18th century, 
they made considerable headway throughout the 19th century in the 
industrial sphere. With the extensive use of power in the 
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manufacture and importation of more modern machines, this 
particular group of entrepreneurs tried to model their production 
on the real capitalist pattern. The increase of free labour, by 
comparison with the forced labour in the entire working force 
of the industry, became an advantage to such entrepreneurs.' At 
the same time, the governmental fiscal policy, in whatever 
direction it was aimed, served ult~ru~~e~yas an incentive to such 
entrepreneurs. Their production apparatus was set up in such a 
fashion that it could be readjusted to the fluctuations of prices 
and demands of the market. The wages and other conditions of 
work were more favourable than comparable manufacturing establish-
ments under different types of entrepreunership. As a consequence, 
the productivity was higher here and the cost per unit of output 
was lower. The superiority of this kind of entrepreunership' 
became more evident by the middle of the 19th century even in 
the eyes of the government. But, this, as a single factor, was 
too inadequate to alleviate or eradicate the intensive proletarian-
isation of the urban masses, because growth of production on 
capitalist lines would have welcomed 
population, which in turn would have 
the surplus mass of rural 
. the 
leq' tq/proletarianisation 
of the masses. As one author has said, "the government was eager 
to lay the ghost of peasant rebellions, it was unwilling to 
conjure up the menace of urban revolutions." (20) 
Whereas the merchant capitalists were really advancing towards 
acquiring the character of a bourgeoisie on Russian soil, the 
other two types of entrepreneurship, i.e serf-owner-entrepreneurs 
and the peasant-serf-entrepreneurs, were involved in a serious 
crisis. In the first case, it was a crisis involving the economy 
in production, in the second it was a crisis concerning owner-worker 
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relationship. In the case of serf-owner-entrepreuners, the 
enterprises were mainly of two types, (a) the ancestral 
(votchinnyi) and (b) possessional (possessionyi). In the case 
of ancestral manufacturing establishments, the practice was for 
the serfs to work for their own subsistence in their own 
allotments of land, and when their agricultural pursuits for the 
year were over, they were obliged to work in the factories of 
their masters. Thus, the owners of such factories simply reaped 
the 'surplus' product from the labour of their serfs and in 
these circumstances there was no labour cost. Hence, from the 
economic standpoint,the production for market in such enterprises 
was advantageous to the owners, as it had no need to adjust its 
production to the trend of prices, nor had it any need to 
introduce cost reducing measures in the face of falling demand. 
But there was one snag in the set-up: the productivity of labour 
in such enterprises was deplorably low, and for reasons mentioned 
earlier, the entrepreneurs were never keen on innovations as 
they had at their disposal abundant free human labour. At a time 
when internal competition for market was becoming stiffer, 
inefficient utilisation of resources for the purpose of production 
was a serious disadvantage for ancestral factory establishments. 
Th~ net result was that the product of such establishments had more 
difficulty to be absorbed in the market mechanism since it lagged 
behind the products of capitalist manufacturers, as far as quality 
was concerned. The only way by which the deficiency in the quality 
of the product could be compensated was through increase in 
quantity and selling cheaper, and this could only be achieved 
through more extortions of workers and hence more unfavourable 
conditions of work, leading to more inefficiency. Thus a vicious 
circle ensued. (21) 
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In the second category of establishments, viz. in 
possessional factories, the practice was for the owner to buy 
the workers and then to utilise their labour for production. 
Initially this system paid off because, firstly, these workers 
became, within a relatively short span of time, skilled 
workers who knew their jobs; and secondly they were not simply 
utilised for producing the 'surplus' product, as in the case of 
ancestral factories, and they did not have to pursue two 
different occupations in the same or in two different locations. 
That is, work in the factories was a full-time occupatioQ of 
. . 
the workers(in such factorie~ and they earned their subsistence 
from such work and not from agricultural pursuits. The result 
was more productivity per unit of labour and greater efficiency. 
But this initial advantage could not be enjoyed by the owners 
of the possessional factories for long. In the 19th century, 
especially towards the middle of the century, a severe bottle-
neck was created in the sphere of production. As these establish-
ments had to 'own' the workers and not to hire them, the problem 
of adjustments of production in the face of changing demands 
became difficult. When a shrinkage of production was necessary, 
the huge cost of maintaining the fixed assets (which included 
the workers too) in working condition became an extremely 
burdensome liability to the owners. In the competition for 
market, these establishments faired very badly against establish-
ments run on capitalist lines, where the owners could hire and 
. 
fire hands according to the needs of production. The possessional 
factory owners like the ancestral ones could not afford or did 
not want to introduce innovations in the factories because it is 
one of the first principles of economics that, in order to make 
innovations play a due part, the condition of the mobility of 
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labour must be fulfilled. The question of the mobility of labour 
could not even be raised in either of these types of factories 
so long as the institution of serfdom existed. In the middle· 
of the 19th century, with the increase in the tempo of capitalist 
production on the one hand and the defect inherent in the system 
of ancestral and possessiona1 factories on the other, a crisis 
in the whole sphere of manufacture gathered momentum. One point 
should b~ mentioned in this connection: even in the midst of 
this crisis, the ancestral factories enjoyed more advantage than 
the other because the purpose of their production was simply to 
get as much 'surplus product' as possible; and this was more 
economically feasible in the conditions prevailing in the ancestral 
establishments than in the possessiona1 ones. 
In the case of peasant-serf-entrepreneurs, the enterprises 
were run by the peasants in the name of their masters, and they 
hired freely their fellow serfs as workers, who were generally 
under obrok obligations. This unusual nature of production 
relations has led one author to connnent: "paradoxes abound in 
things Russian, at least to western ways of thinking, but surely 
few have been stranger than this phenomenon of the peasant 
industrialist - above all when the peasant was a serf owned by 
another man. Serf factory owners not only hired other serfs to 
work for them but also employed freemen, sometimes to do menial 
tasks, and a few among them were even millionaires."(22) Another 
author in a few lines has summarised the genesis of the successful 
serf-enterpreneur in the following way: "Russia had her rags to 
riches stories during the early 19th. century,.f6r it .was not 
impossible for a few millionaire industrialists of the time to 
trace their origins in the lumpenproletariats of St. Peterburg 
or Moscow. There were more millionairs among the peasants '. 
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however, by the end of the reign of Alexander I. Here again, 
as with the middle class, a prior accumulation of capital in 
trade might be diverted by a wealthy serf into industrial 
enterprises. In many cases, however,the serf millionaires of 
the pre-reform era began their career, pounding the road, with 
no other assets than a knapsack filled with their wares, a 
few kopecks, and a furlough from their master granting them 
permission to leave the village to trade." (23) 
Two of the most well-known serf-entrepreneurs were Grachev 
and Garelin - the calico manufacturers in the village of Ivanovo, 
in the province of Vladimir. Their master was none other than 
Count Sheremetev, who, as has been mentioned before, was famous 
for his . refusal to grant freedom to his serfs at any price. But 
these two calico manufacturers became so prosperous that they 
could persuade even a Sheremetev to grant them the freedom they 
sought. Having been set free, they went as far as to oppose 
effectively the prevalence of kustar industries in Northern Russia 
as a potential competitor of their products. They also became 
ill-famed for their harsh attitude to their workers - one time 
their fellow serfs. Another important serf-entrepreneur was 
Morozov - the cotton textile manufacturer. From a small beginn-
ing in 1801, his family acquired by 1852-53, 9 steam engines, 
456 nandlooms, 74 mechanical looms. It employed 2572 workers and 
the annual production was worth 1,943,000 rubles. This did not 
include their putting out affiliations.(24) There were the 
Kondrat'ev brothers, silk manufacturers of Moscow, Ushkov, the 
founder of the first large chromate plant in Russia, and Nikita 
Demidov, the founder of the great Demidov industries in the Urals. 
In the middle of the 19th century when firms of serfs had already 
reached a definite stage of prosperity and were contributing a 
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fair share towards the gross national product of the country, 
employing thousands of men, the whole set-up that made them 
the 'property' of other people and their owners, the ultimate 
owners of these enterprises became an anachronism and a 
hindrance in the pursuit of a policy of optimum growth of the 
firms. This difficulty could be resolved only in those cases 
where enough money could buy the peasant-owner's freedom. But 
this was not always possible. In the case of Morozo~mentioned 
above, the owner adopted a peculiar attitude towards the freedom 
of the members of his family. In 1823 Ryumin, the master, 
accepted 17,000 rubles for the freedom of Morozov himself, his 
wife and four of his five sons. He did not give freedom to 
the fifth son, because he thought that, as Morozov was on the way 
to greater prosperity, he could get a much larger sum for his 
fifth son later. This is just one of the many anomalies brought 
about by the existence of serfdom. 
Apart from such anomalies indicative of the crisis which the 
- -
serf-owning society had experienced and which called for sweeping 
changes, another turning point in industry was reached in the 
second half of the nineteen fifties. There was an international 
trade crisis in the fifties (though the concept of trade cycle 
. . 
or business cycle was not used in contemporary economic literature) 
and Russia did not escape its impact •. According to S. G.Strumilin, 
~ "o'!linous harbingers of crisis (in Russia) could be found as far 
back as 1852, and its effects did not disappear completely in some 
branches of industry until 1860". (25) The years 1857, 58 and 59, 
were particularly critical, though in economic history the crisis 
is known as the crisis of 1857. One government official, V. Tatarin, 
wrote at the beginning of 1858, "due in part to the general 
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depressed condition of European trade, and in part to an over-
rapid pace of activity during the preceding two years, a 
stagnation of sales has been experienced." (26) The stagnation 
became so deep-rooted in 1858 and 1859 that even the soundest 
industrial enterprises could not escape its effects. The sales 
of the Nizhni-Novgorod fair, which was a good indicator of the 
business activities of the country, dropped rapidly to rock 
bottom level, and did not recover until 1861. The general nature 
of the early stages of the 1857 crisis cannot be discerned 
because of the disruptions caused by the Crimean war. It was 
felt more deeply in Russia than in other European countries 
because of the post-war economic dislocation. It is difficult 
to ascertain precisely how far this industrial crisis affected 
Russian society as a whole, but there is no doubt that it served, 
along with other forces, to deepen the crisis of feudalism in 
Russia. (27) 
Attitude of the Gentry towards Abolition 
We must now investigate how far, the gentry as a class was 
willing to part with their serf-owning right and in which manner 
they were contemplating this sacrifice. The theory that, because 
of excessive indebtedness, the landlords were thinking in terms 
of an abolition of serfdom in a manner which would relieve them 
of this burden is not correct because their excessive borrowing 
was a measure of their presumed right to 'own' souls and of the 
state's support of this presumption. Since the state considered 
financial advances to the gentry to be 'bad debts' for a good 
cause, there cannot be any doubt that the nobility as a class 
never thought of redeeming its debt at the expense of giving 
away the privileges of masters. There were,however, certain 
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other factors that prompted the nobility to think in tenns 
of abolition of serfdom in a manner advantageous to them. 
Firstly, the effects of demographic movement have to be con-
sidered. There was a continued increase in the relative 
density of population in the agricultural sector. This 
necessitated a more intensive cultivation of the soil, since 
there was no means to increase the average productivity of 
servile labour. Thus, many landlords came to believe that 
servile labour was disadvantageous to them. They entertained 
the idea that the productivity of hired workers was higher than 
that of the serfs. 
The landlords were facing yet another problem: despite the 
miserable living conditions,the serf population was increasing 
quite rapidly, and so was the cost of their maintenance. Con-
sequently, the surplus labour was becoming less productive. 
This feature became particularly pronounced in years of bad 
harvests. Secondly, the increase in the price of land,coupled , 
with the growth of population in some parts of the black-soil 
area, mainly in Tula and to some extent in Orel, Kursk, Riazan, 
Tambov and Voronezh,created the circumstances that made the 
servile system disadvantageous to the landlords. (28) This 
disadvantage was once again found in the low productivity of 
servile labour and the high cost of maintenance in the days 
of bad harvest. The situation repeated itself with statistical 
regularity. During the fifties,Samarin, Cherkasskii and 
Koshelev cited a number of cases within their respective guberniias 
where the price for uninhabited lands was more than for the 
inhabit~~ _ ones. This was due to the simple fact that the 
owner of the uninhabit~d lands could get greater return by 
the application of hired labour. At its limit, it shows that 
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serfdom had lost its economic importance for the landlords in 
possession of such lands. (29) In 1858, at the time of the 
election of the gentry committee of Tambov, the landlords con-
veyed their well-thought out intentions of liberating the 
peasants entirely, provided they (the peasants) had no allot-
ments, because, in the opinion of the landlords, this would 
have provided them with enough natural resources which con-
sisted mainly of land. As is well-known, the landlords of 
the black-soil regions regarded the right to the land more 
valuable than the right over persons: the land.was the most 
precious commodity. In the changed social and economic con-
ditions in these regions the value of the land to the masters 
was the only important thing and the number of souls one 
possessed lost its significance as a measure of one's power. 
That this production relation was acting as a fetter to 
economic development in the rural sector and that it was prevent-
ing them from obtaining maximal return from the land was quite 
apparent to many of the landlords. So, the main question that 
the landlords of these zones considered was the amount of land 
that they would have to part with if serfdom were abolished. 
Though they would have preferred the abolition of serfdom with-
out land grants to the peasants, they realised that a land 
r 
allotment to the peasants would to some extent tie them to the 
region and, in the absence of an abundant supply of free labour, 
these peasants would be invaluable as hired labourers. Also they 
recognised that if the government decided to free the peasants, 
it would feel obliged to grant them some allotment. 
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In the south-western region, particularly in Kiev and 
Podol, the value of the land was higher because of the 
intensive sugar beet culture. This particular situation 
made it more advantageous to employ salaried workers than to 
own serfs. The landlords in these regions were totally against 
parting with any of their valuable land, but they were not at 
all against setting their peasants free. The same situation 
prevailed in most places in the Ukraine, especially where 
peasant households did not have any permanent allotment. 
The picture was quite different in the 'non-b1ack-soi1' 
areas where the landl~rds valued their peasants more than their 
lands as a source of revenue. So, whenever the idea of 
emancipation arose, the question of redemption of persons was 
uppermost in their minds. It is interesting to note that in 
spite of the bad quality of land in Vladimir, Kostroma, Yaroslav, 
Tver, Smolensk, Kaluga and some parts of Riazan, in the years 
before the reform, the price of estates rose more than in the 
black-soil.regions. According to an estimate by Koshelev, the 
price of an estate was 100 rubles per soul in the black-soil 
region immediately before the reform and 125 rubles in the non-
black-soil region.(30} According to the data compiled by Ia.A. 
Solov'ev for the government of Smolensk in 1855 the average price 
.. ... , . 
of inhabited estates (domains peup1es) had risen to 117 rubles 
per 'soul' whereas the price of land was only 5.5 rubles per 
dessyatina.(3l) 
Whereas in the regions of black-soil there was little 
difference between the prices of uninhabited and inhabited lands -
in Orel - 12%, Tula - 11%, Riazan - l2~ Voronezh - 6%,and Kursk-
5%; in the non-black-soil regions the differences were remarkably 
large - in Tver - 29%, Yaroslav - 48%, Kostroma - 52%,Nizhni-
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Novgorod - 35%, Vladimir - 43%, Moscow - 29%, and Smolensk - 26%.(31) 
Another in terestingfact is that during the ten years preceding the 
abolition of serfdom, the average price of a serf was 50.4 rubles 
in the non-black-soil but only 20.4 rubles in the black-soil 
areas. (32) 
It follows, therefore, that the abolition of serfdom would 
have deprived the landlords in the non-black-soil regions of 
a large portion of their incomes. The landlords in this region 
did not want abolition without land allotment to the peasants. 
They foresaw that if this happened, their peasants would leave 
the fields and in most cases seek work elsewhere, leaving the 
landlords with no peasants to work their fields. Thus their 
desire to offer reasonable allotment to the peasants was to 
guarantee 'working hands'. Also to organise the estates in the 
non-black-soil areas on capitalist lines, as some landlords con-
templated of doing, needed capital. So, they hoped to obtain 
liquid funds in exchange for their loss of obrok revenue, and it 
was imperative that this liquid fund was obtained as soon as the 
reform was completed. Most of the powerful landlords, therefore, 
- -
desired 'proper' redemption of persons to accompany emancipation. 
How economic interests predominated in the consideration of 
the reform is evidenced again in the case of the landlords in 
the Steppe region. Here there were vast expanses of in part 
fertile land. The population was thin in relation to the 
availability of arable soil. The landlords therefore, in spite 
of the high fertility of the soil,did not consider liberating the 
peasants without land allotments. They wanted working hands; and 
a landless abolition would have prevented them from utilising> 
their land. Though it was possible that after the abolition there 
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would be an influx of free peasants from other more densely 
populated parts of the country, the landlords of the Steppes 
were not prepared to take any risk. Moreover, in these regions 
the obligations were mostly in barshchina; so the landlords 
had neither the implements nor the know-how to work the land. 
They were quite ready to part with a portion of their fertile 
lands in order to keep their peasants tied to the region. 
With similarly fertile soil but a denser population, the land-
lords of the black-soil region held the_ opposite opinion, ron-
sidering reform without land preferable. 
All the different categories of landlords considered the 
question of the abolition of serfdom with unmistakeable 
reference to a maximum economic advantage. And it is evident 
that the conditions most advantageous to one group were least 
advantageous to another. These conflicts of interests among 
the landlords and the government's desire to satisfy all the 
groups as much as possible led to a decree which satisfied none. 
Attitude of the Intelligentsia to Reform 
It is interesting to note at this point the trend of liberal 
opinion on the question of the abolition of serfdom. In 1855, 
a year before Alexander II's speech to the Moscow gentry, 
K. D. Kavelin circulated a memoir proposing emancipation of the 
peasants according to a compromise formula which, in his opinion, 
would have satisfied both the landlords and the peasants. Later 
the 'Slavophil' - A. I. Koshelev, published a proposal advocating 
in more detail a . radical reform for the peasants, but his 
proposals lost their radical appearance when his plsn for 
redemption was found to be the same as that of Kavelin, that is, 
the redemption of both persons and land. These memoirs and 
proposals were circulated for one purpose - to influence the landed 
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gentry. Kavelin, Koshelev and others of their persuasion 
were convinced that the gentry would benefit from the 
abolition of serfdom and their statements dwelt at length on 
the positive benefits that would accrue to the gentry should 
abolition take effect. (33) 
The written evidence from the liberals not only supports 
arguments in favour of abolition but also attacks the 
bureaucracy. In their view, the defeat in the Crimean war 
had undermined the credibility of bureaucractic absolutism. 
One author stated, "the key to the necessary changes, it was 
generally recognised, lay in the reform of the bureaucractic 
administration which in its recent great expansion had become 
the bete noire of all articulate Russians." (34) Valuev's 
characterisation of the evils of a bureaucratically run state 
is a reflection of the general liberal view of the contemporary 
bureaucracy: "universal absence of credibility, mistrust by 
... 
the government of its own instruments, and disregard for every-
thing else. The multiplicity of forms smothers the essence of 
administrative activity and assures universal official false-
hood. On the surface - lustre, beneath - decay." (Sverkhu 
blesk, snizu gnil~ (35) 
"In spite of such a scathing criticism of the general 
social conditions and of the bureaucracy in particular, and 
in spite of their awareness of the sorry position of the 
peasantry, the proponents of liberal reform as will be shown in 
a subsequent chapter, never dreamt of any real change in the 
structure of the society of which these conditions were a necessary 
by-product. The articles of K. D. Kavelin and Boris Chicherin, 
at first circulated in manuscript form (36 ) and later published 
in Herzen's "Voices from Russia", proposed only mild reforms. A 
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reform scheme in which serfdom is abolished but the autocratic 
state retained was not a democratic reform scheme at all, but 
it is just this kind of ambiguity which is characteristic of 
Chicherin's attitude. Chicherin's later seven point plan for 
liberal reform was a closer approximation to the different 
freedoms as conceived in western liberal democracies at that 
time. But in all his expressions of liberal opinion there was 
no suggestion of curbing the autocratic power of the sovereign. 
It is difficult to understand how Chicherin couldronceive the 
freedoms enshrined in his seven-point proposal while ignoring 
the political context in a bourgeois democracy. Russian liberal 
opinion, however. no·' less than Slavophil opinion - never doubted 
the validity of autocracy. The liberals attacked the bureaucracy 
because it was allegedly the only obstacle in effecting a harmonious 
unity between the tsar and the people. Unlike the Slavophils, 
the Russian liberals were inspired by western political ideas, but 
lacked comprehension of the basis of these ideas in a-democratic 
form of government. Consequently, the various liberal proposals 
were utopian, unrelated to the real condition of Russian society. 
Public opinion in support of freeing the peasants was 
increasing. The liberals, the liberal bureaucrats, a cross-section 
of the nobility and the radical intelligentsia were united in 
thinking that abolition was necessary, though each judged the 
necessity from its point of view or group or class interest. Amo~gst 
these groups,the most critical of the government were the 
raznochintsi. They represented the opposition at its extreme. They 
protested not only against the economic serfdom of the peasants 
but also again~the intelligentsia's moral responsibility for it. 
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This raznochinnecheskaia intelligentsia became an increasingly 
important radical force in Russian society. The development 
of industry, the crisis of serfdom, the extension of the services 
of the state, the progress of education (starting from the 
Nicolaian era) - all these helped to increase the number and 
the moral fervour of this section of the intelligentsia. Here 
is how Herzen characterises these people: "Renegades of all 
" classes, these new people,these moral raznochintsi do not denote 
. . 
a class but a stratum, comprising primarily teachers, men of 
letters, literary hacks, non-dilettantes; but also students who 
had or had not completed their courses, employees of universities 
. . 
and seminaries, small landlords, disaffected children of high 
ranking government servants, officers fresh from the military 
academy and so on." (37) These people asserted new social values. 
They.rejected aristocratic prejudice. They proclaimed new 
principles in aesthetics and politics. The only thing they con-
sidered to be noble was work. (38)· Often, they were condemned to 
live in misery and destitution, uncertain of the future. Reject-
ing as they did the existing order, they could not serve within 
. . 
it except at the price of betraying their convictions. Instead, 
th~y became disinherited professional' ideologues of the p~oples' 
cause. Even so, they powerfully influenced pUblic opinion. The 
relative relaxation of censorship du;ing the first years of 
Alexander II's reign enabled them to articulate their view~, 
however indirectly, in the pages of the more progressive journals 
(Sovremennik and Russkoe slovo). Even though this activity in 
the open was short-lived, the radical ideas became imprinted on 
the minds of the public. Western European political literature 
also became more accessible than during the reign of Nicholas I. 
One might say that what is known as public opinion became for 
- 74 -
the first time in Russian history a definite, if not decisive, 
factor in Russian political life. 
Though the raznochinnecheskaiya intelligentsia played a 
most important role in shaping public opinion in favour of 
reform, the liberals and a section of the conservative elements 
in the society also contributed to making the government consider 
and finally implement the abolition of serfdom. 
Among the factors that were decisive in bringing about abolition 
of serfdom, two stand out as of particular importance, namely, 
economic necessity and the need of political stability. When 
disaster came in the wake of the Crimean war, the autocracy felt 
strongly that there was no longer an economic justification for 
serfdom. The government was very slow in underst~nding that 
serfdom was no longer relevant. Now the need for large-scale 
farming and manufacture had become evident. It was accepted that 
the prestige of the Russian empire depended not only on owning 
vast stretches of soil but on the strength of the Russian economy. 
In order to strengthen the economy, the government needed a period 
of internal as well as external peace. The deep anomalies of 
Russian society, the declining economy and the discredited admin-
istration, along with the increase in the number of peasant revblts, 
were admitted to be a stumbling block in the promotion of a stable 
government. The authorities were convinced that, while avoidiDg 
to endanger the interests of the nobility, a peasant reform was 
a necessary condition of stability. Even before the slaughter of 
the peasants in uniform during the Crimean war :eally bega~, 
Alexander II feared a liberation from serfdom from below. This 
threat, and the mood of apprehension in court circles, remained 
alive even when the deliberations on the reform were in full swing. 
All the more important became the need for government agents who 
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could be trusted to promote change, while keeping the 
order intact, and for elements among the wider public who 
could effectively play this dual role. 
76 
CHAPTER FIVE THE GREAT REFORM 
The first statement, semi-official in ~. nature, that 
the government was considering the abolition of serfdom came 
from Alexander II when he addressed the Moscow gentry on 
30th March 1856. He asserted the view that unless he did 
something, that is, unless something is done from above, 
emanicipation would start from below, and would culminate 
in a rebellion. 
On the other hand, it must be mentioned that Alexander 
II made this statement to the Moscow gentry not with the 
purpose of convincing them of the immediate need of emancipa-
tion but to pacify them. There was a rumour that the Tsar 
was seriously considering the passing of a decree to this 
effect and this became a source of agitation among the gentry. 
In order to remove any misunderstanding as regards his concern 
for the gentry, the~Tsar made (at the express request of 
Zakrevskii, the governor-general of Moscow) the following 
historic statement: "Rumours are spreading that I want to give 
the peasants freedom, - this is unjustified and you can tell 
. . 
this to everyone; but an inimical feeling between the peasants 
and the landlords unhappily exists, and on this account there 
have already been some cases of insubordination to the landlords. 
I am convinced that sooner or later we shall have to come to 
this. I think that you agree with me. Consequently it would be 
much better for it to come from above than from below." (1) 
It is necessary to trace chronologically the actions taken 
by the government. In 1856 the Tsar began to appoint secret 
committees to discuss ways and means of freeing the peasants. 
~One such committee was appointed on 1st January 1857 and it 
marks the first official step towards an elaboration of reform 
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bills. The committee was instructed to study the memoirs of 
Kavelin and Koshelev, although the committee members never 
considered the question of land allotment to the peasants. In 
July 1857, S. Lanskoi, the Minister of the Interior, submitted 
two memoranda to this secret committee. In the first he raised 
the questions: (a) whether the land would remain completely 
the property of the landlords and (b) in case of their retaining 
ownership, would the peasants have the right to work the land or 
could the landlords drive the peasants away, (c) could the. 
landlords expect compensation from the government for losing 
their rights over both person and land if they were obliged to 
part with their land? In the second memoir, it was emphasised 
that it would be impossible to deprive the peasants of all rights 
to land. This memoir proposed to grant the 'usad'ba'to the 
peasants with compensation to the landlords. The secret committee 
discussed all the suggestions but the members could not reach an 
agreement as to whether all the land would remain the property 
. , 
of the landlords or whether the peasants would be given the 'usad'ba: 
Other questions such as the nonn of allotment were also discussed. 
The prevailing view in the committee, persisting until the ultimate 
stages of deliberations, was that the landlords had the right to all 
.. 
land, but that for prudence's sake this right should be slightly 
curtailed. This opinion was initially and explicitly stated·by 
K. Chevkin, one of the members of the Council of State and a man 
quite indifferent to the idea of emancipation. 
Because of the resistence of the gentry to the idea of the 
abolition of serfdom evidenced in the deliherations of these 
committees, the government considered a novel plan in which it 
sought to show that the whole problem of emancipation had to be 
started as there was a definite concern at least from a section 
of the nobility and that the nobility itself was anxious to 
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promote it. Accordingly Nazimov, the Governor General of Lithuania, 
was asked to submit, on behalf of the landlords of Kovno, Vilno 
and Grodno a petition to the Tsar to free their peasants. C . O.Sl-
derable pressure was put upon the landlords of these guberniias 
to concur with this request. Nazimov was given the authority to 
persuade these landlords should they not agree to the scheme; it 
was explicitly stated that a new inventory would be taken in 
the western guberniias (which included the above three), "which 
would decrease the rights" of the landlords much more than in 
the already existing inventory.(2) The Tsar's reply (20th 
November 1857) to this so-called petition is known as the 
'Nazimov rescript'. 
The main points of the Nazimov rescript were as follows: 
(a) that preparatory committee be set up in each of the three 
above guberniias, and then one general commission for all the 
three in the guberniia of Vilno. 
(b) Each guberniia committee was to be chaired by the leader of 
the nobi1itYfwith members as follows: 1) one member from each 
of the uezds elected from among the rank of the nobility, and 
2) two experienced landlords of the guberniia, to be selected by 
the government officers. 
The general commission was to be composed of the following 
persons: 
1) TWo representatives from each of the three guberniia com-
mittees. 2) One experienced landlord, to be chosen by Nazimov 
and 3) a member chosen by the Ministry of Internal Affirs. 
Nazimov was also to choose the President of the commission from 
among the members of the guberniia committees. 
I 
The guberniia committees were given the task of formulating 
a detailed plan for "improving the condition of the peasants", 
having in mind the following principles: (a) the landlords would 
preserve the right of property on the entire land and the 
peasants would be left with their 'usad'ba' which, in course of 
a definite time, could become their property by means of 
redemption payment: the peasants would also be given some lan~to 
till for their livelihood for which they would have to either pay 
obrok or perform barshchina. (b) The peasants must be distributed 
into rural societies (obshchina) and the landlords would be given 
the traditional police power; (3) and (c) proper payment by the 
peasants of state and local taxes were to be guaranteed. The 
responsibility of developing a project on these lines and apply-
ing it to each of the three guberniias was conferred on the 
guberniia committees, which, after finalising these projects, 
would present them before the general commission. The general 
commission, having examined the separate plans of the three 
guberniias would prepare the final grand" plan, which would take 
into account regional peculiarities~ Nazimov was given full 
authority to supervise and to direct the work of the guberniia 
committees. When the plan was completed he was to send it to 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs which would present it to the 
emperor. (4) 
Publication of the rescript was greeted with uprecedented 
enthusiasm and optimism not only among those who were close 
to the government, but also among those who were sceptical 
about the government's attitude towards emancipation. Herzen 
cam~ out with an articl~ 'You have won, - Galileian,' even 
Chernyshevskii for a moment considered approvingly the government's 
- 80 -
advance towards emancipation. He went as far as to compare this 
rescript with the reforms of Peter the Great. (5) The intelligentsia 
looked forward to new and better times. In Moscow, on 28 December, 
a political banquet was given to celebrate the pUblication of the 
rescript. Members of the Moscow intelligentsia attended this banquet: 
a political banquet was undoubtedly a unique occasion in the history 
of Moscow. Count Zakrevskii hailed Alexander II as the "Russian 
Pasha"to whom had been given the glory of instigating the much 
desired reforms of the entire society. This is how Dzhanshiev 
describes the occasion: "The entire Moscow intelligentsia, whatever 
their views, assembled around one table to hail the approaching 'new 
era'. The arch-conservative Pogodin, the liberal constitutionalist 
Katkov, the tax-farmer Kokorev, forgetting their differences of 
opinion, met to give a feast in the Tsar's honour". (6) Dzhanshiev 
says that on this occasion Alexander II was hailed as 'Tsar Liberator' 
by a member of the gathering, Professor Babst of Moscow University. (7) 
Even if the rescript was a positive step towards reform, 
yet, to many it remained obscure in some important respects. How 
long was the transition period to be during which the landlords 
retained supervisory rights over the land eventually to be given to 
the peasants. Nothing specific was said about the nature and 
the amount of-redemption payments. With the purpose of clarifying 
these issues the government appointed the Main Committee on 
16 February 1858. It continued to deliberate until March 1859, when it was 
replaced by an editorial commission. On 21st April 1858, a government 
order authorised the formation of gentry committees in all the provinces 
of the empire with the duties and functions specified in the rescript. The 
task of forming such committees fell to the marshals of the nobility 
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under the supervision and control of the Governor-General of 
the region. Within a short period most of the committees were 
formed and commenced discussions on reform. 
Looking at the composition of the Main Committee, one 
was bound to be sceptical about the outcome of its working. 
The majority of its members, Count Orlov, V. A. Adlerberg, 
M. N. Murav'ev, V. A. Dolgorukii, Count V. Panin were well~ 
known reactionaries. Some other members, namely K. V. Chevkin, 
Ia. I. Rostovtsev, Baro~ M. Ia. Korf maintained an attitude 
of indifference. Only S. S. Lanskoi and D. N. Bludov took 
seriously the task of the committee, though the latter had 
no definite programme in mind. On 4th March 1858, a provincial 
Section of the Ministry of the Interior (zemskii otdel) was 
formed. This Section was to examine new ways of organising 
the rural economy, A. I. Levsin presided over this Section, 
whose other members ~re N. A. Miliutin and Ia. A. Solov'ev. 
All three were partisans of emancipation and the formation of 
the zemskii otdel was therefore a significant step towards the 
realisation of emancipation programmes. Of, these three, 
N. A. Miliutin was one of the most eminent figures in the reform 
movement. He took the initiative in seeing the rescript 
published and it was under his influence that the editorial 
commission was formed. In all stages of preparation he 
persistently supported progressive programmes and won himself 
the reputation of a 'red'. He was supremely efficient and the 
Tsar, in spite of his known misgivings about Miliutin, could not 
dispense with his service for quite a long time.(8) 
With the admission of these three new members the atmosphere 
in the main committee changed perceptively. 'In the meantime 
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Ia. I. Rostovtsev, who later became the Chairman of the 
Editorial Commission, whose attitude towards ~ancipation was 
at first indifferent, had begun to show serious concern in 
favour of it. This proved a powerful weapon in the armoury 
of Lanskoi and Miliutin and they could push forward their 
proposals of reforms with more confidence. 
the 
While the sessions o£lMain Committe~ were going on, the 
provincial committees were also discussing emancipation on 
the basis of data collected in their respective provinces. 
The main points that were considered important were the size 
of allotment to the peasants, the extent of the temporary-
obligatory period if any,(9) the size of the redemption money 
and also the nature of redemption (whether redemption of land 
and/or persons). In these discussions of the provincial 
committees, two distinct opinions, each supported by some 
members tended to crystalize, one representing the majority 
of the members and the other the minority. In all the~ovincial 
committees where this division of, opinion occurred, the majority 
opinion supported a reforming measure that would essentially 
preserve the status quo. The only exception, and it was a notable 
exception, was in the Tver provincial committee, where the 
majority of the gentry, under the leadership of Unkovskii, 
Golovachev, and Evropeus, proposed far-reaching changes. In 
formulating the project of the Tver committee, Unkovskii played 
a very important role at all stages .of the discussion supported 
ably by the other two. (10) Their proposals for fairly sweeping 
reforms were however unpalatable to the Tver gentry, and the latter 
eventually forced J. Unkovskii, who was marshal:. of the nobility, 
to resign his post. Provincial committees where wider reforms 
were proposed by a minority were Kaluga, Vladimir, and Moscow, 
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but they were not agreed on the conditions of reform. In 
some cases even the minority opinion resisted real change. 
For instance, in Nizhni Novgorod, where the minority 
committee proposed complete abolition of seignorial rights, 
• but suggested a smaller allotment of land to the peasants, 
the Governor, A. N. Murav'ev concluded, after examining the 
report that "serfdom is only abolished in words, but in fact 
remains with all its consequences". (11) 
The different attitudes of the members of each provincial 
committee have been brilliantly characterised by Evaniukov: 
"In the provincial committees people of the old and new eras 
assembled. One group - the persistent Don Quixotes of moribund 
serfdom brought to its defense the whole weight of ancient 
traditions, and desperately ~ried)out that property and law 
would perish, that the foundations of the aristocracy were 
rocking, that waves of democratic revolution would inundate 
Russia. The others, passionate and energetic fighters, took 
their aspirations to the blessings of civilisation out of the 
walls of the.lecture-rooms; an active minority, they wholly 
dedicated themselves to the problem before them,for it was to 
them the realization of their sacred dreams and would increase 
the prosperity of their fatherland. Finally there was the 
third category, the largest in number: those who understood that 
serfdom's hourhad struck and directed their efforts mainly to 
the defence of their pockets." (12) 
Because of the apathy of most of the members of the guberniia 
committees towards emancipation, the progressives within the 
government, Lanskoi, Miliutin and others, decided to invite the 
minority opinion in each guberniia committee to attend the gentry 
conv.ention held in the capital. This convention of gentry deputies 
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was held in St. Peterbuzgin August 1859 with 44 delegates from 
the 15 non-black-soil provinces. This convention was originally 
called by the government to act as its advisory body in questions 
arising out of the reform proposals. As these minority opinions 
generally favoured a liberal emancipation, the main purpose of 
such an invitation was to give the Tsar the impression that 
the gentry as a whole was not entirely opposed to real reform.(13) 
In the first convention only the representatives of the -o_-b1aQk-Boil 
regions were invited and Unkovskii played a most signifiCant part 
in the deliberations of this convention. But even if the spirit 
of this convention was more in line with the wishes of the liberal 
bureaucrats, its representatives were not even allowed to meet 
the main committee, which was from then onwards reduced from 
an advisory body to a panel of information. B~fore the con-
vention, Lanskoi had submitted a secret memorandum to the Tsar, 
(according to many, this memorandum was actually drafted by 
N. Miliutin) which stated the three main opinions of the nobility, 
but stressed that the majority were against any sort of abolition 
of serfdom. So, the main purpose of the memorandum was to inform 
the Tsar about the dominant gentry opinion. Consequently, the 
gentry of the first convention met with an unexpectedly cold 
response from the government. 
The bureaucrats who were real proponents of emancipation 
feared a possible entente between the aristocratic-oligarchic 
elements of the gentry and the conservative elements of the 
bureaucracy which would constitute an open and powerful pressure 
group vis-a-vis the Tsar to force him to withold the progressive 
part of the proposed emancipation. In the words of Nicholas 
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Miliutin, the immediate aim of the aristocratic party was "to 
replace the legislation with some kind of defined rules, so 
. . . . 
that emancipation would remain only in words without the 
solution of the most vital economic question" (14h Some of 
the members of the provincial committees, especially the 
members of the Tver committee,feared such a reaction from the 
government. This is evidenced by the following remark by 
Evropeus, an ex-Petrashevist and an important member of the 
Tver committee, "the time has come gentlemen, to understand 
that the utilisation of rights is not an exclusive privilege 
of one class; we must fulfil our obligations in respect of 
our society. At the present time our consultative meeting 
alone has the legal right to enter into discussion of the 
questions of social utility and to serve as the only legal 
guarantee against the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy; the 
entire oppressed people do not understand anything, ••• and are 
afraid of everything; the bureaucracy has in view only its 
personal advantage, directly opposed to the interests of the 
entire society and the will of the sovereign emperor."(15) 
. -
At the time of the sessions of the Main Committee and the 
guberniia committees, the Tsar became apprehensive about the 
mood in the country. He was becoming impatient with the long 
deliberations of the committees. He feared that the people, 
after having been kept waiting so long, would become impatient 
or would revolt. As a precuation,he sanctioned the regional 
Governors to use more power and ordered them to keep military 
personnel ready at hand. N. Miliutin and a few others tried to 
persuade the Tsar not to take any hasty measures that might 
infuriate the masses and thus place the government in a defensive 
position. But the Tsar went on with his precuationary plans 
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and asserted that "in desperate circumstances desperate measures 
have to be taken" (16). 
The Editorial commission was appointed in March 1859 and it ended 
its proceedings on 10th October 1860. The main points that were 
considered important in these proceedings were the norms of allotment, 
the extent of the temporary-obligatory period and the value of the 
redemption payment. The norms were fixed in such a way that the 
peasants were deprived of some portion, in some cases a substantial 
portion, of the land that they were utilising under the servile 
regime. The editorial commission conceded the vested interests of 
the nobility and released a schedule of redemption based on over-
valuation of the land. This scheme tied the peasants to another 
form of.servile bondage. for not.less than 49 years. 
The chairman of the commission, Rostovtsev, in spite of his 
early indifference to the cause of abolition, on becoming a member 
of the Main Committee, took up his task in the editorial commission 
with real enthusiasm. He considered the task to be a 'glorious 
cause' •. In the early part of 1860, just before he died and knowing 
that his work was unfinished, he appealed to the Tsar not to be 
afraid of the consequences of a real reform. (Gosudar' ne boites' 
was the last sentence in his.letter) (17). After the death of 
: Rostovtsev, the Tsar showed his characteristic irrosolution by 
appointing the arch.reactionery Count Panin as the chairman of 
the commission. As one author has aptly.remarked, "Panin, for 
whom reaction was not merely a policy, but a state of mind,behaved 
like authority incarnate, with whip in hand. He confessed on a 
famous occasion,~as aw~althy landown~r, I consider the matter of 
emancipation to be a private affair of the landlords." (18) 
Dzhanshiev summed up the character of Panin by saying that he 
suffered from 'photophobia' (sv~toboyaz~). (19) 
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Lack of fixity of purpose was evident in all the decisions 
that Alexander II took concerning abolition. In'] one speech he 
tried'to hasten the preparation of the measure, in another he 
tried to appease the gentry. Russia had had her own share of 
court intrigues and palace plots originating in the nobility. 
Consequently the ,Tsar was afraid to go totally against it., At 
the same time he knew that the peasant question would have to 
be solved. These two mutually oppos~d factors, coupled with 
his peculiar psychological make-up, that is, "an innnense capacity 
for lachrymose sentimentality and splenetic peevishness, but also 
an overwhelmingunolence of will, a lack of direction or even 
conviction"(2~)played a vital role in the final outcome of abolition 
proposals. 
When the editorial commission finished its work and submitted 
the draft Statutes to the Tsar for final approval, the intention 
was to declare the abolition of serfdom on the 19th February 1861 • 
. . 
But after going through the Statutes, the Tsar became convinced 
that there would be widespread uprisings as soon as the provisions 
of the Statutes reached the peasants. Extreme preca.utions were 
taken: military units were sent to all corners of Russia so as 
to be able to wipe out even a faint trace of 'insubordination'. 
One wonders if ~. ruling circle has ever been so fearful of the 
consequence of granting freedom to its people. This very fear 
explains the half-heartedness of the proposals. A limited 
liberation from above conceived to forestall liberation from 
below is no liberation at all. 
The government officials close to the Tsar did not doubt 
that the decree, when announced, would, instead of offering 
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unbounded satisfaction and delight to the masses, infuriate 
them. So, the government made elaborate arrangements to 
induce jubilation among the people. But these did not bear 
fruit. Except for the supporters of the government, no one 
could see any spirit of freedom emanating from the manifesto. 
Pertsov's unpublished diary*vividly depicts the response of 
the masses to the manifesto and the bureaucracy's desperate 
attempts to prove that the people were delighted by the 
Tsar's grant of freedom.(21) Millions of copies of the 
manifesto were printed, distributed and ceremonially read. 
But they were at last accepted with complete indifference. 
Here is how one author describes the situation: "They (the 
serfs) only understood one fact, that whereas they had been 
bond, they had become free. It took them a long while to 
grasp that they would have to pay heavily for their freedom, 
and not one piece of the wide land of Russia was to be had 
without paying for it. When someone who could read tried to 
interpret the terms of the deal to the others, he was flogged 
for his pains."(22) Pokrovskii, while describing the immediate 
post-reform conditions of the peasants once said, "never were 
the peasants flogged so violently as in the time immediately 
following the publication of the manifesto of the emancipation". 
In many cases, .. of course, the administration was relieved of 
the necessity of flogging the peasants because of the simple 
fact that the peasants were completely deprived of the faculty 
of understanding what freedom meant. The burden they had borne 
-was so heavy that in the course of time they had become stultified, 
I. Ignatovich describes such a situation in the guberniia of 
Kursk, where an officer named N. Reshetev went to read out the 
manifesto to the peasants of a landlord named Kharkevich. They 
* See SOIa agai.st Fathers - E. Lampert. 
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could not understand a word "having been successfully transformed 
into animals in human form." (23) 
• Even from a cursory examination of the Statutes, it is clear 
that the entire abolition scheme was prepared for the advantage 
of the nobility. According to article 8 of the general Statutes, 
the landlords were guaranteed that no land exceeding the extent 
stipulated by the local Statutes would be taken from them under 
any circumstance. Article 11 obliged the peasants to pay com-
pensation even for their usad'ba. According to article 12, 
the peasants were entitled to acquire holdings of land for 
constant use (at this stage the question of ownership has not 
been mentioned) only by. the consent of their landlords and there 
is no penal provision in that article if the landlords refused 
to give their consent. According to article 18, the landlords 
were given the traditional powers, Articles 21 to 30 on civil 
rights, in which the peasants were granted the right to marry 
freely and to lodge complaints against any injustice inflicted 
on them by the:landlords, were definitely liberal in spirit, 
but the language of the articles was such as to obfuscate any 
reader and to ensure that the peasant would not understand what 
his rights were, thereby preventing him from taking advantage of 
them. Article 31 conferring the right of property to the peasants 
contradicts article 12. Such contradictions between different 
articles are noticeable throughout the Statutes. (24) 
It had become customary that whenever there were some grounds 
f~alegal dispute between the rich and the poor, the former got 
the benefit of the doubt. The provisions of the Statues are a 
striking case in point. The reactions of two authors to the 
Statutes may be of interest in this connection; "These laws of 
1861 were so verbose, so full of variables,' so loaded down with 
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qualifications and exceptions and in general so astonishingly 
involved and complicated that it is difficult to understand how 
many serfs could ever by anypossibility have known what rights 
might be hidden in this legislative haystack." (25) "The only 
conclusion to be drawn from the emancipation Statutes themselves 
is that they represent in the last analysis a charter not for 
the peasants, but for the landlords." (26) 
If one looks at the mechanism for the allotment of land and 
for redemption payment in various regions, one sees a contrast 
. , . , 
of attitudes between the landlords of the black-sol.l-areas and 
those of the'non-black-soil'areas. The pomeshchiks of the 
black-soil region wanted a deal without land to the peasant or 
with a minimum allotment of land reduced to his house and;plot. 
This prompted Prince Cherkasskii to comment that the serfowner 
is a monopolist over the most valuable commodity - the black 
soil. In the non-black-soil regions, the emphasis evidently 
was on the redemption of persons, but as Liashchenko puts it, 
'Ulen personal redemption proved to be impossible in open form, 
a solution was found in excessive land valuation which included 
personal redemption in a hidden form." (27) 
In the 16 black-soil provinces the post-reform land allotment 
exceeded that of the pre-reform days only in the case of three 
provinces ~ Tula, Voronezh and Kharkov. In 12 provinces, the 
post-reform allotments were lower than those of pre-abolition 
days. In the province of Oryol the allotment remained unchanged. 
In the provinces of Kiev and Podol the allotment was greatly 
reduced from 6.6 and 5.5 dessyatin per person to 2.1 and 2.2 
dessyatin per person. Taking the 21 black-soil provinces, the 
reform resulted in a reduction of 26.2% in~the allotment. On 
the other hand, in six sample obrok dominated non-black-soil 
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provinces namely, Vladimir, Moscow, Kaluga, Petersburg Novgorod, 
I 
and Smolensk, the post-reform allotment was higher than the 
pre-reform allotment. Taking all the 15 obrok dominated non-black-
soil provinces the amount of reduction of allotment due to reform 
was 9.9%. According to an estimate by Professor Y. Yanson, 5 
dessyatin in black soil and 8 dessyatin· in non-black-soil areas 
were the minimum requirement for the subsistence of a peasant 
family. But after reform the allotment averaged only 2.45 
dessyatin per person in the black-soil and 4.3 per person in the 
non-black-soil regions. The following table gives an overall 
picture of the land allotment before and after the abolition of 
serfdom: (29) 
Change in Peasant Land Allotment in 43 Provin~ 
Land under peasant Land permanently allotted Decrease compared % 
tillage before 1861 to peasants under. the with pre-reform a11ot-
reform procedure ment 
(dessyatin) (dessyatin) (dessyatin) 
35,196,734 33,755,658 1,441,076 4 
Not only the size of allotment, but also the huge redemption which 
the freed peasants were obliged to pay (especially in the non-
black-soil regions) clearly showed that the serf-owners were the 
ultimate gainers. Apart from the additional holding, the 1and-
lords of the black-soil regions extracted a redemption value 
60% higher than the value of land in 1854-1858 and 25% more 
than the linearly extrapolated value for the same in the period 
1863-1872. For.the non-black-soil region these differences were 
120% and 90% respective1y.(30) The only region which did not 
experience an inflated price of redemption was the western 
provinces and this again reflects the advantages of the serf-
owners in these provinces. It is interesting to cite Liashchenko's 
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comment on the whole affair: "If we compute the entire premium 
collected by the landowners for the portion of land detached 
from them, it seems evident tha-t they sold land at a price 
well above average prices prevailing at the time in the black-
soil belt, at 12.5 rubles per dessyatin, and in the non-black-
soil.zone at 15.2 rubles per dessyatin. This was indeed a 
payment to the landowner in redemption of the peasant person, 
a payment for the kerf-souls' formally charged against the 
landlord. If we relate this cost specifically to that which 
it actually represented, namely payment for the 'serf-souls' 
it would seem that the landowners, having received in the 
redemption operation the entire value of the land, obtained 
additionally, as a result of the inflated redemption values, 
about 36.1 rubles per 'serf-soul' in the black soil belt, 
and as much as 62.3 rubles per person in the non-black-soil 
belt." (31) 
The net outcome of all these different aspects of the so-
called emancipation was that after the passing of the decree 
there ensued widespread and unprecedented unrest among the 
peasants. The peasants thought that a new decree was in the 
offing, containg 'real freedom'. One of the most well-known 
and tragic of such revolts was the incident at Bezdna, where 
the peasants under the leadership of one Anton Petrov refused 
to accept the Tsarist manifesto as a charter of real freedom. 
Their resistence was so subborn that the government resorted 
to systematic suppression by military units. Several hundred 
.~ peasants were shot dead and Petrov was summarily executed. 
This was not an isolated incident. In fact from March to July 
of 1861 not a single province was free from more or less massive 
protests against the ill-conceived emancipation. The following 
table will illustrate th~ ext~nt of p~asant resistanc~: 
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Th.ble showing the number of peasant revolts (March-July 1861) 
Province Number of Revolts 
March April May June July Total 
Vilno 2 1 2 5 
Vitebsk 3 4 3 1.' 11 
Vladimir 1 2 6 9 
Vologod 1 1 2 
Volyn 1 1 2 
Voronezh 2 3 1 6 
Viat 1 1 2 
Grodnen 1 1 1 1 4 
Ekaterinislav 2 1 1 4 
Kazan 5 4 9 
Kaluga 1 4 4 9 
Kostroma 1 1 
Kiev 1 1 2 4 
Koven 2 2 4 1 1 10 
Kursk 1 1 1 1 4 
Minsk 1 1 
Mogulev 1 2 2 2 7 
Moscow 2 2 
Nizhegorod 1 2 3 
Orenburg 2 1 2 5 
Orlov 1 2 1 1 5 
Penzen 1 6 5 12 
Perm 2 6 2 1 1 12 
Podol 1 1 2 
Poltav 1 1 2 
Pskov 2 2 1 5 
Riazan 1 2 ·6 9 
Samara 2 3 1 6 
St. Petersburg 4 4 
Saratov 1 1 1 1 4 
.r Simbir 1 2 2 1 6 
Smolensk 1 24 4 29 
Tambov 2 2 1 1 6 
Tver 2 1 3 
Tula 1 8 9 
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table contd. 
Province Number of Revolts 
March April May June July. Total 
Kharkov '2 2 
Kherson 2 1 3 
Cherni10v 4 5 9 
Yaroslav 1 1 3 2 7 
Total 35 69 106 17 8 235 
(Compiled from the book krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v 1861 godu 
pos1e otmeny krepostnogo prava. Moscow 1949) 
The peasants showed their rejection of the 'false freedom' 
not only in revolts, but also by refusing to sign title 
deeds (ustavnaye gramot;) after the abolition. In July 1862 
out of 20,108 such deeds issued 9687 remained unsigned, (43% 
of the total). By the e,nd of the same year, out of a total 
issue of 73,195 title deeds, 36,782 were not signed, that is, 
more than 50%. The peasants refused to sign these documents 
because they considered them fraudulent. By the beginning 
of 1863, the percentage of unsigned deeds was 57.9%. (33) It 
should be pointed out that obtaining the signature of the 
title deeds was the responsibility of the mir and so the 
number of unsigned deeds might understate the number of 
peasants dissatisfied with the reform. Here again the peasants 
took this action because they still believed that a new charter 
of real freedom would be granted. 
This situation in Russia produced a great impression on 
Chernyshevskii, and had a'considerable influence on the formation 
of his Viet-1S. 
PART TWO 
Chernyshevskii and the abolition of Serfdom 
95 
CHAPTER ONE SUPERIORITY OF HIRED LABOUR 
This chapter will be mainly concerned with Chernyshevskii's 
vie~on the agrarian situation after the publication of the Nazimov 
rescript of 20th November 1857. As has been pointed out earlier, 
the publication of this rescript was received with great 
enthusiasm by all sections of the intelligentsia.(l) It was felt 
that at last a solution was being sought for the age-long problem 
of serfdom. Chernyshevskii.sh~red.jhis reaotioa t.o some extent. 
From 1858 onwards he published a series of articles in the journal 
Sovremennik (of which he had become the principal editor) dealing 
mainly with different aspects of serfdom and suggesting ways and 
means by which serfdom could be abolished. He published two studies 
under the title, '0 novykh usloviakh sel'skogo byta', of which 
the first expressed his provisional view of the rescript. They 
were concerned mainly with the question of the economic superiority 
of hired labour over forced labour and that of the role of the state 
in changing the economic situation in a society. 
Initially Chernyshevskii hailed the Imperial rescript as 
something the significance of which could only be compared with the 
reforms undertaken by Peter the Great.(2) Whether he genuinely 
welcomed the rescript or indirectly and surreptitiously ironised 
.. 
about its real implication is difficult to determine. Censorship 
regulations even after the relaxation usually associated with the 
beginning of Alexander II's reign, made it very difficult to 
publish anything outspoken, let alone anything that questioned 
official state policy. Therefore, even if Chernyshevskii had 
~wanted to condemn the rescript, he would not have been able to do 
so. The fact that he published anexffi~ from K. D. Kavelin's 
manuscript, 'Zapiski ob osvobozhdenii krest'ian v Rossii' (1855) 
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in the second of the two articles mentioned above is sometimes 
taken as evidence that he genuinely welcomed the rescript, 
since Kavelin's suggested basis for reform was far from being 
radical. But Chernyshevskii of course did not agree with 
Kavelin and was simply publicizing all opinions supporting 
emancipation. 
Voluntary' or Hired Labour and Forced Labour' 
Chernyshevskiibelieved that a transformation from a con-
dition of forced labour to hired labour was not only economically 
desirable but imperative. In the interest of the entire Russian 
economy, at any rate of the rural economy, the abolition of 
serfdom was therefore the first step in this transformation of 
the labour force. He elucidated this viewpoint in a polemic 
against L. V. Tengoborskii, a contemporary economist whose book, 
Etudes sur les forces productives de la Russie, he attacked. 
Chernyshevskii prefaces his argument against the supporters of 
forced labour with the following remarks: "We must first of all 
discuss the views that/in the present stage of development of 
Russian life, the preservation of serfdom could be advantageous 
to the rural economy, that with the liquidation of forced labour, 
the quantity of arable land would be diminished. We would not 
be surprised to hear such views from people who say that the 
earth is stationery and the sun revolves round it, or who assume 
that we are richer than other Europeans because of the prevalence 
of serfdom in our country: but it is surprising that, to the 
disgrace of science, there are people, apparently acquainted with 
political economy, who stubbornly talk of the value of serfdom 
for agriculture" (3). 
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This was stated a propos of the arguments and figures put 
forward in Tengoborskii's book and reproduced in detail by 
Chernyshevskii. The number in the two categories of peasants 
(serfs and free peasants) given by Tengoborskii were; (4) 
(a) No. of serf peasants (male only) 
(b) No. of free peasants (male only) 
11,683,200 
11,687,500 
According to this estimate, the number of the two kinds of 
labour was almost equal. He (Tengoborskii) went on to say that 
if account were taken of the fact that on many estates the 
landlords had substituted obrok for barshchina, it would be 
found that two-thirds of the total number of peasants were free, 
because Tengoborskii had reckoned peasants in obrok as free 
peasants. And so, in ~ngoborskii's opinion, serfdom could 
not have such a strong influence on agriculture as was claimed. 
He goes on to argue the necessity for forced labour in agriculture 
in some parts of Russia. He contends that (a) Russia had 
insufficient capital to introduce rational agriculture with hired 
labour on all her arable land; (b) in many regions the price of 
the agricultural products did not produce enough surplus to cover 
the cost of production; (c) in the provinces where there are 
poor trading institutions, with little turnover of money, it was 
much more helpful'to the peasants to fulfil their obligations by 
labour than t6 pay any sort of rent in money. He says that in 
many regions the poor peasants who were in obrok wanted to go back 
to barshchina because they found that those who were in barshchina 
were better off. He also quoted Baron von Haxthausen on the 
~ necessity of preserving serfdom in some regions of Russia, including 
even Yaroslav, an infertile province. (5) Haxthausen says in effect 
that "if an estate in Yaroslav were offered to anyone, on condition 
that he should manage and cultivate in the same manner as in Central 
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Europe, then he would refuse it. Not only would he derive no 
advantage and receive no income from it, but he would lose a 
considerable sum of money every year. 
"Thus in these northern districts, agriculture cannot be 
~ursuedon large estates as a profitable speculation: nor can 
it be abandoned, for it is absolutely necessary, and in an 
inland country alone supplies the means of subsistence for man 
and beast. ' 
"Under present circumstances I should say that large , 
proprietory farms can only exist in these districts in two ways; 
either. as corvee establishments, where the landowner has not 
himself to maintain labourers, etc.(in other words, to pay none 
of the farming expenses) or as ordinary farms with hired workmen 
and cattle, but united with manufacturing industry by means of 
which the labour not required for agriculture might be constantly 
and profitably employed. 
"that there should be a certain iuriib~~ of large ·.agricu1tura1 
establishments in these districts I consider absolutely necessary. 
Without them no progress in agricu1tu~ (which is more needed in 
Russia than is generally acknowledged) can be imagined. But if 
the existence of these large estates is necessary for the improve-
ment of agriculture, the consequent welfare of the people, serfage 
cannot.yet be,abo1ished; it may however be regulated by land, with 
fixed amounts of labour and limitation of the landowners' power, 
such as the ukase of 2rdSeptember contemplated." (6) 
Tengoborskii asserts that the Russian peasants were not subject 
.' to the kind of arbitrary fixation of obligations that was the 
practice with the French peasants and he mentions the ukase of 1797 
of Tsar Paul which placed an upper limit on barshchina obligations 
of three days per week. Along with this, Tengoborskii maintains 
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that time and moral progress transform the nature of the obliga-
tion and that little by little 'natural' obligation is trans-
formed into an obligation of rent. He also emphasises the 
regional divergence in the nature of obligations and in some 
cases finds special justification for them. Tengoborskii says, 
~ . . ...... . 
naxthausen quite correctly says that the emancipation of the 
peasants must definitely be solved with a view to regional con-
ditions and not uniformly throughout the entire empire"(7). In 
support of this Tengoborskii contends: "in those regions, where 
the land is not fertile and is unsuitable for cultivation, where 
production does not meet the needs of the tiller, where hehas 
to find another occupation as an auxilliary source of subsistence 
and for the payment of obligations~the change-over from barshchina 
to personal rent is as advantageous to the peasant as to the 
landlord: but it can be advantageous to both sides only in phces 
where it is easy for the.agricultural worker to find an occupation. 
For these reasons there are voluntary agreements of this kind in 
a large number of places where arable land is scarce, where there 
is man-power and time to spare, and where well-paid jobs are 
easily to be found. On the other hand, in places, where arable 
land is abundant, where the soil is fertile, where the harvest 
exceeds the needs of the population, and where at the same time 
there is a go,od market for agricultural produce, it is often 
advantageous for the landlord to cultivate his fields on the 
bases. of barshchina, In these places barshchina does not affect 
the welfare of the agricultural labourers and when barshchina 
/ is replaced by obrok, this generally takes place by mutual agree-
ment, to the satisfaction of both landlord and peasant ••••• It 
is extremely difficult to regularise all these circumstances by 
laws based on general, predetermined principles." (8). 
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Chernyshevskii 's rebutall of Tengoborskii' s vieWs is a 
masterly piece of lucid thought and irony. He starts with the 
charge made by Tengoborskii against many economists who think 
that serfdom is an inefficient way of tilling the land. 
Chernyshevskii expresses surprise at the word 'many' and says that 
one might just well say that many astronomers think that the 
earth moves round the su.!!.; he says the statement should be, 
. t" -
••• with the exception of the author of the book 'Etudes •••• ' 
and Haxthausen - all the economists". ;(~)He then deals with 
the matter of obrok. Chernyshevskii contends that the amount 
of obrok that a peasant has to pay increases with every change 
of the owner as a general rule; there are exceptions of course, 
but these exceptions prove the general rule. He also maintained 
that the obligations of obrok payment increased several times if 
a peasant remained with the same landlord for a considerable 
time. Tengoborskii on the .)oortrary,~ believed that the peas ant 
I 
in obrok may be considered a free labourer and the fixation of 
obrok is made by a voluntary agreement. Chernyhyshevskii asserts 
in this connection that of the two meam available to the landlords 
for receiving incomes, it is obrok that discourages the peasants 
from tilling their holding with real zeal. The peasant knew that 
if he showed initiative and started to cultivate more, the obrok 
would invariably increase in proportion to the rise in the volume,cif 
his production, if not more. (10) 
There is no doubt that obrok assumed a parasitic character in 
the economy of Russian serfdom. It became more parasitic when the 
obrok peasants had to leave their villages in pursuit of some gain-
ful occupation which would enable them to meet their obrok obliga-
tion. In such circumstances, the logical basis of the payments to 
. the landloIrlwas doubtful. Chernyshevskii was aware of it and 
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spelled it out in an article published in 1859 under the title, 
'Ustroistvo byta pomeshchich'ikh krest'ian! He examined the 
legal basis of serfdom in this article and contended that serf-
dom consisted in the appropriation of power by the landlord 
to force the peasants to settle on his land to do agricultural 
work for his profit. Only that and nothing else was involved 
in serfdom. The jurilical and police authorities enforced. the 
obligation of the serf to do agricultural work. "It is easy 
to prove this" he say's "Let us aSStmle that a tailor or a shoe-, , 
maker, a serf who lives in a town and pays obrok, returns to the 
village and says to the landlord, 'It~ do not want to pursue my 
trade and pay obrok'. Can the landlord say that such a peasant 
will not be fulfilling his obligation if he regularly performs 
barshchina,?, Ask the police officer or the ,justice of peace of 
the district: it would appear to all that if the peasant is 
ready to go over to barshdina he is fulfilling his obligation 
and the landlord cannot complain of the fact that he (the peasant) 
is only a tiller and not a trader. Consequently, if obrok is 
received from some other occupation besides agriculture, it is 
only an arbitrary substituion for agricultural barshchina which 
alone is appertaining to serfdom." (11) The Soviet historian 
\ 
Yatsevich presents an interesting case of a nobleman who put his 
peasants on obrok, sent them to St. Petersburg to work and trade, 
and when they had acctmlulated sufficient money, called them back, 
took away the money and transferred them from obrok to barshchina. 
(12) Chernyshevskii then presents a case in this article where 
landed property due to its smallness of size or the infertility 
of its soil, cannot give sufficient income to the landlord to 
maintain his personal commitments, or perhaps does not feed the 
. . 
peasants at subsistence level. In this situation legalized 
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serfdom, that is, the tilling of land by forced labour breaks 
down. He raises the juridical question of whether the land-
lords have any right to demand obrok when the peasants leave 
their estates. According to him, the law of serfdom permits 
the landlords to receive rent in whatever form it may be so 
long as the peasants are on the territory of their estates. 
If the landlords resort to transferring the peasants to obrok 
and sending them away to earn money for the landlord, they are 
violating the bounds of serfdom - specified by the bw. 
Chernyshevskii asserts emphatically that "besides serfdom our 
law does not recognise any other basis for rights over persons,"(13) 
which implies evidently that the right to persons is only valid 
so long as the masters and serfs are within a legal relationship 
within serfdom. But since that was not the case anywhere, the 
landlords resorted to more exploitation of the peasants on obrok 
, 
by forcing them to pay money rent and exerting their presumed 
right to persons wherever they physically existed; he concludes 
that "in point of fact obrok is almost always in excess of serfdom; 
it is the utilisation of the right to persons under conditions 
which contradict the basic character of serfdom"(14) 
Chernyshevskii analysed the effects of barshchina obligation 
to refute Tengoborskii's contention that this obligation was not 
disadvantage9us to the peasants. According to Chernyshevskii, 
although during the reign of Tsar Paul the maximum limit was 
fixed at 3 days a week, in most cases the limit was either ignored 
or applied in such a fashion that the peasants had no time to till 
their own holdings., He remarks sarcastically that since 
Tengoborskii's entire information was based on Haxthausen, he 
could not know how the prescribed three-day labour was carried 
out since Haxthausen does not deal with the matter. Chernyshevskii 
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describes one way of circumventing the limit: the peasants 
were supposed to work, say, on Monday for the landlord, 
but it so happended that the weather was bad on that day, so 
the landlord shifted the work to a later day when the weather 
was fine. As a result the peasants would lose a day for their 
own cultivation, and if the weather remained unfavourable for 
a few days in a week, the peasants would not have even a single 
day to work on their holdings. (IS) Similarly the peasants 
would be made to till the mast~rs' land continuously during 
periods most favourable for cultivation. Only after finishing 
the landlord's land were the peasants permitted to work on their 
own. In this way the peasants would be put in the position of 
working most productively for their master and least productively 
for themselves.(l6) 
Moreover this method of utilisation of forced labour involved 
the fixation of tiaglo by an even number, i.e 2 or 4 etc. And 
if any household had only one work-hand, then necessarily he had 
to work twice the time that he would have worked if the allotment 
or work was fixed on a unit composed of individuals. As a con-
sequenoethe workhand of such a household could never even step 
into his own allotment except occasionally in the middle of the 
night, if he were.not by then completely exhausted. Also the 
law was some~imes flouted and peasants were forced to work more 
than three days per week. All these cases unde~ned the 
credibility of Tengoborskii's arguments that Paul's ukase fixing 
the three day limit made serfdom less burdensome. (17) 
Chernyshevskii characterised Tengoborskii's explanations as 
spurious since they failed to take into account the real 
situation as regards the use of forced labour by the landlord. 
Apart from the fact that forced labour led to more exploitation 
of the peasants, Chernyshevskii also showed the economic 
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inefficiency of forced labour in the productive sphere during 
the period under review. His analysis was succinct, the facts 
were conclusive and his conclusion was brilliant. Here are 
a few examples. of the ·factual evidence adduced by Chernyshevskii. 
He cites an example of an estate, where the income after abolition 
went up by three times. The findings of a Danish Minister, 
Count Bernsdorf, who found that on his own estate, average 
productivity rose by more than 300% when hired labour was sub-
stituted for forced labour :" confounded the Danish landlords 
who oyjected to the abolition of serfdom on the grounds of 
unprofitability. A statistical survey, originally conducted by 
Zhuravskii in the province of Kiev showed the extent of the 
wastage of man-days in unproductive labour :~under serfdom. 
According to this survey, in estates with 250 adult workers the 
total number of man-days in barshchina comes to 45,000 a year, of 
which only 12,000 were generally utilised for cultivation. This 
comprised approximately a quarter of the total barshchina days. 
What about the remaining three quarters of the working days7 Most 
of them were spent on activities which were virtually unproductive. 
For example, 1,900 days were spent on the gardens of the masters 
who had an army of house-serfs to do the job. Over-manning of 
threshing machines also accounted for 5,800 man-days. This ia 
a glaring example" of 'disguised' unemployment of serf-labour. 
This is evidenced by Zhuravskii's estimate that the total number 
of man-days that were necessary for all the work in the province 
of Kiev was 17,500,000 and the total number actually used was 
no less than 65,000,000. 
The concept of 'disguised' unemployment was not explicitly 
stated by Chernyshevskii as it was later by the Norwegian economist 
Ragner Norkse and the Bolshevik leader Preobrazhenskii in the 
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twenties of this century, but there is not the slightest doubt 
that he clearly understood the working of this type of 
unemployment in agriculture within the peculiar social frame-
work of serfdom, where the available man-days of labour in most 
cases far exceeded the socially useful labour requirement. 
Chernyshevskii concludes that this underutilisation of productive 
power is a general phenomenon not peculiar to Kiev alone. 
This conclusion is followed by an analysis of the extent 
of diseconomy prevalent in agriculure based on forced labour. 
Chernyshevskii assumes that the labour cost at the level of 
technology prevalent in agriculture at that time in Russia com-
prised half of the working capital and in most cases less than that. 
This was quite a reasonable assumption to make. According to his 
calculation, the total cost of agricultural production in Kiev 
would be 14,500,000 silver roubles; adding a net profit of 10%, 
the aggregate normal price of the entire produce of the same 
province would amount to 16,000,000 silver roubles. But 
Zhura~skii's findings show that the total income in money terms 
of the Kiev province was 7,123,380 silver roubles, which is even 
less than the labour cost alone if properly computed.(18) This 
diseconomy was, according to Chernyshevskii, due to the existence 
.. 
offorced labour. The nature of the labour cost in such a productive 
activity has already been discussed in an earlier chapter* where this 
was shown to have been an important reason for exploitation of serf 
labour by the landlords to augment their incomes, involving diminished 
productivity per man-day and.leading to a vicious circle of 
~diseconomy. (19) Chernyshevskii attributed the growing indebtedness 
of the landlords to this unprofitable form of production rather than 
*::see Chapter one of Part one 
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to indulgence in luxurious living and conspicuous consumption which 
some writers have assumed to be the cause. "The ruin of the 
landlords themselves is the most evident consequence of forced 
labour. The account of the credit institutions as to the extent 
of mortgaged estates and the publication of the figures of sale of 
these estates due to non-payment of the loan unfortunately show 
only too clearly that this scientific truth is confirmed by the 
facts of our life. Recently a scholar - he should remain anonymous -
tried to prove that our estates are not (as we all know them to. be) 
burdened with debts. The answer to this frivolous joke was a 
bitter smile on the lips of all readers to a man. A landlord whose 
estate is not mortgaged is a rare exception with us.' . Correct 
information about the amount of the entire indebtedness of our 
landlords' estates has not been collected, but it is certain that 
with every year the burden of these debts has increased and at the 
present time Russian estates are the most burdened with loans of 
... " " 
all the estates of Europe. (20) He then states, " ••• one can talk 
about extravagant life, about neglect of one's affairs~ But 
firstly, all these and other secondary causes are insufficient to 
. I universal . 
account for an accumulation of debts so' .. ,.:.: .. <,. and so large; 
secondly, extravagance and neglect of one's affairs arise mainly 
from a funadmental evil to which a limit is now being imposed."(21) 
Chernyshevskii contends that because the landlords had an easy 
means of income from serf labour, they never took pains to make 
their productive activities economic. 
Chernyshevskii then proceeds to criticise Tengoborskii's 
/' statement that "in those regions, where trade and industry are 
weak, where there is little money in circulation, it is more 
beneficial (udobno) for the peasants to fulfil .. their obligations 
by labour rather than by paying for the rent of theland in money. 
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Chernyshevskii contends that even if such a state of affairs is 
more practicable, it is not desirable. 
" ••• If in fact the tilling of some fields in Russia were 
possible only under forced labour, then what would follow from 
this? It would follow only that some fields do not justify the 
labour needed, and the sooner their cultivation, which is 
disadvantageous to the state, is stopped, the better for the state." 
(22) Here again Chernyshevskii refers to the existence of 
'disguised' unemployment in the economy of serfdom and so he does 
not consider any productive activity worth pvrsuing unless it is 
economic. The existence of an abundant supply of forced labour 
cannot be a justification forindulging in economic activities 
which are harmful both to the state and the society. "If I 
, I 
utilising privileges granted to me by the state, decided to grow 
forests in the Vologoda or Viatka provinces, in which, as it is, 
- . - . . . 
there is too much forest,! would doubtless'succeed in growing,a few 
dessyatins of forests in my plantation. But it goes without 
saying that the sale of this forest would not by an,means cover my 
expenses and my plantation would only be viable if the government 
were to give a grant every year to cover my losses. What then 
follows from such a state of affairs? I shall only contribute to 
the ruin 0'£ the state supporting my uneconomic production; the 
state should therefore stop its assistance ••••• I should myself 
feel bound to put an end to my uneconomic production and turn to 
some other occupation that would be not ruinous but advantageous to 
the state." (23) 
The point at issue is whether it is economically self-
defeating to uphold a system that perpetu:ates the indebtedness of 
the landlord. It also shows the need for maintaining a position 
of economic equilibrium in production. As is well-known, 
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equilibrium in production is a function of revenue and cost and 
even if the latter is indeterminate,under forced labour any 
. -
reasonable computation of the labour cost will reveal that in 
most cases it,together with the cost of raw materials is not 
safe-guarded by the sale of agri,cultural products in the presence 
of forced labour. In the prevailing circumstance~ therefore, the 
ru.ral economy of Russia ran constantly under loss (economically 
speaking) and Chernyshevskii held that no one with any knowledge 
of economics could possibly support such a state of affairs. 
"An enterprise", he says, "which does not cover its cost 
by the sale of its products when produced by forced labour is 
ruinous to the state, and the sooner it is stopped the better for 
the prosperity of the state". (24) 
Tengoborskii took Yaroslav, one of the most infertile regions 
in Russia,' to prove the justifiability of serf labour and Chernyshevskii 
criticises him for his generalising from an atypical sample. 
Chernyshevskii introduces a criterion for assessing whether 
forced labour was advantageous in any region in Russia. This 
criterion was originally forumulated by a pre-Smithian economist, 
T. Tucker and ~ . an exponent of the labour theory of value. In 
1774 Tucker, published a book under the title, "Four Tracts and Two 
Sermons on Political and Commercial Subjects" in which he dealt 
exhaustively with the question of the efficiency of servile labour 
in agriculture. The criterion was based on popUlation density. 
If the popUlation density exceeds or is equal to a certain number, 
then cultivation by free labour is more advantageous; if, on the 
/other hand, it is less than that number, servile labour is more 
advantageous~ Taking into consideration the whole of Russi~, 
Chernyshevskii tries to apply this criterion and his arguments are 
as follows: 
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"One of the circumstances on which the advantage or dis-
advantage to the landlord of hired labour as compared with forced 
labour depends, is the population density. The smaller the 
population of the country the more advantageous is forced labour 
to the landlords; the denser the population the more advantageous 
to them is hired labour. Tucker made a study of this and found 
that with sixty six persons per square mile, hired labour becomes 
more advantageous to the landlord than forced labour. This 
figure is too high, as we shall see below; and even in a popula-
tion of less than sixty six persons per square mile hired labour is 
more profitable than forced labour; this we will prove. But let 
us try to apply to Russia the figures we find in Tucker. In order 
to apply them in Russia,we must take into account two circumstances: 
the size of the urban population and the amount of infertile land. 
C4 In the countries, which Tucker had in mind (western Europe 
and North America), the urban population forms at least one~hird 
of the entire population. In Russia it forms hardly ten per cent, 
including the capitals .,and in the greater part of the provinces it 
is under nine per cent. 
C~In western Europe and Northern America, the amount of land 
unsuitable for crops is limited: five or six per cent of the entire 
.. 
area of the territory; in European Russia infertile lands occupy 
more than one,~hird of the entire territory. These two factors 
must be considered, if one is to apply the figures given by Tucker 
to Russia. 
" ((ruck~r' s estimate of') 66 persons per square mile amounts to 
·1400 per geographical square mile. Out of this (total density), 
the urban population in western' Europe and North America is not 
less than a third, so 966 persons constitute the rural population. 
Those provinces in Russia where the size of the rural population 
exceeds this figur~ ther~fore satisfy th~ conditions stipu1at~d 
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by Tucker." (25) 
But land in England was more fertile,than in Russia and Tucker 
developed his criterion on the basis of the fertility of England. 
Chernyshevskii therefore adjusted Tucker's estimates according to the 
regional infertility of soil in Russia. According to Chernyshevskii, 
in Voronezh, Tula, Podol, Nizhninovgorod and Tambov, the percentage 
of infertile land is small, that is 3 to 8%. This proportion is not 
unlike that which Tucker envisaged. But in the provinces of 
Orenburg and Kherson half of the land was infertile; in the provinces 
of Ekaterinislav, Stavropol and Tavrich, the amount of infertile 
land is larger than the amount of fertile land. It would be mislead-
ing, according to,Chernyshevskii, to take into account the number 
of people tilling barren lands, where no increase in population is 
likely to occur and where no workers can be employed. 
Chernyshevskii now proposes to deduct 5% of the Tuckerian 
criterion of 966 persons in the rural area to make an adjustment 
for,the number of working hands in infertile areas. (26) 
First of all, he considers the areas ,where the working hands 
are mostly serf peasants and states ,that there is positive 
evidence that hired labour is found to be more advantageous to 
landlords in these areas. 
He then points out that in almost every area of Russia, the 
.. , 
population density is above Tucker's level, and so hired labour is 
more advantag~ous than servile labour. "The regions of the Russia. 
empire", he states, "which do not have forced labour at the present 
time either because of the high density of its rural population 
which attained such a level that hired labour becomes more 
~ advantageous to the landlord than the forced labour or according to 
other local conditions which has led to such an economic situation, 
embraces almost the entire area of Russia and its population amounts 
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to 63,000,000. In all these regions forced labour for the landlords 
is less advantageous than hired labour."(27) 
I have quoted Chernyshevskii extensively in order to show 
that he was an ardent supporter of free labour and so was a champion 
of emancipation of serfs. But he was not, as will be seen later 
• 
an advocate of the creation of free landless peasants, a feature 
peculiar to England during the industrial revolution where it was 
assumed that the existence of such people, historically speaking, 
was a pre-condition of capitalist development. Chernyshevskii did 
not advo~ate the 'abstract' freedom of the toiling masses, i.e 
a mere legal or formal freedom. That is why all his a~guments 
against forced labour were not aimed at creating a condition in 
Russia reminiscent of the days of the infamous enclosure movement 
in England. This willbe evident later when his various redemption 
plans will be examined. He not only protested against the morall 
injustice inherent in rural servitude but also challenged it on 
economic grounds. 
Referring again to Tucker's criterion, Chernyshevskii asks 
whether forced labour is indispensable even in regions with 
less than 966 persons per geographical square mile. If this were 
the case there would have been partial justification, economically 
speaking, for servile labour. But taking the regions of the United 
States of America as evidence, Chernyshevskii tries to prove that 
in areas of low population density,free labour is efficient. With 
the help of the Americanpopu1ation figures of 1850 in the regions 
where there was free labour, Chernyshevskii showed that even with 
, a popUlation density of less than 66 persons per English squre mile, 
free labour existed, and thus was presumably most advantageous. 
He quotes, (a) Vermont, Massachussets, Connecticut and other New 
112 
England states where the population denaity was 43.07 per English 
square mile or 915 geographical square mile and (b) the north-
western states of IndiaU\ Illinois, Michigan and others where the 
population density was 16.75 per Eng~ish square mile or 356 persons 
per geographical square mile.(28) Thus there was no reason to 
favour forced labour anywhere where cultivation took place, since 
the population density everywhere in Russia exceeded 16.75 persons 
per English square mile: even in the Yaros1av province which 
provided the test case for the argument the population density was 
66 persons per square mile. 
In discussing the advantages of free labour, Chernyshevskii 
attaches importance to the role of the state, monarchial or 
otherwise, as the pnmoter of a more progressive form of production. 
He quotes Roscher, founder of the Historical School of Economics 
whom he disagreed with in many other respects, but who shared 
his view of the historical role of monarchies in doing away with 
slavery. Roscher dealt with different types of economic formations 
in different historical epochs. Here is one of his explanations 
of the deolineof servile labour in different countries. 
"The progress of civilisation increases the burden of labour. 
As the demands of luxury grow the gulf separating the master from 
the servants or the peasants widens everyday. As the industry and 
commerce develop the master finds it more and more advantageous 
to demand excessive labour, ••• the last bridle that could check 
the greed, becomes weaker while the demoralisation of masters and-
the servants grows in proportion to the increase in luxuries ••• that 
is why among almost all nations, in the course of the development 
of civilisation, state power endeavoured to abolish forced labour. 
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The autocratic monarchies of all nations saw the necessity of 
acting energetically against the forced labour and in favour 
of the betterment of the lot of the lower classes. In Italy 
Frederick II emancipated all the slaves of the state. In 
England Alfred the Great attempted to liberate the slaves, though 
unsuccessfully. Wilhelm I had more success. Queen Elizabeth 
accomplished in England what Frederick II did in Italy. Even in 
Russia, Tsar Ivan III restored the freedom to the peasants which 
they lost during the Mongol domination; but again they lost this 
right in the dim period of the beginning of the 17th century when 
the importance of the nobility in the state affairs iucreased~ 
In Bohemia, when the nobility became stronger during Vladislave II 
serfdom previously abolished was again restored. When the Danish 
aristocracy became strong in the government they also subjected the 
free settlers to servile domination." (29) 
Roscher tried to link the. growing influence of the nobility 
in state affairs with the restoration of serfdom. In quoting him 
Chernyshevskii was implying that a dominant gentry class and free 
labour did not go together. 
But the main question in Chernyshevskii's time was whether the 
government could justifiably interfere at all in the inner working 
of the economy as'a whole. It was the hey-day of laissez-faire, 
laissez-passer and that was the only conceivable view of economics. 
The sacrifice of the group interest (even if the group constituted 
the overwhelming majority in society) for wealth of 'the nation' was 
considered necessary,and no one questioned the assumption that the 
economy was a self-regulating system, wondrously adjusting itself to 
the best possible state. But this is what Chernyshevskii did 
question. He endorsed the intervention of the state, if undertaken 
in the best interest of the society. Often he referred to common 
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sense (zdravyi smysl') to justify this. Common sense tells us that 
the prosperity of a nation is inseparably linked up with the well~ 
being of the masses. Chernyshevskii was a normative economist. He 
reacted against the indifference of the policy makers towards the 
miserable plight of this majority of the people: the indifference, he 
said, was due to their resolve to sacrifice concrete reality for an 
abstraction, 
natsia. This 
concrete people for abstract nationhood, narod for 
,0 onoeptual 
being the Iz"r.~:t., L",~l foundation of the dominant school 
of economics in Chernyshevskii's time, the question of social evil of 
forced labour was ignored. "We will make full concession to the 
theory which says that the government must not interfere in politico-
economic relation", Chernyshevskii writes, "let us assume that the 
government must never, in whatever form and under whatever circum-
stances, concern itself with matters, which are subject to the 
operation of pOlitico-economic principles. We have expressed the 
law of the independence of economic labour from administrative 
measures with a more unqualified insistence than even the most ardent 
supporters of this system (the system of forced labour). Well, 
what follows from this? The government must not undermine the 
independent activity of politico-economic relations; so what sort 
of principles will not be the concern of the government? The answer 
is politico-economic principles. Now does forced labour belong to' 
politico-economic principles and are the relations arising from it 
" 
within the ambit of the laws of political economy? •• According 
to Storch, "forced labour 1S not within the scope of political 
economy; it is completely alien to the group of conceptions and 
relations subject to this science and its laws. All the scholars 
pursuing political economy, from Adam Smith to Roscher are in 
agreement with this." (30) 
ll5 
Chernyshevskii attacks with irony the upholders of the idea 
that an analysis of forced labour does not concern the science of 
political economy. He states, "thus whatever you think about the· 
dependence of politico-economic principles and relations on the 
government, or their independence of it, your politico-economic 
theories do not concern themselves at all with the question of 
forced labour." Chernyshevskii a~kfL if the question of forced 
labour is not the concern of political economy then.what sort of 
phenomenon is it? "Forced labour is a phenomenon, completely alien 
, 
to the laws of political economy", he continues ironically, "a 
historical phenomenon of quite a different order. It both arises 
and is upheld in opposition to all economic principles; this 
phenomenon is purely historical, arising out of relations and events 
belonging to the ambit of politics, military affairs, administr~ve 
power, but not in the least to political economy. It (an analysis 
of. forced labour) plays the part of an obstacle to devel~nt cr ooliucal 
economy." (31) In brie; Chernyshevskii wants to impress upon his 
readers the ridiculousness of the attempt of the theoreticians 
\ 
of political economy to avoid the analysis of forced labour. Forced 
labour constituted a major share in the working force in the 
agricultural sector of Russia at that time and it was the obligation 
of the political economis~ to analyse it carefully. 
Now Chernshevskii puts forward his own idea of the role of 
the government in economic matters. He emphatically asserts that 
the government under all circumstances must come forward when the 
welfare of its people is endangered. In his opinion, the role of 
/ the government is that of the guardian of the peoples' interest. 
"The government has not only the right, but it has,according to the 
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demands of all economists, a direct duty to remove from the 
nation all the obstacles to the working of the essential parts 
of the economic structure. If in a state there is absence of 
safety on roads, this hinders the development of economic life 
and so the government not only can but is obliged to make the 
roads safe. In a similar way, all economists would agree that 
the government is obliged to support justice with all its power, 
to observe the fulfilment of contracts, to punish criminals and 
so on. Precisely in the same way it has a duty in respect of 
free labour;' (32) 
Chernyshevskii did not propose that political economists 
should study forced labour as an autonomous subject but argued 
that if one considered hired labour properly, forced labour had 
to be considered also. 
According to him, if free labour is an element of investiga-
tion in the science of political economy, its corollary, forced 
labour should also be equally treated. As will be evident later , 
this was one of the characteristic ways by which Chernyshevskii 
attacked the arguments of his opponents, utilising their own 
assumptions to refute their reasons for upholding principles which 
Chernyshevskii considered regressive. The expression, 'all 
economists would agree' was used to preface the views of that body 
, 
of economic opinion which did not involve a belief in the infalli-
bility or unchangeability of the doctrine of laissez-faire, laissez-
passer. He called the Russian representatives of the English 
Classical School (Vernadskii, Bezobrazov and others) 'economists 
~ of a backward school' (ekonomisti otstaloi shkoly); by 'all economists' 
he meant those who opposed this school.(33) His reference to the 
~anger in the road' has been interpreted by K. A. ZhuravleY,a Soviet 
commentator on Chernyshevskii, as a cryptic demand for nationalising 
the landlords' estates without compensation. The reason for such 
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cryptic language is supposed to have been the vigilant censorship.(34) 
While it is true that Chernyshevskii had to express his radical 
views in allegorical and other indirect ways, Zhuravlev'ainterpreta-
tion of the 'danger in the road' is not entirely credible because 
in 1858 Chernyshevskiiwas not yet thinking in terms of emancipation. 
In fact he himself formulated a number of redemption schemes and 
he wanted to assemble at the time the whole body of pro-'aboli tiOlll 
opinion around his journal Sovremennik. This accounts for the 
inclusion of a long excerpt from Kavelin's important 'Zapiski ob 
osvobozhdenie krest'ian' in which not only the redemption of land, 
but also redemption of persons was recommended. 
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CHAPTER TWO CHERNYSHEVSKII AND HIS REDEMPTION SCHEMES 
When the abolition of serfdom became the talk of the day 
after the publication of the rescript, Chernyshevskii himself 
put forward some schemes of redemption. His thinking was 
focussed on two matters. Firstly, as has been mentioned above, 
he emphasised the economic necessity of abolition and, in doing 
so, he tried to rally liberal opinion around him, even though he 
differed on many fundamental issues with it ~ This was just a 
tactical manouvre to isolate the anti-abolitionists. Secondly, 
he took up the question of redemption payments. It became quite 
clear to him that abolition without any burdening of the peasants 
with redemption payments was the only correct s6lution, but 
that it was unlikely to occur. Indeed he foresaw that the gentry 
would put forward arbitrary and excessive claims of redemption 
to the government, which would find it difficult to ignore the gentry's 
interests. In order to prove that excessive claims by the gentry 
in case of abolition would be unfounded he presented his own calcula-
tions of norms for redemption and these were published in Sovremennik. 
He also wanted to show that the financial burden on the government 
. neoessarily 
would not I . . be heavy if abolition were carried through. 
In 1858, he published an article under the title, "On the 
necessity of Keeping to the Most Moderate Sums (of money) in 
determining th~ amount of redemption payment." (to neobkhodimosti 
derzhat'sa vozmozhno umerennykh tsifr pri opredelenii velichiny 
vykupa') (1). He examined the inter-play of economic factors that 
usually entered into any scheme of determining redemption payment. 
Yirst he dealt with the length of the period of redemption payment. 
He understood rightly that the official scheme of redemption would 
be formulated in such a manner that the peasants would have to pay 
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over a long period of time and during this period they would have 
to remain in a condition of semi-serfdom,even if they were legallv 
liberated. 
"But everyone proposes," he says, "a sum for redemption 
such as cannot be paid by the peasants at one time: so that it 
is generally accepted that the redemption must be spread over a 
number of years. Thus the account will not be closed in one 
instalment and the peasants will remain debtors for some time."(2) 
He asserted that three conditions had to be taken into con-
sideration while examining the length of the period for repayment 
of debts by the peasants. They were: (a) the amount of the 
principal, (b) the rate of interest and (c) the amount of the 
annual payment that would repay the principal plus the interest 
on the outstanding balance. So, (a) the more the capital, the 
longer would be the time to repay under a condition of fixed rate 
of interest and annual payment: (b) the higher the rate of interest, 
the more prolonged would be the time for total repayment if the 
amount of instalment and capital remain the same: and (c) the more 
the annual payment the quicker will be the repayment, if the 
principal and rate of interestare fixed. (3) As an illustration he 
takes 100 rubles as the amount of annual payment to repay both 
the capital and the interest accumulated on the outstanding balance. 
He first cons~ders the length of time necessary with varying amounts 
of capital. Chernyshevskii presents the following table to demonstrate 
his point.(4) 
capital 
Years (*) 
Total Payment 
Necessary 
R'ubles 
1000 1·500 2000 
12.06 20.22 30.99 
1206 2022 3099 
2500 
46.88 
4688 
(*) necessary for paying off the debt 
3000 
77 .89 
7789 
3300 
155.77 
15577 
120 
According to this table (the calculations are correct to the 
nearest integer). -the difference in the amount of payment 
increases exponentially as the capital increases. As is 
evident from the above table 46.88 years are required to pay 
off a debt of 2500 rubles at an annual payment of 100 rubles 
at 3%, whereas the corresponding figure for 1000 rubles is 
only 12.06years.Again if the debt increases only by 500 
rubles, the debtors have to wait for an additional 16.73 
years (46.88 less 30.15 years): the above table also clearly 
demonstrates the great increase in premium that the debtors 
would have to pay with a moderate increase of capital. ·By 
a straightforward arithmetical calculation it can be seen 
that an increase of 50% of capital, that is from 1000 rubles 
to 1500 rubles would mean that the debtors would be compelled 
to pay a premium of nearly 17% more per unit capital. This 
premium goes on increasing as the amount of capital increases. 
In the second example Chernyshevskii considers the role 
of the rate of interest. In this case he examines the effect 
of a change in the rate of interest with a constant capital of 
1000 rubles and a constant annual payment of 50 rubles. (5) 
Table 
Rate of·· 
Interest 
Period of 
4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4 .. 8 4.9 
Payment 41.06 42.69 44.54 46.71 49 .. 24 52.30 56.16 61.24 68.6682.76 
4.n years) 
Total .. 
Payment 
(Rubles) 
2052 2139 22272335 2462 2615 2803 3062 - 3433 4138 
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As is evident from the table, an increase of the rate of 
interest of 0.9% increases the period of payment from 41.06 
years to 82.76 years i.e the total payment is more than 
doubled. So, as soon as either the capital for the interest 
exceeds a moderate value,the repayment of the debt by the 
peasants will not only take a very long period but the whole 
amount will become burdensome for them. 
In the third example he assumes an annual payment of 125 
rubles; by keeping this payment constant he examines the 
nature and period of payment under varying capital and rates of 
interest. 
Capital 
1000 
1200 
1400 
1600 
1800 
2000 
Rate of 
Interest 
3 
3! 
4 
4! 
5 
6 
,Period 
necessary 
for paying 
off 
9.29 
11.90 
18.05 
28.95 
41.64 
74.18 
Total Sum 
to be paid 
ll5l rub 25 kop 
1487 
2250 
3618 
5205 
9272 
If 
If 
" 
50 
62 
75 
If 00 
" 50 
If 
" 
" 
" 
" 
Payment. 
of Interest 
alone Col.5 
less Col. 1 
151 rub 25 kop 
287 
850 
2018 
3405 
7272 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
50 
62 
75 
00 
50 
If 
" 
" 
If 
" (6) 
As is ~vident from the above table, with a constant increase 
of 200 rubles of capital and a i% increase of rate of interest 
(excep~ing the last row), the period and the amount of payment 
become exceedingly large and the premium over the original capital 
(col. 5) also increase exponentially. All these examples were 
introduced by Chernyshevskii to emphasize one basic point,that 
only a moderate and a bearable debt by the "emancipated" 
peasants had a meaning. It cannot be ascertained from Chernyshevskii's 
writing at this time whether he was a supporter of some kind 
of redemption or whether he was totally against any sort of 
redemption. It is very possible that in criticising so strongly 
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redemption schemes in which more than very moderate redemption 
. was to be paid, he was obliquely hinting at the view he later 
expressed openly that no redemption payment at all should be 
paid. It must be borne in mind that even if he had wanted to 
say something specific on this issue in the best interests 
of the peasants, he would not have been able to do so because 
of the censorship. He emphasised the reference in the rescript 
to the betterment of their (the peasants') condition in many 
of his arguments in support of his views on emancipation. 
When he published excerptsfrom Kavelin's article in Sovremennik 
in order to advance the cause of emancipation with land grant 
he had to face an attack from the censorship authority. In 
reply to this he maintained that the rescript did not simply 
use the expressions 'liberation' or 'emancipation' but 
'betterment of their condition' (uluchshenie ikh byta) and he 
adds, "it follows that the will of the emperor is that the 
emancipation of peasants should be accomplished in such a way 
as aefinitely to bring about the betterment of their (the peasants) 
condition." (7) 
The implication of Chernyshevskii's hypothetical redemption 
schemes as evident in tables 1 to 3 is that burdensome redemption 
was incompatible with the betterment of the condition of the 
peasants. The betterment of the condition of the peasants was 
the stated objective in the rescript. He also said that heavy 
redemption payment may be of immediate advantage to the creditors 
in quantitative financial terms, but in the long run would cause 
the ruiD.atiOllt,. of th~ debtors, that is the peasants, so that the 
very economic purpose for which abolition was designed would be 
defeated. Assuming that the government could be, in the last 
resort, at the receiving end financially after the peasants had 
been emancipated, a heavy redemption payment would kill the 
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goose that laid the $olden e?~ ~d thus prove uneconomic • 
. / ~ven arithmetic shows,· Chernyshevskii observes,· "that greed 
is not at]. all economic; that, on the contrary, the tlZuly 
prudent is as moderate as possible in his demands; we only 
ask at this point that the creditors should as far as possible 
calculate precisely, what they will get if they are moderate 
and what the consequences will be if their demands are 
excessive or immoderate." (8) 
At the beginning of 1859, Chernyshevskii published a most 
comprehensive treatise on ·redemption payments in Sovremennik 
under the title, Ustroistvo byta pomeshchich'ikhkrest'ian - 6: 
truden Ii vykup zemli? This develops further the previously 
formulated minimum scheme. In the meantime the Main Committee 
which was set up to recommend to the emperor ways and means for 
the successful abolition of serfdom had almost finished its 
deliberations and the trend of its recommendation was becoming 
quite transparent to Chernyshevskii. It-::is this that made him put 
forward his own comprehensive plan of redemption which would be 
truly in the interests of the peasants, rather than of the landlords, 
as was the case in official projects. The purpose of this paper 
was to show that the landlords are entitled only to a very low 
redemption payment. and in some cases to no payment at all. As has 
been explained above, Chernyshevskii was entirely opposed to the 
idea that the redemption payment, if spread over longer period, 
would be easier for the peasants to bear and this he tried to prove 
by concrete examples. He also reaffirms his earlier view that "the 
redemption of land given over to peasants who were formerly serfs, 
presents to many, almost all, a very serious problem ---- Some 
deceive themeselves by masking the difficulties, by having recourse 
to such phrases as 'it will be easy for the peasants to pay such-
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and-such an annual insta~ent' or in this way the peasants will 
quickly be able to repay the loan for their land.' It is 
sufficient to look at the figures produced by these (people who 
think redemption payment can be met 'easily' and 'quickly'):to 
see that the matter is neither 'easy'lPr quick'. It will be 
clear to almost everyone that the peasants would have to pay 
redemption money for land in excess of the obrok which they have 
to pay now and it would take 30, 35, 40 years or even longer, 
to repay in full. How can it be 'easy' or 'quick'? The 
figures do not correspond to the accompanying words. IF ••• Many 
people who argue about the peasant question say openly that the 
redemption of land at the present time is difficult, almost 
impossible and that it would be better to defer the measure to 
the future. n(9) There was a view current in economic circles 
at the time that the state finances were incapable of providing 
the necessary funds to compensate the landlord (in anticipation 
of repayment by the peasants) if the programme was carried out 
in a shorter period. The financial debacle of the Crimean war 
and the general economic crisis of 1857 were stated to be the 
reason for this. 
In replying to this thinking Chemyshevskii said, n'political 
economy openly affirms that the sum of the capital acquired by 
one generatIon from the preceding ones is very insignificant in 
comparison with the aggregate of values produced by the labour of 
this generation. For example, the entire land belonging to the 
French nation with all its buildings and everything inside them, 
with all its ships and cargoes, with all its cattle, all its 
money and all other wealth belonging to that country hardly 
comprises a value of a hundredmilliard francs; and the labour 
of the French people produces annually a value of fifteen or more 
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milliard francs, that is, in not more than seven years the1rench 
people produce an aggregate of values equal to the value of the 
whole of France from the English channel to the Pyren~es;. It 
follows that if the French had to redeem the whole of France from 
someone, they could do it in the course of one generation, using a 
fifth part of their income,mrredemption.And how does the matter 
stand with us? Is it the whole of Russia with all her wealth that 
needs to be ,redeemed? No, only the land. Is it the entire land 
of Russia? No, redemption applies only to those provinces of 
European Russia in which serfdom has taken root, that is, an area 
not extending over more than 60 thousand geographical square miles. 
Is the entire land of this area subject to redemption? Not at all: 
in this area as many free people live as there are serfs. And 
(although we have no correct information about the proportion of 
land there belonging to the state) one can say definitely that a 
little.less 'than half of these 60 thousand square miles belong to 
the state and a littLe more.than half belong to the serf-estates. 
Shall we claim the entire land from these 30 or 25 thousand square 
miles? No, only about a third is in the use of serf peasants • 
•• So, can it be difficult really for the great Russian people to 
redeem one-sixth of the area of European Russia?" (10) 
In order to arrive at the mean value of redemption for the 
whole of Russia, Chernyshevskii considers the data of two provinces, 
namely, Kiev and Smolensk, which were at the two extremes of the 
productivity range. The.obvious procedure to arrive at the mean 
value would have been to compute the average of the magnitudes of 
two extreme values. He does not take this logical course, but 
.. 
bases his estimate on the data concerning the province of Kiev, 
which was one of the richest in Russia. The purpose of this 
procedure is to show that even accepting the higher values of 
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the data of Kiev, one could arrive at a redemption scheme 
which would not be burdensome for the peasants. He 
justifies this method with the following words: "thus, for 
example, as the basis for our approximate conclusions, we will 
take a figure presented by the late Zhuravskii for the province 
of Kiev, one of the richest provinces; and this time we will 
not use the figures presented by Solov'ev for the province of 
Smolensk at all, because it is one of the poorest, and a com-
bination of its figure with that of Kiev would significantly 
reduce the result. In strict justice one must say that in our 
country provinces similar to those of Smolensk are not less 
typical than those of Kiev, and we would have the full right 
to base our results on Mr. Solov'ev's estimate as much as on 
the results of the late Zhuravskii. But I repeat, we would 
rather err on the side of too high a value than risk the 
possibility of the opposite." (ll) 
With this object in view, Chernyshevskii computed the 
average income per soul in Kiev. The number of souls in 1834 
in Kiev, according to Zhuravskii was 504,431 and the total 
income was 7,123,380 rubles, so the average income was 14 rubles 
12 kopeks per soul. But according to claims of the landlords on 
. . of 
the basis of the return of the income/their estates income was 
only 4,020,557 rubles, an average of 7 rubles and 9 kopeks per 
soul. Chernyshevskii does not use this last lower figure in 
his analysis. He wants to show that even with the greater 
valuation, .: only a very modest redemption payment is justified. 
With a note of irony he states, "We would have been justified 
of course, in not estimating the.incomes of the properties 
higher than the estimate of the owners themselves; but we only 
want to ask our readers to remember if need be, that whatever the 
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results obtained by us, the amount would have been decreased 
by more than 43% had we accepted the figure which it pleased 
the landlords themselves to quote before the peasant question 
arose. We will observe this principle to the point of exaggera-
tion.We will be concerned with the advantage of the landlords 
more than they are themselves, and instead of their own low 
figures, w~will take a higher figure compiled by Zhuravskii 
himself." (12) From the total gross income of 7,123,380 rubles, 
Chernyshevskii deducts the cost of management of estates and the 
insurance premia. The two charg~s taken together comprised 
between 3 to 40% of the total gross income. Chernyshevskii 
deducts only 10%, but also deducts the amount which the landlords 
receive as income from factories and other productive activities 
not connected with their estates. This amount was three million 
rubles. The remaining income is 3,711,042 rubles or 7 rubles 
36 kopeks per soul. Then capitalising this amount at 7~% (which 
he thought to be a reasonable rate of capitalisation) he obtains 
the figure of 98 silver rubles and 10 kopeks for the average 
redemption price of 'souls' of male sex. Now this amount included 
the redemption value of both land and persons and there was no 
formula, he stated, by which the relative proportion of these 
values could be worked out. Though he admitted that, according to 
the provisions laid down by the Imperial rescript, a person was not 
n· 
subject to redemption, he could not ignore this factor. The 
reason was that Chernyshevskii wanted to show that even providing 
for redemption of persons the redemption payment by th~peasant~ 
could not be burdensome. In addition, by applying his principle 
of maximum advantage, he assumed that' incomes from and the value 
of the land in both the obrok and the barshchina dominated 
sectors were the same. "According to our rule, in those cases 
where the correct figure is not known and an error is therefore 
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unavoidable, it is better to err on the side of an increase than 
a decrease.' We will take it that the estates under obrok must 
be valued exactly in the same way as those under barshchina. 
The reader will see that in this way the redemption sum clearly 
becomes more than the actual value; we have already said that 
estates under obrok yield less income in general than those in 
barshchina. But in spite of this, let us assume that they 
yield the same income. Again it is well-known that the personal 
obligations of a peasant emancipated without redemption are a 
much greater part,and the land a much lesser part of the 
overall value of the estates under obrok, than of those under 
barshchina. But we will again stretch a point by increasing 
the sum of redemption: let us assume that in the obrok estates 
land has the same value as under barshchina." (13) 
Applying this principle and using the data for 11 Kievian 
uezds given by:"Zhuravskii, and assuming that the value of personal 
labour is twice the value of land, Chernyshevskii arrives at the 
following interesting figures: 
Value of landlords' land per unit 621 rubles or 35.5% 
Value of the peasants" la~d per UIit 379 rubles or 21.5% 
Value of forced labour (twice the 
758 rubles or 43% 
value of the land of peasants) 
Total 1758 rubles 
As 21.5% is the total value of peasants' land and as the 
total value per soul has been calculated at 98.1 rubles per soul, 
the redemption value in barshchina areas where the value of the 
person is nil, cannot exceed 21 rubles. But the argument does 
not end here. At this stage, Chernyshevskii brings in an 
interesting argument in support of a 'negative' redemption value. 
According to some landlords the income from forced labour was not 
less than 30 silver rubles per tiaglo: he takes this figure and, 
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assuming that 100 souls comprised 30 tiaglos, calculates that 
the total income accrued from forced labour alone was 900 rubles, 
whereas, according to earlier calculations, the total annual 
. . . W~ . 
value of the person and the land per soul/7 rubles and 36 kopeks,. 
that is 736 rubles for 100 souls or 30 tiaglos. In such cases, 
therefore, the landlords were due to receive a 'negative' 
redemption payment of 1 ruble 64 kopeks per annum or 21 rubles 
90 kopeks in a lot when capitalised at 7i%. This meant that not 
only would the landlords have to give all lands to the peasants 
free but would also have to pay a sum of 21 rubles and 90 kopeks. (IS) 
If',on the other hand, the value is taken at a higher level, that 
is, at 36 rubles per tiaglo, and if it is assumed that 100 souls 
comprise 40 tiaglos, then the total capitalised value of forced 
labour at 7i% would be 19200 rubles and the redemption value of 
the entire estate with 100 souls, would be 9810 rubles (7 rubles 
36 kopeks capitalised at 7i% as shown before). Thus in the 
event of the abolition of serfdom on such estates, not the 
peasants but the landlords who would be obliged to pay 9390 rubles 
to the peasants and, at the same time give them the land. 
Chernyshevskii's argument, though appearing somewhat perverse in 
the face of the actual discussion of emancipation, is perfectly 
logical and incontrovertible. There is no doubt that at this 
stage he was trying to emphasise that the abolition of serfdom 
should be without any sort of redemption payment by the peasants 
or, to be precise, the landlords had no right to accept any 
payment from the peasants as their price for being freed from 
serfdom •. The article, '0 neobkhodimosti derzhat'sa vozmozhno 
umerennykh tsifr pri opredelenii velichiny vykupa gives no 
indication that the landlords had no right to compensation: on 
the contrary~it suggests, moderate schemes of redemption payment, 
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as has been pointed out earlier. Whether the proposed amount of 
payment would have satisfied even the most liberal proponents 
of abolition is another question, but ~ that stage he did not 
challenge the landlords' right to ask for compensation. Yet 
hardly a year had passed when the situation was made clear to 
him and he shed any illusion he may have entertained about the 
real aims of the landowning gentry and the reformist government. 
Chernyshevskii did not, of course, stick unrealistically 
to his discovery of the validity of negative redemption payment. 
He wanted to allow as much flexibility as possible in his analysis. 
He displayed all signs of objectivity by concentrating , as he 
himself repeatedly pointed out, on sound economic principles. 
But he sought to dispel the mist of confusion and double-th-inkiilg 
that was created in the minds of the public by the deliberations 
in the different committees on abolition and to emphasise the 
immensity of the task and the difficulties involved in its 
fulfilment. 
Pursuing his calculations, Chernyshevskii contended that one-
fifth of the total value. of estates per soul was the value of 
forced labour. By deducting one-fifth from 98 rubles 10 kopeks, 
the value of land comes to 78 rubles 48 kopeks, while, according 
to the pr~vious table, the proportion pf peasant allotment was 
37.9%. Applying this percentage to the value of land, Chernyshevskiio 
arrives at the average figure of redemption per person in areas 
under barshchina of 29 rubles 74 kopeks. After giving allowance for 
pastures and meadows, he arrives at the mean value of redemption in 
regions under obrok, which was 68 rubles 67 kopeks. Assuming further 
that the ratio::; of barshchina to obrok was 2:1, he concluded that 
the redemption payment amounts to an average figure of 49 rubles 
5 kopeks for all estates in the Kiev province. Now for the 
whole of Russia he employed the weighted average method 
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ln computing the average redemption payment .• (16) The procedure 
was as foIbws: after calculating the average redemption figure 
for Kiev, which was one of the richest provinces, he used 
Solov'ev's figures for the province of Smolensk, which was one 
of the poorest. Combining these two figures and assigning weights 
according to the total serf population in these two provinces, 
and assuming that the ratio' between obrok and barshchina peasants 
'was 1:19 in ~iev, the mean amount of redemption for the whole of 
Russia was found to be 36 rubles and 12 kopeks. Chernyshevskii 
used the usual formulae for weighted average. 
wk Yk + Ws Ys/wk + ws ' where Wk = 594431 souls, 
Yk = 40 rubles 71 kopeks 
and w~, = 378038 souls, 
Ys = 29 rubles 95 kopeks 
Next, Chernyshevskii discusses ways of obtaining the necessary 
finance for redemption payments. Broadly speaking, he suggested 
three mutually exclusive plans. In the first of these, which was 
the most important from the economic point of view, he sug~sted 
the following procedur~: according to his calculation there was 
a difference of 3 rubles between the taxes of serfs and free 
peasants, i.e the state peasant had to pay 12 rubles as tax and 
the landlords'peasants 9 rubles in addition to other obligations. (17) 
When emancipated the serfs would be expected to pay 12 rubles per 
annum as tax and they would be relieved from any obligation 
to the landlord. So, this additional amount of 3 rubles 
(12 rubles less 9 rubles) paid as tax by the emancipated peasants 
Would be a source of extra revenue to the state treasury. Hence 
if this additional revenue of,3 rubles per soul is paid back 
to the landlords by being converted into bonds of different 
denominations, the entire amount of redemption would in fact 
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be paid by the peasants themselves and thus the state would 
not have to take any additional burden for paying compensa-
tion to the landlords. Chernyshevskii showed, with the help 
of figures '. that these bonds would finally mature after 
22 years 4 months, assuming that the landlords would be allowed 
to withdraw money by cashing the bonds only thrice a year. 
He also made a distinction between the different categories 
of serfowners and suggested that the date of maturity of bonds 
should depend on the economic status of the landlord, that is, 
whether he belonged to the poorer or the richer class of 
landlords. Since the small landlords were not well-off and 
were not due to receive a large payment of redemption, these 
bonds should, in his opinion, have earlier dates of maturity, 
say within the first two or three years. Following the same 
rule, the owners of the middle sized estates would have to wait 
7 or 8 years before these bonds mature; the rich landlords 
would have to wait still more. In this scheme, with the 
passage of time, the number and quantum of unredeemed estates 
would gradually decrease, until in the very last phase only 
a handful of very large estates will remain unpaid (but retain-
ing ownership of the bonds.) (18) 
After presenting this scheme, Chernyshevskii asks whether 
it would not all of a sudden vest the landlords with huge 
spending power, and whether this would not lead to an inflationery 
situation affecting the economic stability of the country. The 
suggestion that small landlords should be the first tocash their 
bonds was supposed to obviate such a prospect. To meet the 
state's deficiency of cash reserves a limited extra issue of 
. . 
notes would be made, which would constitute only a very small 
and hardly inflationery percentage, say 5% of the total amount 
of notes in.circulation. As the. landlords could only cash three 
not 
tim~s ay~ar, th~r~ wouldib~ continuous flow of additional m~~ey 
throughout the year. When bonds of medium landlords would come 
to maturity the additional spending ability of the community in 
the shape of its disposable income would be offset by a corresponding 
increase in the productivity of land after emancipation, and thus 
the apprehended 'inflationery gap' would no longer be real. As 
regards the big landlords, Chernyshevskii proposed that their 
denomination of bonds should be of a very high value, for example, 
10,000 or 20,000 rubles, and the~e should be a provision that they 
could not be cashed in parts. He knew that this group of landlords 
were generally very rich and they could easily find other means 
to get the required amount of money than by-the disposal of these 
bonds. There was every chance that they would keep them as a 
. fixed asset, rather than convert them into liquid assets. This 
argument is quite indisputable from the theoretical stand-point. 
Subsequent theories of government budgeting uphold Chernyshevskii's 
approach. That an additional flow of money at any given time in 
the presence of a productivitylag creates an inflationery situation 
... 
is well-known, but this is off-set by an increased tempo of 
production in any sphere, if the institutional set-up allows it. 
In Chernyshevskii's scheme, there are fixed points in time (viz. 
three) when an additional flow of money is suggested, and the 
government," having prior information, can carefully avoid the 
~idening of the infl at ionery gap. From this point of view the 
scheme and the economic.reasoning contained in it are perfectly 
plausible, although Chernyshevskii did not contribute significantly 
. , . .. _. " 
in the theoretical sense, apart from presenting clearly a 
, 
criticism of the 'classical quantity theory. In fact, in this 
essay he produced Irving Fisher's argument in the early twentieth 
century and showed the invalidity of the latter's position in a 
mndition of less than full employment. Chernyshevskii anticipated 
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the criticisms of adherents of the quanity theory of money and clearly 
refuted those in support of his position. 
In another article in the same year under the title, 'Materials 
for the solution of the peasant question' (Materialy dlia resheniya 
krest'ianskogo voprosa) Chernyshevskii follows up his arguments and 
schemes for the extent of compensation. It is worthwhile to 
examine these in detail. He first indicates the paradox in the 
sale price of landlords' estates. It is found, he says, that, 
given the income per dessyatina to a landlord of 40 rubles on an 
estate comprising 100 souls and 1000 dessyatin, the profit would 
not be 40,000 but only 25,000 rubles, or 30,000 rubles at the 
most. The main reason for this paradox lies in the fact that a 
portion of the land is given out to the peasants and this portion 
is not included in the valuation of the estates. Chernyshevskii 
presented this example to assert', that any redemption scheme 
based on landlords' earning capacity according to his size of estate 
would be misleading. Then Chernyshevskii presents his arguments 
in favour of hired labour with the help of hypothetical example 
to show that even if the serfs were freed without any compensation 
to the landlords, the estates could be run more profitably. He assumes 
that landlords had to spend 3 rubles towards working capital for 
cultivating their portion of the land, applying forced labour. The 
gross income per dess~ ~n such cases is 12 rubles, that is, a 
net income of 9 rubles per dessyatina. Whereas, if he employs.' 
hired labour, he has to spend, say, another 4 rubles in wages, so 
that his cost of production comes to 7 rubles. But the gross income 
per dessyatina in this case would be 20 rubles. According to 
this calculation the landlord gains 4 rubles per dess. if he 
employs hired labour (20 rubles less 12 rubles, less 4 rubles). 
It is worth mentioning that Chernyshevskii did not use, any empirical 
data to illustrate the point; rather, he chooses some hypothetical 
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figures to demonstrate his consistent' assertion that productivity 
under hired labour is greater than under forced labour. "Thank 
heavens", Chemyshevskii observes, "landlords have understood 
this and, apart from a few people with very little foresight, 
everyone finds a direct advantage in freeing peasants from personal 
bondage without any compensation. In this case as in all others, 
that which is most profitable from the economic point of view 
coincides with justice". (19) This statement evidently contains 
a note of irony because the landlords never considered emancipation 
without compensation for persons, 
Chemyshevskii then proceeds to demonstrate the extent of capital 
gain that would accrue to the landlord after emancipation. Assum-
ing that 220 dessyatins of landlords' land were cultivated at 
9 rubles per dessyatina, the gross income would come to 1980 rubles, 
which, when capitalised at 8%, gives the sale price of the estate 
at 20,000 rubles. With the emancipation from servile labour and the 
introduction of hired labour, 220 dess. of land yields an income 
of 2860 rubles which, when capitalised at 8%, gives 3~650 ru~Jes as 
the sale price of the estate. Thus, inspite of the fact that the 
amount of land would decrease for the landlords, due to the 
abolition of serfdom, the part remaining with them (two-third) 
would fetch a much higher price than the entire estate under serfdom. 
This type of capital gain, therefore, would make it unnecessary for 
the landlords, especially for those practising barshchin~, to have 
any compensation. Some economists, Chernyshevskii adds, may raise 
the question of how to acquire the additional working capital of 
4 rubles per dessyatina to spend on hired labour. lut this is, 
according to him, the responsibility of the landlord because if 
he seeks additional benefit from his enterprise, it is up to him 
to find further resources for his own benefit and, in any case, 
the amount (that is, 4 rubles per dess.) was quite insignificant 
for a landlord.(20) 
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Yet there was one more important question to settle, namely 
the landlord's indebtedness. An opinion was expressed in the 
course of the discussion of the emancipation projects that a 
portion of this debt was to be compensated for by the peasants, 
who would be allotted land as part of the emancipation deal. 
Chernyshevskii rejected this opinion on the following grounds: 
"If we examine the utilisation of the loan, obtained by the land-
lords from credit institutions, we find that a greater portion ' 
of it, at least two-thirds,went to meet the personal expenses 
of the landlords themselves, for whose way of life their income 
was insufficient. A significant part of the rest was then' 
utilised for the buying of new estates or the establishment of 
industrial undertakings, that is, again for the perso~ benefit 
of the landlords. Excluding these two items from the sum of debt, 
we find that scarcely one-fifteenth part, or one~.welfthat most, 
was applied for aid to the peasants. If a precise, mathematical 
assessment is made, only that part of the loan. utilised by the 
peasants should be transferred to them."(2l) After agreeing 
provisionally that landlords should be compensated for one-twetth 
or one-fifteenth part of their debt, Chernyshevskii expresses 
willingness to make a further allowance to them. He agrees with 
others that, after abolition, the landlords would have to spend 
a considerahle amount to increase the working capital for their 
own agriculture, and this will take some time. During this period 
it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to pay the annual 
instalment of their debt to the credit institutions. Such being 
the case, he included the amount of payment of two instalments 
in the total sum of compensation to be paid by the peasants. 
He arrives at the following break-down: 
Wages to be paid for tilling the land @ 4 rubles per' 880 rubles 
dessyatina for 220 dessyatin 
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One-twelth part of the loan used for the benefit of 
the peasants, that is, 5 rubles per soul (since 
the total loan was 60 rubles per soul) for 100 
souls 
The two instalments of loan at 3 rubles 30 kopeks 
per soul per year; so for 100 souls for 2 years 
Total 
500 rubles 
660 rubles 
2040 rubles (22) 
Thus, the necessary compensation per soul comes to 20.4 rubles. 
This when capitalised at 8% becomes 294 rubles 80 kopeks. This 
shows roughly the situation in estates under barshchina. As for 
the estates under obrok, Chernyshevskii challenges the very 
right of the landlords to receive .obrok. As has been mentioned, 
in his view, the basis of serfdom is forced labour and if the 
land of any estate is infertile or not sufficiently productive in 
the estimattion of the landlords, they have no right to extract 
money obligation from their peasants. Legal serfdom, he says, 
requires the peasants to remain within the boundary of the estate 
and to work for their landlords a certain period of time every week 
and the rest for their own subsistence. The law did not recognise 
anything more than this. He therefore condemns, firstly,the 
. practice of the landlords to receive money payments when the peasants 
remain within the boundary of the estate and,secondly, resolutely 
rejects the still less tolerable condition of those who have to go 
elsewhere in search of non-agricultural work in order to pay their 
obligations to the landlords. He calls this an 'excess of serfdom' 
(prevyshenie krepostnogo prava) which was quite illegal.(23) 
But the landlords in obrok areas, according to Chernyshevskii, 
were not only not entitled to compensation because of its question-
able legal validity and indeed its immorality; they were not even 
entitled to it on strictly economic grounds. His own scheme for 
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the redemption of estates under obrok contained the following 
argument: . In obrok the entire land is utilised by the peasants 
against a definite money payment. Chernyshevskii takes 440 
dessyatins (instead of 220 dessyatins, as in the case of 
barshchina)which, when multiplied by a net income of 9 rubles 
per dess., gives 3960 rubles. Since the peasants were obliged 
to work half of their time for the landlords (3 days a week 
according to the law), the value of obrok stood at 1980 rubles. 
Capitalising this at 71% or 8%, gives nearly 25000 rubles, which, 
according to Chernyshevskii, is the legal value of redemption. 
This value is identical with that of estates under barshchina. 
But, he states, it is well-known that instead of 440 dessyatins 
of aerableland, the peasants do not find more than 250 dess. fit 
for cultivation on obrok estates, because the rest is barren.(24) 
Out of this 250 dess. the peasants can till 180 dess., if they 
work for three days a week for their own subsistence, while the 
remai~der, that is, 70 dess. is·left for the landlords. This, 
multiplied by the net income of 9 rubles per dess., yields an 
income of 630 rubles\which, when capitalised at 8%, gives the 
value of redemption at 7875 rubles. At this point he introduces 
again his interesting idea of a negative redemption payment. There 
were endless estates under obrok where the value of produce did 
not cover the expenses of production. Say 15 rubles was the cost 
of production per dess. and 13 rubles the gross value of the 
product~ then for 440 dessyatin occupied by 100 souls, the loss 
would be 880 rubles and the capitalised value of this sum would 
be 11000 rubles at 8%. In other words, if the peasants insist 
on going back to barshchina, the landlords would have to spend 
2 rubles per dessyatina over and above the value of the produce 
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just to feed the peasants. When, therefore, the peasants are 
emancipated they will be entitled to a payment of 110 rubles 
per soul. But, as before, Chernyshevskii does not insist on 
this. He concentrates rather on the landlords' debt to the 
credit institutions and also on the rate of obrok per tiaglo 
and, finally, comes to the conclusion that a compensation of 
89 rubles per soul would be quite justified. (25) This amount 
can look after the expenses for hired labour that would be 
necessary after emancipation to till the landlords' land and 
can also pay back the money owed to the government credit 
institutions. But he warns that this money is quite adequate 
if it is utilised for production purposes. If, on the contrary, 
the landlords spend this compensation money on unproductive and 
conspicuous consumption, it would not help them in any way. 
According to Chernyshevskki this amount of redemption is reasonable • 
• 
"The Russian people", he says, "do not consist of economists, they 
have not read Adam Smith". They know that the landlords must be 
compensated and this compensation should serve to bridge the 
. . . . 
difference in the conditions of the state and the landlords' 
peasants: there should be no difference between the two after 
abolition. (26) "The code of laws", Chernyshevskii cOBDlude"S, 
"national feeling, political economy lead to the(idea')that 
redemption is hardly advantageous and even hardly possible; but 
redemption can be obtained in as much as state finance permits it 
and in accordance with national feeling." (27) The general 
impression gained from Chernyshevskii's analysis and suggestions 
is that they represent a challenge to the schemes formulated by 
the gentry guberniia committees and the Editorial commission 
engaged in working out the abolition measures. Because of the 
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trend 'taken by those who were preparing the official emancipation 
projects, he became opposed to the principle of redemption pay-
ments to the landlords,although he could not spell out his views 
because of the censorship. This clearly demonstrates a change 
in his attitude between 1858 and 1859 from one of relative 
enthusiasm for the Imperial rescript to one of growing scepticism 
about the whole enterprise. 
Chernyshevskii and liberal opinion 
As has been mentioned earlier, Chernyshevskii tried, shortly 
after the publication of the rescript, to assemble liberal 
opinion on the abolition of serfdom as a move against the anti-
abolitionist gentry position. His journal Sovremennik became 
one of the principal forums of genuine emancipation opinion. 
In 1858, he published an extensive excerptfrom Kavelin's 'Notes 
on the Emancipation of the Serf-peasants' (Zapiski ob osbovozhdennii 
krepostnykh krest'ian) with some minor modifications. Chernyshevskii 
did not agree with Kavelin on many points, specially where they 
concerned redemption payments. But, though Sovremennik was an 
organ of radical thinking, he chose to publicize Kavelin's view on 
the matter. Apart from rallying all available opinion in favour 
of abolition, this served to weaken the vascillation in governmental 
.. , 
circles and, at the same time, to contribute to the polarization 
of opinion. '. 
Kavelin's observations in his Zapiski on serfdom and emancipa-
tion are summarised by him as follows: " ••• it is hardly possible," 
he says, "to find another state where well-being was at such a 
low stage of development, where so little capital was in circulation 
and where poverty was so uniformly spread between all the classes 
of the nation." (28) The reason of such a situation according to 
him, was not inefficient management, or absence of a strong 
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jUdiciary and a correct credit system, or 'deep' ignorance or 
general diseconomy in production. . He says, "but neither of 
these reasons can penetrate so deep in the national life, 
neither of these defeats industrial activities of the people 
at its very embryonic stage, neither of these kills the moral 
and material success of Russia as serfdom i. which the entire 
half of g~n~ral population is ~niangied'.J/ (29) Kavelin found 
the root-cause of all the maladies of Russia in serfdom, or 
to be more precise, in forced and unpaid labour. There,may 
be plenty of right-thinking people in Russia, but she was 
inhabited by 25.5 million men' and women who were deprived of 
"every stimulus to pursue their trades, and the r,ight to demand 
the compensation for their work". Kavelin here agrees with 
Chernyshevskii in ascribing the backwardness of Russia to the 
existence of serfdom. When Kave1in speaks of obrok, he , like 
Chernyshevskii, condemns it as the primary cause of diseconomy 
in the whole sphere of agriculture. "Obrok by serfs who live on 
passports is a tax on labour, a personal payment, which is so 
immoderate that it deprives the serf of all energy,of all willing-
ness to pursue any occupation."(30) As a consequence of this 
system, he says, "a considerable percentage of the working force 
of the entire serf-population of Russia is lost without being 
of use to the landlords or to itself, and consequently to the 
state in general", (31) Serfdom, according to Kavelin, is 
associated with a primitive economic a"~ouut~b.g,, with a regime 
. 
of low prices of crops. "Not having any opportunity to calculate 
how much he himself spent on the production of crops, the landlord 
is not in a position to determine the lowest and the minimum price 
below which it is not possible for him to se,ll crops without 
suffering a loss, and so most landlords consider only the market 
price and their own consumption.(32) An artificial deflationary 
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price thus created, affects everyone "who lives in Russia and 
lives on the land." (33) Furthermore, the existence of such a 
mass of unpaid labour inevitably lowers wages. Thus, not only 
the lower classes are the losers but also the government. (34) 
This echoes Chernyshevskii's arguments against Tengoborskii, 
referred to earlier. 
Kavelin's verdict 1S that " ••• Russia is condemned to petrify, 
to exist in the present form. ~e~th~r advancing forward, nor 
having anything that could promote a change in the situation so 
long as serfdom overshadows our basic social and civil life; all 
our social maladies are tied with this Gordian knot."(35) In 
analysing the 'main principle' or 'the basis' of the emancipation 
of the landlords' peasants, Kavelin proposes the following 
measures: (a) serfs should be emancipated completely from their 
dependence on the master; (b) it is incumbent upon the government 
to emancipate the peasants not only with all the property 
belonging to them but also definitely with land and (c) emancipation 
must be carried out by compensating the landlords and not otherwise.(36) 
Compensation was necessary because "the emancipation of peasants 
without compensation to the landlords, would, firstly, be a dangerous 
precedent undermining the social order and the community 1n its 
very foundation; secondly, it would suddenly subject the numerous class 
of educated and prosperous consumers to misery in Russia ••• ; thirdly, 
the landlords of the estates, where cultivation of land by hired labour 
will cost more than the income it will accrue with the emancipation, 
will be deprived of income altogether from these estates." (37) 
As a basis of compensation, Kavelin suggested a redemption payment 
for both land and person. The validity of a redemption for land 
seemed self-evident to almost all sections of the public, but 
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the right to redemption of persons was not clearly justifiable 
to everybody. Kavelin criticises the view against the redemption 
of person by saying that 'it is unj~st' to deprive the landlord 
of his p:-operty, "because the serfs are as much a property of 
the landlords as is the land; it is inequitable because only 
in a few densely populated an~ agricultural guberniias, has land 
much value while serfs have none or very little; in all the 
other primarily industrial or at least in agricultural provinces 
with a thin population, the landlords do not get income from the 
., 
land, but from the serfs." (38) In spite of the fact that Kavelin 
condemned obrok he came out with a justification of compensation 
to the receivers of obrok for the payers of obrok. It may be 
remembered that, though Chernyshevskii did not subscribe to this 
view, in his article 'Is the redemption of land difficult' (Truden 
Ii vykup zemli?) discussed the possibility of redemption of 
person under obrok; yet, as has been pointed out, all his arguments 
are basically directed to show the unjustifiability of redemption 
for either person or land. This became quite clear in his 'Materials 
for the Solution of the Peasant question' (Materially dlia reshenia 
krest'ianskogo voprosa), published in 1859, which deal predominantly 
with the compensation of estates under obrok. 
Another important figure in the liberal camp was Boris Chicherin. 
His views on, emancipation almost coincided with those of Kavelin: 
both represented the typical trend of liberal thinking. In an 
article published in Atenei in 1858 under the title, 'On the Present· 
and the Future Position of the Landlords' Peasants' (0 nastoiashchem 
i budushchem polozhenii pomeshchich'ikh krest'ian) Chicherin states 
that:. "th~ purpos~ ~f th~ r~fo~ is the full~st fr~edom of the 
individual in his economic relations" (39) Chicherin did not 
• 
attach any importance to the legal concept of equality because 
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he believed that "equality under freedom is nothing but 
mockery (chimera)" (40). According to him the aim of the reform 
should be the replacement of forced labour by hired labour 
betweell 
based on an agreement /: individual persons. (41) He 
characterised the consequences of serfdom in the following way: 
"the higher class guaranteed in its existence by the labour of 
the subjects, it deprived of all encouraging reasons to personal 
endeavour; in the lower classes, on the other hand, forced 
labour and a desperate situation kill all energy and initative.'(42) 
As regards the question of whether emancipation should be with or 
without land, Chicherin asserted that the peasants must be 
emancipated with land, in fact with the land which they were 
tilling for their own use before the abolition of serfdom, (43) 
because "peasants must not be homeless farm labourers but settled 
property h9lders".(44) In spite of.-such a criticism of serfdom 
and advocacy for emancipation, Chicherin proposed redemption of 
both land and person as the basis for abolition of serfdom. (45) 
Part 3 
Chernyshevskii's views on the Commune and 
his theory of social development. 
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Chapter One Chernyshevskii and the economic advantages 
of the Commune 
As capitalism developed in the 19th century in western 
Europe, there was a growing concern in Russia about the 
impoverishment and pauperisation of workers that went 
hand in hand with such a development. All variants of 
public opinion were apprehensive of the formation of a 
preletariat within Russian society in the event of a 
capitalist path of development of her economy. Consequen-
tly the government was not keen on freeing the serfs 
.. 
even if the situatiorr,demanded so lest the free serf popu-
lation were transformed into a city proletariat. The 
radical intelligentsia, on the other hand, fought for 
the emancipation of serfs and projected a non-capitalistic 
path of development. The main source of such a socialist 
trend of thought lay in the existence of a village organi-
sation known as the obshchina (commune). The socialist 
pattern of corporate ownership of land by the members of 
the commune and the nature of its redistribution amongst 
them prompted social thinkers to believe that Russia 
could avoid ~capitalism and its associated miseries if 
a. 
she could build/economy based on an improved form of the 
communal organisation. The salient feature of the commune 
was that'land at its disposal was owned communally. The 
rationale of its distribution among its members was des-
cribed by Baron von Haxthausen: "The following information 
was given to us concerning the division of land in the 
village Communes. The principle is, that the whole of 
the land (tillage, meadows, pasture, woods, streams, 
etc.,) belongs to the population regarded as a unity, and 
every'male inhabitant has a right to an equal share. 
This share is therefore constantly changing; for the birth 
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of every boy creates a new claim, and the share of those 
who die revert to the Commune. The woods, pastures, 
hunting-groUnds, and fisheries remain undivided, and free 
to all the inhabitants; but the aerable land and meadows 
are divided, according to their value, amongst the males. 
This equal division is of course difficult, as the soil 
differs in quality, and portimns of it may be distant or 
inconveniently situated. There are however in each com-
mune skilful land-surveyors, without any education but 
what has been acquired from the traditional habits of the 
place, who execute the work to the satisfaction of all; 
the land is first divided, according to its quality, posi-
tion, or general value, into sections, each possessing 
on'~the whole equal advantage~ the sections are then divided 
into as many portions, in long strips, as there are shares 
required, and these are taken by lot. This is the usual 
plan but each District, and frequently each Commune, has 
its local customs and it would be very interesting to 
. collect these. The al10ttment takes place in an assembly 
of the whole Commune, including the women and children. 
A very just spirit prevails, and disputes never occur. 
If too small a share is supposed to have fallen to any 
one, it is made up to him of the ~-·teserve. In the Govern-
ment of Yaros1av, for instance, many of the Communes have 
peculiar measuring rods, which are almost regarded as 
sacred; they correspond with the quality of the soil, the 
rod for the best land being the shortest, and that for 
the worst the longest; the shares therefore vary in size, 
but are equal in va1ue."(1) 
In his numerous writings, Herzen also expressed the 
belief that the village commune was the key to the trans-
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formation of Russian society. He believed that powerful 
elements of socialism were inCluded in the very structure 
of the obshchina. "In the form of communal ownership,~ 
he said, "socialism becomes realistically possible; 
under hereditory land ownership it is deprived of its 
basis. Perhaps theoretical socialism does not recognise 
this because it does not find its worked-out forms in the 
existing communes. But in historical experience as well 
as in all types of organic life, forms are realised not 
according to prescription but according to the necessary 
combination of highly complex elements."(2) Herzen was 
evidently attacking the necessitarian socialist position 
of his time. He was also opposed to the contemporary 
liberal opinion in Russia which considered the commune 
an outdated organisation serving no longer any useful 
purpose. Herzen believed that although the commune was 
an ancient institution it could rescue Russia from the 
series of misfortunes that western Europe was subjected 
to. But he insisted that it was not the fear of im-
poverishment of the masses but the dream of a healthy 
society that prompted him to advocate the benefits of 
the commune. \' There are different attitudes to the 
Russian commune", he says. "Many valued it especially 
for economic reasons and among other things (they) find 
that the communal organisation will rescue (Russia) from 
proletarianisation. I, for my part, find the communal 
organisation only a guarantee of an orderly, healthy and 
a humane rural administration in Russia. Besides,I love 
the commune because I am convinced that communal life has 
saved the Russian peasants from an ultimate and a total 
intellectual and moral decline."(3) Elsewhere Herzon s~ated 
that the peasants who were united in a commune were 
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immune from the misfortunes that an individual peasant 
proprietor was vulnerable to. If there were crop fail-
ures or other misfortunes, it was the landlord who would 
lose his estate but the members of the commune would 
remain in a healthy bond as before,though temporarily 
in a straightened economic circumstance. (4) 
Many followed Herzen, Ogarev and Chernyshevskii ;In 
believing that Russia had a unique advantage over other 
European nations because the commune was still a living 
social organism, whereas elsewhere it had virtually dis-
appeared. Herzen said that the Russian commune survived 
inspite of the 'blows of Imperial battering'. Ogarev, 
Herzen's friend and collaborator, stated that the future 
of Russia depended on the commune. " ••• Right to land 
and its communal ownership~ he wrote, "presupposes communal 
reorganisation as a geneological base of the whole struc-
ture of the state which was supposed to develop on this 
basis. The communal administration survived in spite of 
the pressure of foreign governments and power of the land-
lords... This character of communal administration struck 
Haxthausen, then various American travellers/including 
the well-known economist Carey, who himself told me this 
year after returning from Russia, that in the corporate 
principle "of our commune lies the great foundation of 
self-administration.' Thus, immemorial elements of coo-
peration brought in by the Russian peasants through the 
Mir are now coming into their own and meeting the need 
of economic transformation in Europe."(5) 
Ogarev mentions three principles of this transforma-
tion and insists that only on the basis of these principles 
could Russia progress towards the future. These are: 
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(a) right of everyone to land, (b) communal ownership of 
land, and (c) communal administration.(6) 
Haxthausen also discovered a unique potential in the 
Russian commune, that is, its capacity to hinder a social 
process leading to the formation of a proletariat in 
Russia. "The facts here described" he says "constitute 
the basis of the Russian communal system, one of the most 
remarkable and interesting political institutions in exi-
stence, and which possesses great advantages for the 
social condition of the cou~try. The communes present 
an organic coherence and compact social strength which 
can be found nowhere else, and yield the incalculable 
advantage that no proletariat can be formed so long as 
they exist with their present 'consti tution. A man may 
lose or squander all he possesses, but his children do 
not inherit his poverty: they still retain their claim 
upon the land, by a right not derived from him, but from 
their birth as members of the commune."(7) Elsewhere 
Haxthausen states paradoxically that the commune not only 
protects Russian society from proletarianisation and 
pauperism but also defends her from the assaults of soc-
ialistic and communistic ideas. "Russia has nothing to 
fear" he says, echoing or anticipating the Slavophils, 
.. 
"from the revolutionary tendencies which threaten the rest 
of Europe. Its own internal healthy organisation protects 
it against pauperism and the doctrines of communism and 
socialism. In the other modern states, pauperism and pro-
letarianisation are the festering sores to which the pre-
sent condition of society has given birth. Can they be 
healed? The communistic doctors propose, as a preliminary 
step, the destruction of the present organisation, as new 
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buildings can best be erected upon a tabula rasa. But 
death never produces life. One thing however is certain, 
if these people succeed in carrying out their schemes, 
the ~esult will not be a political but a social revolu-
tion, a war against all property, and complete anarchy. 
Will new states then be~constituted, and upon what basis, 
moral or social? Who can raise the veil of the future? 
and what course will Russia then take? A Russian proverb 
says, "I sit upon the shore and wait for the wind"(e) 
Though Haxthausen considered the Commune a bulwark against 
socialism/he finds funnily enough that through it the 
principles of st. Simon were being ~ealised in Russia. 
It is worth quoting his observations in length because 
Chernyshevskii introduced a lengthy discussion in his 
own polemic against Vernadskii of the utility of communal 
ownership of land based on this observation by Haxthausen. 
"We see, at present," Haxthausen says, "three dis-
tinct principles prevailing with regard to the possession 
of land in Europe. In three countries they are distinctly 
marked, and in the others they exist in a modified form.--
"In England we find this principle: the land must 
be divided as little as possible, and only so many hands 
devoted to agriculture as are absolutely necessary; for 
in trosway alone can it be energetically prosecuted and 
maintained in a flourishing condition. The whole country 
therefore is cultivated by means of large (though not over-
grown) farms, which have the advantage of providing work 
the whole year for all the hands employed upon the, la.~ a.d 
no labour is lost. Lasting improvements can only be 
effected upon large farms. -
"The second principle is represented by France. r_ .-
- 152 -
The principle is this:· Agriculture is a free-trade em-
ployment, and therefore all the land must be divisible; 
every man must be able to acquire it; in other words, 
the land must be a commodity, and pass like a coin'~ from 
hand to hand. It is in consequence subdivided into 
~.~u,merable .! small properties. 
"The third principle is represented by Russia. France 
has the principle of divisibility of the soil: Russia 
goes much further; it divides it constantly. France re-
presents the principle of free competition, and considers 
all the land . '.~ a commodity which everyone can acquire 
with money: Russia gives the right to everyone of her 
sons to participate in the usufruct of the land, in per-
fect equality in each Commune. In France the land is 
the private property of the individual: in Russia it is 
the property of the people, and their microcosm the Com-
mune, the individual having only a right to the usufruct 
in common with all the rest. That_ agriculture cannotattaim 
so high a degree under this ~stem as in England, or even 
in Germany, must be allowed; but in our opinion it might 
attain the degree which it has reached in France, if some 
other conditions of social progress were fulfilled, and 
certain obstacles removed. 
"In considering the social condition of Russia, •• ~ 
we cannot fail to be struck with the remarkable points 
of comparison which it offers to the dreams of some of 
the modern political sects, particularly the st. Simonians' 
and the Communists. The social state however which they 
imagine to be the highest development of the human race-
can never be established upon the bases of their doctrines, 
because these are unchristian, untrue, and atheistical; 
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it would be to build upon sand, and anarchy would be the 
certain consequence of the attempt. But I deny that such 
an order of things, apart from the principles upon which 
these sectaries would erect it, is in itself unchristian 
I 
and unreasonable, and therefore impossible: the present 
condition of Russia is a proof, that a political and 
social state and a Christian monarchy may coexist with 
such institutions. 
"The st. Simonians would abolish all private property 
in land, and the right of inheriting it, substituting only 
a life interest in its place. In Russia this arrangement 
actually exists. Among the people, individuals have 
usually no property in land, not even a certain and 
fixed occupation; they have only a claim to the usu-
fruct; there can therefore be no inheritance. The prin-
ciples however which lie at the base of this social condi-
tion are different from those upon which the st. Simonians 
would establish their modern polity; they are completely 
national, and adapted to a Christian monarchy. 
"According to st. Simon, the land belongs to the 
Spirit of Humanity, as the God of the earth. Every man 
is a temporary emanation from this Deity; and therefore, 
so long as he exists as an individual in the world, and 
has not yet flowed back into the universal spirit, he 
has a right to a certain amount of what the earth pro-
duces. This right however is wholly personal; he cannot 
bequeath it to his children, for these, like all past 
and future generations, are emanations, and have merely 
a personal, not an inherited, claim to a portion of the 
earth's produce. 
1\ The Russians, on the other hand, say that the earth 
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belongs to the Creator, and has been granted by Him to 
Adam and his descendants. Successive generations inherited 
possession; and as their numbers increased they occupied 
a greater extent of the earth's surface, which they shared 
under the Divine guidance in the world's history. The 
country now called Russia fell to the progenitors of the 
Russians; and his descendants, remaining united under 
the head of their- race, and thus constituting a people, 
spread over the territory which has thus by the providence 
of God become their property. The disposal of it, as 
in a family, belongs to the father, the head of the race, 
the Czar: an individual has a right to share in it only 
so long as he lives in unity with the Czar, and his people. 
The soil is the joint property of the national family, 
and the father or Czar has the sole disposal of it, and 
distributes it among the families into which the nation 
has in the course of time been divided. 
", A joint occupancy of the whole could only exist while 
the people led a nomadic life: when they became settled, 
a portion was assigned to each family, which occupied 
its share under a separate head. The right of the family 
thus arose in a manner quite analogous to that of the 
nation. The property is a family property, belonging 
equally but undivided to all the members of the family, 
--the father having the disposal and distribution of the 
produce. If a member insists on a division, he receives 
his portion, but loses all claim upon the joint possession; 
he is paid off and excluded, and thenceforth constitutes 
a new family. The families thus remained for many gene-
rations under their respective heads, and became family 
Communes: hence <rose the communal rights" "The Commune 
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is still considered in law to form a family. If a 
stranger comes to reside in a village, he is adopted. 
Every member has an equal claim upon the joint and undivided 
communal property; the distribution of the produce rests 
with the fathers, the 'Whiteheads' or the Starosta (Elder). 
A member cannot possess private property in the land, 
and therefore cannot bequeath it; but his sons, by vir-
tue of their birth into the family, have an immediate 
right to a share in the joint property and its usufruct.' 
"According to st. Simon, the individual, as an emana-
tion from the God of the earth, has a joint right to the 
possessions of the whole earth. With the Russian people, 
the individual, as a son of the Czar, as a Russian, and 
member of the Commune, has a joint right to Russia which 
has been granted by God to the Russian people, and par-
ticularlyto the property of the family or Commune to which 
he' belongs." (9) 
Chernyshevskii discussed the commune in its various 
aspects in a number of articles published in Sovremennik .. 
mainly between 1856 and 1859. Two of his publications -
'Baron von Haxthausen's Studies of the Internal Relations 
of National Life and in Particular of the Rural Institu-
tion of Russia' ('Issledovaniya 0 vnutrennikh otnosheniyakh 
narodnoi zhizni i v osobennosti sel'skikh uchrezhdeniyakh 
Rossi Barona Avgusta Gakstgausena') and 'On the Landed 
Property' (0 pozemelnoi sobstvennosti ) - were aimed at 
refuting the arguments put forward by Vernadskii, a well-
known economist in Chernyshevskii's time, who called in 
question the relevance of the commune for Russian society. 
Vernadskii characterised the commune as an old outdated 
organisation which had no justification in the middle 
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of the 19th century. He expressed his view in an article 
in the journal 'Economic Indicator' (Ekonomicheskii 
ukazatel'). There ensued a long series of arguments and 
counter-arguments on the pages of Sovremennik and Ekono-
micheskii ukazatel. Vernadskii's economic ideas were 
derived from western sources and he believed that private 
property in land wasahigher and a more progressive form 
of ownership than the communal one: Russia could not be 
an exception to this principle. Vernadskii went as far 
as to brand supporters of communal land ownership as 
'dilletantes in science'.(10) Chernyshevskii's first 
reaction to this attack on communal landownership was 
to present a detailed evaluation of Haxthausen's findings 
on the commune in the above cited article (Issledovaniya 
etc.) and to show that in the conditions prevailing in 
Russia, communal landownership, in spite of its archaic 
and patriarchal nature, was a living and beneficial force 
and that it could be developed further in order to foster 
the economic growth of the country. According to Cherny-
shevskii, large scale farming in agriculture needed a 
sUbstantial amount of capital and this was not available 
in Russia at that time. Moreover the commune and the 
communal administration were part and parcel of Russian 
rural life and a large section of the rural population 
were wedded to this concept of land ownership. If one 
accepts, Chernyshevskii said, even for argument's sake, 
that sufficient capital was available to tranSform the 
Russia.n rural economy into a western system, then doing 
this would destroy the organic foundation of rural life 
bec~~a large number of people had given the allegiance 
to the village commune. Consequently, the breakdown of 
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the communal structure in the village was not desirable. 
Chernyshevskii did not deny that there were elements of 
patriarchalism in the communal structure and he also ad-
mitted that rapid economic growth was needed. But while 
pursuing the policy of economic growth, was there any 
need to destroy the communal basis of land ownership?(11) 
He agreed that a patriarchal form of economic organisation 
was incompatible with a high degree of civilisation and 
that' is why the major1i.ty of the people of his time sub-
scribed to the view that su~h organisations should be 
done away with in the interest of the national economy. (12) 
But he asserted that the particular form of an organisation 
~s 
and principles on which it/based are two different ideas. 
Even if the patriarchal form of communal organisation 
was replaced by a modern one, the communal principle of 
redistribution of land should be preserved because, pro-
vided serfdom is abolished, this principle was superior 
in Russia to that of private ownership of land. (13) 
It should be preserved, firstly,because of the painful 
experience of the transformation of the rural economy 
into a capitalistic one in western Europe; and secondly 
in the structure of communal organisation was to be found 
a means of guaranteeing the maximum well-being of the 
people by 'resorting to socialist production, the seeds 
of which lay hidden in the commune. (14) 
In his polemic against Vernadskii on the utility of 
the commune, Chernyshevskii extensively used Haxthausen's 
arguments in its favour. It may come as a surprise to 
many that Chernyshevskii, an outspoken opponent of the 
gentry interest, should support the arguments of Haxthausen, 
a Prussian landlord, on a question of agricultural economics. 
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But his attitude to Haxthausen is ambiguous. "Firstly, 
it is necessary to say," Chernyshevskii writes, "that 
Haxthausen in his political views is not only not a 
republican, or a liberal or even a simp~e conservative, 
but is a complete reactionery of the kind to be found only 
in Germany among the landlords of some Prussian provinces ••• 
He regards any German or French who does not recognise 
the necessity of monarchical power in either Germany or 
France as the enemy of God or of his fatherland. He 
not only desires the revival of monarchical power in 
those countries of western Europe where a;.;;struggle is 
going on between autocracy and constitutional structure, 
but would also have wished to introduce autocratic monarchy 
in north America, which is inferior'. to Russia in respect 
II 
of political organisation. (1S) 
And yet Chernyshevskii uses Haxthausen's view on 
the commune in arguing with Vernadskii, because in Cherny-
shevskii 's own words, u;b.:e (Haxthausen) is a fine agronomist 
and knows about the agricultural institution of all the 
countries of western Europe thoroughly and particularly 
of Germany which he studied extensively from the economic 
point of view; he not only knows these institutions well 
but argues about them with fairness. He is a highly pra-
. tical man; especially in those matters where one can en-
tertain independent opinions thn0ugh close familiarity 
with them. He was not activiely involved in politics; 
while talking politics, he takes for granted certain trad-
itional concepts peculiar to the class in which he was 
brought up and still lives. But as soon as he comes to 
agricultural problems, Haxthausen sheds his skin of a 
Prussian landlord, and turns into a fairly enlightened, 
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experienced and astute landowner. He does not even care 
what this or that political party may think of him. He 
would confine himself to a consideration of the rural 
economic or the general economic consequences of the 
communal institution. He disowns institutions favoured 
by his own political party, whenever he finds that they 
a~e disadvantageous or unsatisfactory for the national 
economy. He openly declares that : 'The economic sphere 
must be separate from political prejudice or partiality: 
questions about national well-being are higher than 
arguments about political form~'l(16) In spite of such 
pra~ of Haxthausen for his understanding of agricul-
tural question, one cannot fail to see that Haxthausen's 
defense of the communal structure in Russia was entirely 
serving the interest of the autocracy. He thought of 
the Tsar as the father of the nation and regarded mem-
bers of the commune as the Tsar's children.(17) He 
also failed to mention that the role of the ,landlords 
would become useless if one adheres strictly to the com-
munal principle. So Haxthausen spoke in favour of a 
society based on the coexistence of Tsar, the nobility 
and the members of the commune - a position which 
Chernyshevskii could not, of course, share. In this 
respect Chernyshevskii's attitude was characteristically 
unequivocal. To fight against Vernadskii, he used those 
arguments of Haxthausen with which he agreed and openly 
those 
criticised/whIch he could not accept. For example, 
Vernadskii had argued in the above mentioned journal 
that communal organisation was a hindrance to the effec-
tiveness of capital investment in increasing the agricul-
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tural production in Russia, because of the small size 
and fragmentated nature of communal holdings. If total 
agricultural production was the criterion, Vernadskii's 
argument:.was correct. Chernyshevskii opposed this view 
because h~ believed in the fundamental economic principle 
that more total production at the expense of many of the 
people is to be rejected in favour of a smaller total 
production which is 'fairly distributed among all. He 
admitted that enclosure of the land of the communes and 
creation of privately owned large scale farms would 
increase production but this would be at the expense of 
the landholders of the commune who would become landless 
labours. Then,paradoxicallY,Chernyshevskii asserted that 
an outlay of capital is not economically viable in land 
in the absence of communal ownership. He refers to Hax-
thausen in this matter saying that, "as a practical man, 
Haxthausen correctly observes that if communal ownership 
in actuality was a hindrance to the investment of capital 
for increasing agricultural production as in western 
Europe, then without communal ownership such an investment 
of capiital is even more impossible in Russia". (18) After 
presenting some of Haxthausen's vie~on the need for pre-
serving the(..:commune as a rural institution in Russia, 
Chernyshevskii goes on to point out in clear terms the 
defects in Haxthausen's position. The latter expressed 
the opinion that communal tillage in all its aspects 
was a special feature of a Slavic or Great Russian com-
munity. Chernyshevskii was of the opinion that the village 
commune had been a living organisation in all the countries 
of western Europe and that the communal spirit had been 
a powerful uniting force of the people in these countries. 
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But, in the course of time,many of these countries had 
gone through a series of economic and social changes. 
As a result, the communes disintegrated and gave away to 
new forms of rural economic organiaations, devoid of 
cohesion. In Russia the village commune survived and 
served a very useful purpose. This did not necessarily 
mean that Russia remained absolutely free from the economic 
upheavals peculiar to western European countries. The 
growth of industrialisation and capitalistic modes of 
production - the two most vital signs of economic change 
in western Europe-had affected Russia. still, Chernyshevskii 
did not see any important symptoms of the cracking up of 
communal organisation in Russia. He even contended that 
it remained as powerful and well-knit in the middle of 
the 19th as in the 17th century. (19) Therefore it was 
not some sort of esoteric quality of the Slav people but 
an ascertainable practice as well as a necessity of 
social survival. 
~hernyshevskii was also critical of Haxthausen's view 
that communal life in the Russian villages was a trans-
lation of Saint-Simonism into reality. According to 
Chernyshevskii, Saint-Simon had a confused understanding 
and an underestimation of the economic implications of 
socialism"being as he was primarily concerned with social 
I 
organization. The commune was socialistic in the economic 
sense and therein resided its importance.(20) Admittedly 
economic transformation was not sufficient to effect a 
complete change in the patterns of social life. According 
to Chernyshevskii socialism e~co~passeall aspects of life, , 
starting from one's attitude to one's neighbour to the 
people of another country. (21) The main objective for 
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which socialism strives is the betterment of the life of 
men. By 'betterment of the life of men,' Chernyshevskii 
wanted to convey two ideas - (a) betterment at a purely 
economic level and (b) betterment at a purely moral or 
intellectual level. The former, according to Chernyshevskii, 
is a prerequisite for the attainment of the latter. 
Saint-Simon'sidea of socialism ignored this and turned 
into an 'undetermined and exalted' (neopredelennoi i ekzal' 
tirovannoi) utopia which endeavoured to recreate the en-
tire life of men by fitting,it into an abstract formula, 
softened by appeals to 'love' which would replace the 
existing inimical relationship between man and man (even 
between a master and a worker). (22) In Haxthausen's scheme 
this 'love' was to operate between the members of the com-
mune and the "father" of the land, the Tsar. Chernyshevskii 
denied that there could be a relationship of love between 
two parties whose interests clashed with one another. He 
even tried to analyse the word 'love' from a semantic 
angle and concluded that this had only an erotic significance. 
The confusion in Saint-Simon was worse confounded because 
he applied the same word to economic matters and to questions 
of marriage and free love. All this appeared to Chernyshevskii 
as highly unscientific. How indeed is one to explain the 
economic structure of a society or the cause of its trans-
formation by means of such notions?(23) 
The Russian communal organisations then, whose social-
ism was economic in nature had nothing to do with the 
translation of Saint-Simonian ideas into reality. In 
this connection Chernyshevskii makes a general point about 
the priority of economics in all discussions of political 
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problems and insists that political economy is the basis 
of scientific social thinking.(24) This idea was not known 
in the days of Saint-Simon whose system, according to 
Chernyshevskii was outmoded and irrelevant as a social 
I 
science and indeed as a philosophy of life. 
In the second of his works on the commune referred 
to earlier (25) Chernyshevskii continued his polemic 
on the superiority of communal ownership of land against 
both Vernadskii and his journal '~E~k~o~n~o~m~i~c~h~e~s~k~1~'1~' __ '~u~k~a~z~a~t~e~1~ 
After the publication of Chernyshevskii's first article 
(Issledovaniya etc.) Vernadskii made a comment in his 
journal (Ek, uk. no.25) that the village commune issue 
was neither a contemporary nor an important one in 
Russia. Vernadskii went as far as to say that only dil-
. 
letants in science would be concerned with such issues. (26) 
This adverse comment provoked Chernyshevskii to publish 
a lengthy reply in the form of a treatise,not only to 
challenge Vernadskii's remarks but also to establish the 
case for the village commune. Chernyshevskii commented 
that it was very surprising that Vernadskii did, not find 
anything important or contemporary in communal landowner-
ship. Any living force in a country was bound to be(con-
temporaneous and if a large number of people adhere to the 
principles' of a particular economic organisation, it must 
be regarded as important regardless of any prejudice 
against it. "You do not consider the question of the 
preservation or destruction of communal ownership as either 
contemporary or too important", Chernyshevskii addressed 
himself to Vernadskii, "bUt millions of people in Russia 
Use the land according to the right of communal ownership; 
if the French consider their law of the equal division 
among children ofth&i~ inheritence to be an important 
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historical achievement, then why is the question of the 
right of ownership not important? The law of inheritence 
allows every Frenchman to be in a position to receive 
something sometime, will many of them receive it? But 
each one of the fifteen million RussianSwho makes use 
of land by this right are interested directly and con-
stantly in the right to communal ownership. Inheritence 
is an important fact of national life, but it is only a 
partial case of the right to property; many things depend 
on inheritence, yet not the whole of economic life; but 
many things definitely depend on property. This question 
is ~ot contemporary' - but is not everybody really arguing 
about economic transformation, is not everybody preparing 
for it, are we not each in our own way preparing for it"?(27) 
Chernyshevskii attached more importance to property than 
to inheritence because the right to inherit itself does 
not guarantee the right to acquire property. 
The next point of controversy between Chernyshevskii 
and Vernadskii turned on the de~nition of the proletariat 
and on whether the members of the commune could be called 
a proletariat. Chernyshevskii, in his article 'Issle-
dovaniya et~' traced the origin: of the preletariat in 
England and France. He stated that in course of the trans-
formation'of ownership of land from the communal to the 
private form a great number of people who had no immovable 
property were transformed into proletarians. Vernadskii 
in fiis reply stated that in France many proletarians had 
immovable property. (28) Chernyshevskii expressed great 
surprise at this remark and asserted that as soon as a 
group of people were termed proletarians, the question 
of them owning immovable property did not arise because 
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owning immovable property and being a proletarian were 
by definition, exclusive categories.(29) According to 
him, a group of men may be very poor, may live in miserable 
conditions, may have only sufficient means to subsist; 
but in spite of this may own immovable property. But 
they can no longer be called proletarians. On the other 
hand, a group of people, in::::spite of not owning immovable 
property, may lead <an ordered life by selling their labour 
and may be better off than the aforementioned group. 
"The French settlers", he ; says, "who have five hectares 
of land may live very meagrely if their land is bad or if 
their families are too large, but nevertheless they are 
not proletarians; on the other hand a factory worker in 
Paris or Lyons can live in a warmer and more comfortable 
room, can eat more tasty food and dress better than these 
agriculturists; yet they will be proletarians if they 
have neither immovable property nor capital, and if their 
fate depends exclusively on wages!'(30) Chernyshevskii's 
argument seems unassailable here. Vernadskii plainly 
made the mistake of confusing the notions of the poor 
and of the proletariat. Having made his point,Cherny-
shevskii ironically observed that, following Vernadskii's 
n 
classification of people, some blind men may be found 
who had some vision. (31) 
This controversy between Chernyshevskii and Vernadskii 
is not important in itself. It indicates why Chernyshevskii 
attached importance to property, especially immovable 
property, rather than to inheritence. He was such an out-
spoken supporter of communal ownership of land (which was 
one form of property) because he was confident that only 
communal ownership could prevent a large section of the 
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Russian people from becoming propertyless proletarians. 
He did not believe in the process of the alienation of 
the producers from the means of production. He was an 
opponent of private ownership of land because this had 
led to the creation of a large rural proletariat in 
England and a sUbstantial fall in the general well-being 
of the masses. As will be discussed later, he even pre-
sented a new theory of social change which would avoid 
the development of capitalism in Russia (and thus of a 
landless proletariat). This theory had as its main 
"' 
emphasis in the communal ownership of land and property 
not by inheritence but by the principle of redistribution 
amongst the members of the commune. 
One might wonder, as Vernadskii did, how the members 
of a commune differed from proletarians when they had neither 
the right to inherit property nor to sell or mortgage it.(32) 
Chernyshevskii pointed out that the difference lay in the 
manner in which the members of the commune utilised their 
land. They remained the owners of land during the whole 
of their life time because the commune was concerned with 
advantages of the members only during their life span 
although the children of deceased members had an equal 
right to become members of the commune.(33) In the case 
of the pro,letarians there was no question of such privilege 
or any possibility of acquiring property. Chernyshevskii 
gives the following example to clarify the distinction. 
Supposing a J"oint stock -.~ •.. ~ for water transport was 
- oOmpalq 
formed with an authorised capital of ten million rubles 
and that one of the founders bought shares worth, say , 
200,000 rubles and on the strength of this investment was 
made directDr of the firm but only on the condition that 
as a director he would have no right to sell or mortgage 
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his holding in the company. If such a director has no 
other means apart from the money invested in the stock 
of the company, Chernyshevskii asks whether he can be 
classed as a proletarian?(34) He is correct in pointing 
out that owning a property without the right to sell or 
mortgage it (as in the case of the above director) is 
quite different from not owning a property at all, or for 
owning a property for only a short period, that is, dur-
ing one's lifetime. But Chernyshevskii failed to notice 
that a director of a company, even if he is not entitled 
to sel1 0 0r mortgage his holdings during his lifetime, 
has the right to leave it as a legacy to his children, 
which right was absent in the Russian commune. In con-
cluding his polemic with Vernadskii, Chernyshevskii main-~' 
t'ained the idea of the economic superiority of communal 
ownership over private ownership in concrete terms. He 
considered two possibilities in this connection: (a) 
production on land under private ownership where the owner 
received the bulk of the income accrued from this land, 
while the others, the farmers and agricultural wage 
earners, receive only a very small portion of this in-
come. (For argument's sake Chernyshevskii assumed that 
" 
the landlord, because of :.his capacity to invest the nece-
ssary capital, will be able to produce more than in any 
other form of ownership); and (b) production under com-
munal ownership where each member will receive an incom~ 
more than that which can be.obtained as a wage earner in 
a farm owned by a private landlord. Here the assumption 
is that the members of the commune because of insufficient 
capital will not be in a position to effect much improvement 
in the techniques of production and hence the total production 
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will be less than that possible in a farm owned by an 
individual. Chernyshevskii explains the two possibilities 
thus: "Let us take two holdings of 5,000 dessyatin. of 
land (one square mile). There are 2pOO men on each hold-
ing. One holding is aivided into thirty farms; with the 
improved method of agriculJture of the second period (the 
period when private property is evidently advantageous) 
each dessyatina gives in general an income of 20 rubles. 
Of these 5 rubles go as rent to the landlords, 6 rubles 
as wage and maintenance of the workers and 9 rubles remain 
at the disposal of the farm. In the second holding, on 
account of communal ownershipJcultivation was less success-
ful, and a dessyatina gives an income of 12 rubles, but 
this entire income remains at the disposal of the tillers, 
all of whom according to the general communal principle 
participate in the use of the land. Let us compare these 
two holdings: 
The general value of production in the first holding = 
5000 times 20 = 100,000 rubles. The general value of 
production in the second holding = 5000 time 12, = 
60,000 rubles." 
"As regards production, that of the holding with the 
farms has a much higher value than that of the holding 
with the communal usage. But let us turn from the state 
of production to the condition of the people who live on 
these holdings. Let us consider the situation as it 
affects each family, assuming that each family consists 
of five people. 
Holding with the Farms: 
1 Family (the landlord) receives 5 times 5000 = 
25,000 rubles. 
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30 families (farmers) receives 9 times 5000 = 45,000 rubles 
or each family gets 1500 rubles. 
369 Families (Hired agricultural workers) get 6 times 5000 = 
30,000 rubles or each family gets 81 rubles 25 kopeks. 
The Holding with Communal Ownership: 
400 families receive 12 times 5000 = 60,000 rubles or 
each family receives 150 rubles. 
The conclusion is clear. In the second holding the 
mass of the population are almost twice as well off as 
those in the first, though the value of produce in the 
.first is almost twice as much as that of the second." (35) 
This is Chernyshevskii's calculation in support of 
the superiority of communal over private ownership. The 
well-being of the majority is ensured even if the level 
of production is not maximum. He restates the argument 
in a concluding remark to Vernadskii: "Opponents of com-
munal landownership assert that (under this form of 
ownership) a dessyatina of land cannot give as large an 
income as under agriculture by farming •••• even if this 
unfounded prejudice is valid, for the majority of agri-
cUlturists communal ownership is more advantageous, be-
cause in the case of agriculture under farming the majo-
rity of the agriculturists are turned into hired workers, 
and therefore, although with the system of farms the amount 
of v~ue produced was greater, the condition of the majo-
rity of the agricultural class is nevertheless better 
Under communal tillage." (36) 
In all his economic arguments, Chernyshevskii adhered 
to this principle which he took as a foundation from 
which to make his critique of the dominant political economy 
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of his time and on which to base his own theory of socialist 
production. 
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CHAPTER TWO CHERNYSHEVSKII'S DIALECTICAL THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT, 
ITS APPLICATION TO THE QUESTION OF COMMUNAL PROPERTY 
OWNERSHIP 
In 1858 Chernyshevskii published an article in Sovremennik 
entitled, "A Critique of the Philosophical Prejudices against 
Communal Ownership" ('Kritika filosofskikh predubezhdenii protiv 
obshchinnogo vladeniya'). The original purpose of this article 
was to restate his case on communal ownership and to refute the 
arguments in favour of private property. On this occasion he 
produced two of his celebrated arguments in defence of communal 
ownership. In the first of these, he developed a theory of social 
change based upon Hegelian dialectics/but,unlike the German 
he 
philosopher,/shifted his attention from "the logic of movement of 
ideas to that of movement of things" (1). !lis second concern was 
whether in processes of social change" a society had to pass through 
all stages to reach the culmination of its development. Cherny-
shevskii came to the conclusion that it is possible for a society to 
bY-pass an intermediate stage in its development while attaining the 
highest degree of development. 
According to Chernyshevskii, contradiction and struggle between 
Content and form are the most powerful causes of development and 
change 'in all spheres of nature and society. By 'content' Cherny-
shevskii meant the aggregative effect of the interplayof forces 
within a given structure, either in nature or in society or in the 
life of an individual. The structure in this case is the 'form'. 
When a change takes place in the content, it comes into conflict 
with the form of the hitherto unchanged content. In Chernyshevskii's 
language, the content becomes 'aggravated' because of its change and 
thus the form associated with it becomes incapable of holding the same 
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content within its limits o Consequently, the latter discards its 
old form and accepts a new one. So, development is an endless 
process of abandonment of old and birth of new forms. This is 
Chernyshevskii's universal law of progress which applies not only 
in society but also in nature. This idea is original in that it 
points out the inevitability of social change. "The eternal change 
of form, eternal abandonment of forms, born of certain contents or 
.. 
aspiration due to an aggravation of that aspiration, highest 
development of the same content - who has understood this eternal 
general law, who has learnt it to apply to all types of phenomena -
oh, how calmly he takes chances which trouble others - he does not 
complain of that which has outlived its time and says, 'let it happen -
we will win the day in spite of everything'." (2) Development thus 
consists of endless 'aggravation' of the content and endless change of 
.the form; each phase of the process following the dialectical principle 
of 'negation of negation'. According to the dialectical principle of 
change enunciated by Hegel, the development of every event passes 
through three states, of which the last one resembles the first but is 
at a higher level. 
followi~g manner: 
Chernyshevskii stated this dialectical law in the 
. 
"The end of the development is a return to its 
beginn~ng" (3). He used the word to mean that the end will resemble 
the beginning in form. (4) He explains the character of development 
by asserting that when the content of a particular form reaches a stage 
of extreme 'aggravation', it discards or is emancipated from the old 
and gives birth to a new form. When this process has continued for a 
long time the content reaches its fullest development; it then returns 
to the form which existed at the very beginning of the process of 
development. This is due to the fact that "the surplus of quality 
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affects the form in a way opposite to that by which the lesser 
degree of the same quality affected it." (5) Chernyshevskii 
further adds in this connection that everywhere the most powerful 
development of the content leads to the revival of the same form 
which had been abandoned when the content was weak and undeveloped. 
By 'everywhere' Chernyshevskii means nature as well as society. 
In all these somewhat abstract arguments Chernyshevskii 
endeavours to explain that development involves not simply a 
quantitative but a qualitative change. He spoke of distinct social 
periods each arising as the result of the struggle between content 
and form; and each of these periods was characterised by him as 
something qualitatively different from the previous phase. He gave 
several examples illustrating the dialectical development of history. 
His main purpose in presenting these illustrations was to refute the 
opinion prevalent in his time that private ownership of the means of 
production was the most developed form of property relations that had 
eVer existed and that communal ownership was a 'vestige of a bygone era. 
Chernyshevskii contended that private ownership had no resemblance 
either in form or in content with first form of property relation which 
Was communal; hence private ownership could not be the most developed 
formo The Russian commune was not the most developed form of communal 
ownership but it was not primitive either, and there were reasons to 
believe that the commune could be developed further in response to social 
needs. Since, according to Chernyshevskii's theory of dialectical 
development of society) 'the end of a development is a return to its 
begin~ing' and since the Russian commune resembled the primitive commune 
in form, he held that communal ownership of the means of production and 
not the private ownership was the most developed form of property relatione. 
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Chernyshevskii illustrates this contention by taking some examples 
of social activity. "At the beginning we find small tribes, where 
each governs itself quite independently and is united in a common 
bond with other homogeneous tribes only in a few cases when these oemaRd 
common action: for example, in case of war and other relations with 
foreign nation~; and also in undertakings which exceed the means of 
one tribe; for example, gigantic structures such as the 
tower of Babylon and the Cyclopean walls. Each member of the tribe 
is united with the other not only by legal obligation, but by living 
personal interests, on account of mutual acquaintance, blood 
relationship and the common advantages of neighbours. Each member 
takes a personal and active part in all matters concerning the social 
group to which he belongs. In the language of a scholar such a state' 
of affairs is called self-rule and federation. Little by little the 
small tribes become more and more merged, so that they are finally 
absorbed as regards administration into large states such as France, 
Austria, Prussia, etc. The administrative character of societies in 
this stage of development is bureaucracy, a complete contrast to the 
primitive tribal way of life. Administrative districts are defined 
with less and less relation to the interests of the inhabitants 
themselves who lay independent of the central source. Neither in 
Prussia nor in Austria has the region corresponding to our uezd any 
living connection between its various parts; only by a wider 
demarcation of the provinces have living connections between the 
component parts: been maintained o But this is a deviation from 
the general rule and at the first opportunity reforms are carried out 
such as have already succeeded in dividing France into departments . 
devoid of organic unity instead of the former provinces. Members of 
an administrative district having no living connection either through 
- 175 -
their history or their material interests are at the same time deprived 
of the full power that they had before in the administration of the 
region. Everything is managed by a special kind of men, called officials 
and police, who by their origin and in their personal relationship 
have no connection with the people of the region; they are transferred 
from one place to another simply in the interest of the central authority; 
they act on its orders and are obliged to submit an account of their 
activities to it alone. An inhaqitant of the region in relation to its 
administration is a purely passive person, materia gubernanda. Is it 
necessary to say that society cannot stop at this stage? Switzerland 
and the North American States are in administrative structure a complete 
return from a bureaucratic order to the primitive conditions before the 
rise of big ~tates." (6) Thus Chernyshevskii seeks to show that the 
latest stage of any development in any sphere of activity corresponds 
in form to the primitive stage. Though his characterisation of 
administration of Switzerland is correct, his assessment of the form of 
government in the North American states is not entirely correct. In the 
Southern states a large number of the inhabitants were still slaves, unable 
to play any role in government. 
The development of a judiciary in society is another case in point 
cited by Chernyshevskii. According to him, in the primitive stage, 
administration and execution of justice were carried out by common men; 
the responsibility of imparting justice was shared by all the male members 
of a tribe. The communal assembly was the only operative body and each 
male member of the tribe had the right to participate in the proceedings 
of the communal assembly. In the course of time the judiciary became 
separated from the common men and the task of making judicial decisions 
Was increasingly restricted to people who were specially trained in this 
field. But, according to Chernyshevskii, social development did not stop 
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at this point; it continued further and eventually the ordinary 
members of society who had been deprived of the right to administer 
justice were reinstated in their former position by being given the 
right to become members of the jury in trials. (7) This was a 
'return' to the primitive form. Chernyshevskii divides the history 
of justice into three distinct stages - (a) trial by the whole 
society, (b) trial by the jurists (a special class of people 
qualified to do the same) and (c) trial by jury (who are again 
ordinary members of the society without any special legal training). 
(8) This is a typical example of Chernyshevskii's dialectical 
method applied to the development of social phenomena. He also 
finds dialectical change in the development of a language. At the 
very first stage there were neither grammatical complexities nor 
complexities of manner and style. Everyone expressed his thought 
in a simple, unambiguous form. In the course of time complicated 
grammatical structures evolved with a multitude of inflections, 
conjugations and declensions. Chernyshevskii'referred to Sanskrit, 
Latin and Greek as such complex languages. But as society emerged 
from the ancient past, the need for more spontaneous communication 
arose. Consequently the content of the living language could no 
longer express itself in complex, archaic forms of communication. 
As a result linguistic patterns came into being in accordance with 
new social and cultural needs; new languages evolved with a minimum 
of inflection, intricacy, convention. A process of simplification 
ensued. The end of the development was a return to the beginning. (9) 
It should be borne in mind that Chernyshevskii never suggested 
that a 'return' to the original form signified a return to the exact 
original form. According to the dialectical law of development, the 
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last stage would be richer in content but will correspond to the 
initial or first stage of the development in form only. That is 
why, in speaking of simplicity as the sign of a more developed 
language, Chernyshevskii does not mean artlessness or naivete but, 
rather, elimination of the elaborate, the studied and the unnatural. 
Cheryshevskii gave these examples in order to convince his 
opponents of the dialectical nature of historical development. He 
then applied this principle to show that the communal ownership and 
not private ownership was the highest form of property ownership. 
According to the dialectical law of development, then, the most 
developed social form would resemble the first stage which was the 
primitive commune. The village commune at that time in Russia was a 
living force and seemed to fit Chernyshevskii's pattern. He insisted 
that he was not championing a social organisation which had outlived 
its existence: he claimed to support the cause of social progress, 
since the commune in Russia was a progressive rural organisation. He 
admitted on numerous occasions that the commune as it existed was not 
at its highest stage of development, but insisted that there was 
potential for further development so that the commune would fulfil 
the task that society expected of it. This point is shown in Cherny-
shevskii's discussion of the theory of socialist production. He contends 
that, in spite of its limitations, the 19th century Russian commune was 
a more developed social organisation than private ownership of property 
because the commune alone could guarantee the maximum well-being of 
all its members. (10) 
Another contribution of Chernyshevskii to the theory of social 
evolution was his idea of "decisive moments" (logicheskie momenty) 
in any development, whether in history or in nature. According to him, 
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any phenomenon passes through certain "logical" or "decisive" 
moments in the process of development from the initial to the 
most mature stage. In Chernyshevskii's view, some of these 
"decisive moments" were intermediate and some were final. (11) 
This point is again illustrated with reference to the development 
of linguistic expression, in particular, of writing. In the 
history of writing there were logographic and pictographic 
representation of ideas in the initial stage,as in the Chinese 
and Semitic languages. The next decisive moment was the invention 
of phonetic alphabets and these were combined to convey an idea. 
The development did not however stop here. The most mature stage 
was reached when new simplicity of structure and content came into 
its own. (12) 
·With regard to the economic spher~, the decisive moments in 
Cheryshevskii's view were these: (a) primitive economic organisation 
(the beginning of development) based on communal ownership of land. 
At this stage the outlay of capital on land was impossible since 
people porsue~a largely nomadic life. Those engaged in agriculture 
had only one means of production - their own labour. As a result 
co-operation became absolutely essential and communal form of 
ownership helped to strengthen this co-operation; (b) the second 
stage (intensification of development): agriculture needed an outlay 
of sufficient capital and labour on land. Improvements were effected 
on land by capital; investments and those who did it became the owners 
of land. Thus private property in land became the rule. (c) The third 
stage - the rise of speculation, (Chernyshevskii had evidently the 
capitalist form of production in mind) due to increasing trading and 
industrial activities. Speculation did not remain confined to 
industry alone, it also entered into agricultureo Consequently, 
- 179 -
instead of small scale tilling, large scale farms became the order 
of the day. (13) "So", Chernyshevskii says, "the private ownership 
of land ceases to be a means to compensate for the outlay of capital 
for the improvement of land. At the same time the cultivation of 
land begins to demand an amount of capital that far exceeds the means 
of the great majority of the agriculturists; agricultural economy is 
on a scale that far exceeds the capacity of individual families and 
agricultural holdings; on account of its size it excludes (under 
private ownership) the great majority of agriculturists from any 
advantage which could be derived by the introduction of farming, and 
turns this majority into hired workers." (14) In the light of this 
state of affairs, according to Chernyshevskii, society would no longer 
derive any benefit or advantage from the form of private ownership in 
land (which was in fact capitalism in land). The next decisive moment 
would therefore be a communal form of ownership, which according to the 
dialectical pattern of growth would be a return to the form which 
existed at the first stage of economic development. "The communal 
ownership", Ch~.t'nyshevskii says, "becomes the only means to enable the 
great majority of-agriculturists to have a share in the reward offered 
by the land as a result of improvements effected on it by (their) 
labour." (15) So, communal ownership in land was not only necessary 
.. 
for the well-being of the agriculturists but also for the success of 
agriculture itself; it appeared to Chernyshevskii to be the only 
reasonable and healthy means to unite the interest of the agriculturists 
with the cause of improvement on land. Chernyshevskii emphatically 
stated that without this unity, a really successful productive activity 
was impossible. 
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In spite of the desirability of communal ownership, however~ 
it was not the only form that existed in Russia in Chernyshevskii's 
time. In any case, capitalism either in land or in industry had not 
penetrated as deeply in Russia in the middle of the 19th century as 
in other European countries. According to the dialectical pattern 
of development presented by Chernyshevskii, Russia was supposed to 
pass through the stage of capitalist development (a "decisive moment") 
and only in case of too much 'aggravation' in the 'content' of this 
stage would a new form arise. Consequently, in spite of the virtues 
of communal ownership, Russia was supposed to pass through capitalism 
before reaching the phase of communal ownership. Hence the celebrated 
notion of 'by-passing the intermediate decisive moment' (capitalism). 
Chernyshevskii contended that, in spite of the fact that in any process 
of development the mature stage is reached after the necessary "decisive 
moment", in certain situations, any of the intermediate moments could 
be by-passed to reach the mature stage. For example, anyone who aspired 
to be proficient in a language does not need to go through all the stages 
in the development of a language or languages in general.(16) Without 
knowing anything of the Chinese or the Semitic languages (which were 
important "decisive moments" iri the history of the development of languages) 
one can learn a modern language, though this language may represent a 
later stage in the development of writing. In other words, by-passing 
.. 
the intermediate "decisive moments" is a possibility if not a necessity 
in this case. Chernyshevskii also refers to the use of arms in the 
training of an army. The soldiers do not need to know how to use bows 
and arrows and other primitive weapons to become efficient fighters. 
They are straightaway taught to learn the use of modern weapons. What 
~as true in the life of individuals (learning a language and the use 
Of arms) was ~lso true of a society. (17) 
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"Social life", he says, "is the sum of individual lives; and 
if in an individual life the course of events can jump from 
the lowest logical moment to the highest, by-passing those in 
the middle, then it is quite evident from this that we must 
expect to come across the same possibility in social life. This 
is simple mathematical deduction. In fact, let the course of 
development of an individual life not shortened by favourable 
circumstances be expressed by the progression: 
1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64. 
In this progression let each term express a moment which 
was not speeded by favourable circumstances of development. Let 
the society consist of A members. Then, evidently, the development 
of the. society will be expressed by the following progression: 
lA, 2A, 4A, 8A, l6A, 32A, 64A ••• 
But we have seen that the course of an individual life can 
skip over from the first stage to the third or the fourth or the 
seventh; and let us suppose that with reference to a certain 
conception or fact it proceeded by the following rapid path: 
1, 4, 64 ••• 
Then evidently the course of social life with reference to 
this event will be: 
lA, 4A, 64A ••• " (18) 
To make this rather notional example concrete, Chernyshevskii 
described the experience of the New Zealand settlers. He says that 
when people migrated to New Zealand, they found themselves faced with 
an uncultivated and almost uninhabited. :' land. So, they had to 
start their lives from the very. beginning in the new country. While 
doing so, they did not go through all the stages of human civilisation 
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to reach the present standard of social and economic development. 
In fact, they reached the level of development of any advanced 
nation in the quickest possible time. This is a clear case of by-
passing the intermediate "decisive moment" in social development. (19) 
The purpose of this whole argumentation was to show that it was 
not necessary for Russia to go through the painful stage of capitalist 
development. Russia could, according to Chernyshevskii, straightaway 
enter into a phase of socialist economy from the then existing 
economic structure. The seeds of a socialist economy, according to 
Chernyshevskii, were latent in the very structure of the counnune. 
Chernyshevskii, of course, was not the first to put forward this idea. 
It was the cause of the idealisation of the commune by all Slavophil 
and early populist thinkers. But whereas the latter had only a vague 
conception of a socialist society, Chernyshevskii was concerned with 
practice as well as theory. He tried ~o show in concrete terms that 
the well-being of every individual, and the right to own the products of 
one's own labour, were the two basic principles of a society and that 
capitalism was incapable of safeguarding these conditions. The two 
principles were the product of rational analysis of real situations 
and not of preconceived ideas and preferences. (20) Fear of capitalism 
endemic among the Russian 19th century intelligentsia, does not in 
itself expiain Chernyshevskii's advocacy of communal ownership and he 
cannot be criticised for unawareness of the necessary stages in social 
transformation. He found in the commune the essential ingredients 
for building up a healthy economy in Russia which would guarantee 
maximum well-being to its people. But there was a corollary reason 
for the need to by-pass capitalism in Russia; Chernyshevskii believed 
that the growth of capitalism as a way to a socialist society was in 
fact redundant in Russia. It could only delay the establishment of a 
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socialist economy because it would serve to impoverish, to 
'proletarianize' Russian society. Unlike Marx, he held that 
Verelendung (immiseration) frustrates the advent of socialism 
in the face of an existing and viable economy. 
Yet Chernyshevskii was not unaware that his theory was 
he 
liable to criticism and/anticipated such criticism. If Russia 
by-passes capitalism and relies on the commune to build her new 
economy, would she not by the s'arne token by-pass the technological 
and scientific developments associated with the growth of capitalism? 
He admitted that the commune as it existed in Russia in his time was 
at a much lower level, economically speaking, than economic 
organisation in Western Europe under capitalism. But so was the 
state of economy of the New Zealanders when they migrated to New 
Zealand. They raised their economic standard by utilising their 
knowledge of economically advanced countries. Chernyshevskii thinks 
optimistically that the situation would be the same in Russia, 
because there is a definite process of development of backward 
countries which he generalises as follows: (21) (a) when a certain 
society or nation reaches a high stage of development, another society 
or nation will take a comparatively short period to reach this stage. 
(England took 1500 years to reach that stage of civilisation which 
existed in the 19th century, whereas New Zealanders clearly took a much 
shorter period). (b) This quickening process takes place because of 
contact between the advanced and the backward countries. The contact 
also helps the backward country to develop certain economic forces 
which otherwise would have taken a long time to come into play if they 
could come into play at all. (c) Because of the rapidity of the process 
of development in backward countries, some of the stages of the 
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development are by-passed making those moments only potential 
but not actual. (The New Zealanders will know only from books 
that protectionism as a system existed in a particular economic 
period.) 
These generalisations are not implausible. The process of 
economic development in backward countries allover the world in 
the 19th and 20th centuries followed largely the pattern predicted 
by Chernyshevskii. The experience of the contemporary developing 
countries also corresponds to this pattern. Chernyshevskii's views 
therefore, represent a valuable contribution to economic thinking. 
Chernyshevskii summarised his theory of development as follows: 
"(a) In form the highest stage of development corresponds to its 
beginning. (b) Under the influence of an advanced stage in development, 
which stage has been attained by advanced countries, this can be 
developed very quickly by other societies, the level can be raised 
direct from the lowest to the highest stage by-passing the 
intermediate logical moment." (22) 
PART FOUR 
Chernyshevskii and the Political Economy or his time 
and his Theory of Socialist Production 
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CHAPTER ONE CHERNYSHEVSKII'S ATTITUDE TO 'LAISSEZ-FAIRE' PRINCIPLE 
In formulating his economic views, Chernyshevskii always made' 
, ' 
a distinction between 'the wealt~of a nation' and 'national well-
idelltioal 
being'. He did not consider these two ideas f., .!._ as did the 
classical economists. Political economy of the 18th and the first 
six decades of the 19th century in western Europe was mainly con-
cerned with an enquiry into the causes of the wealth of nations. 
The classical economists believed that the invisible forces of an 
economy were always self-adjusting, and that this automatic 
adjustment brought about maximum prosperity in a nation. This was 
the premise on which all theories of political economy of that 
time were formulated. The productivity of a nation was taken to 
be the main criterion of national prosperity by political 
economists from Adam Smith and David Ricardo down to Jean Baptiste 
Say. In such a scheme, what was the fate of the ordinary individual? 
Most of the individuals comprising society at that time were 
struggling units of society, economically speaking. That increased 
productivity in a nation leads to an increased welfare of the 
individuals who are units of that nation is the common belief. But 
, , 
the political economy of this time looked upon the individual as an 
abstract idea; the improvement of the condition of the individual 
was thought to be guaranteed by an improvement of the whole society, 
which was the nation. It was a concept of the well-being of the 
abstract individual, not the real individual. In fact, the 18th 
. . 
and the 19th century brougkincreasing pauperisation and impoverish-
ment of the masses in England and France, and simultaneously 
increasing productivity and wealth of these nations as a whole. This 
. . 
paradox was not evident to anyone who had unshakable faith in the 
ideas of 'automatic adjustment', which had productivity and not 
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distribution of wealth as its focal point. The principle 
of'laiss~z-fair~' was th~ main r~ason for ignoring the plight 
of the real ordinary individual in the capitalist economies of 
England and other countries of western Europe. Contemporaneous 
with the rise of doctrines justifying the 'laissez-faire' principle, 
there arose other ideas which endeavoured to deal with the real 
. . . 
individual and refused to treat the individual simply as an 
abstract entity. The economic formulations of Saint Simon and 
Fourier, in spite of their technical inadequacies and utopianism, 
had one strength: they put the Qrdinary man in the forefront 
and made his well-being the first consideration in all economic 
arguments. If they were utopians in their suggestions for 
realising their objectives, the theorists of laissez-faire 
principle were likewise utopians in assuming that the wealth of 
a nation implied the well-being of the ordinary members of that 
nation. The economist who believed that the equal distribution of 
wealth was the key to bringing about the maximum well-being of 
all members of society reacted against this Zeitgeist. Russian 
populists were part of this reaction. 
The first economic formulation of popUlism was made by 
Chernyshevskii in his writings on p'olitical economy. As the basis 
of this formulation he considered society as an additive whole, 
that. is, a sum of individuals rather than a qualitative whole. (I) 
... 
Hence, according to him, the well-being of the soo'ietyis dependent 
on the well-being of its individual members and not vice-versa. 
He always distinguished between natsia and narod,wealth and well-
being. (2) He attached great emphasis to the equal distribution 
of wealth which he considered would finally lead to individual 
, ' 
. . 
Well-being. He was not so much concerned with mere production of 
wealth. In one of his works he stated that even if under certain 
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conditions the income of a farm is increased but is unfavourably 
distributed among the peasants, it is to be abandoned in favour 
of a smaller income of the farm which is more favourably 
distributed. (3) In the first case he assumed private ownership 
of land, and in the second - a communal ownership. In one of 
his well-known articles (4), he designates the economists who 
ignore the cause of the 'real individual' "economists of a 
backward school" (ekonomisty otstaloi shkoly), and asserts that 
their formulation was disadvantageous to the real individual. 
The main reason for naming the second generation of classical 
economists as 'backward' lay in their insistence on prescribing 
the same medicine for all deseases, as their predecessors did 
at an earlier epoch. This second generation, which included 
J. B. Say, Bastiat and others according to Chernyshevskii, did not 
take into account that time had changed and a new medicine was 
needed to cure economic deseases. This attitude, according to 
him, was like the attitude of medical men who relied on the 
principle of 'purgare et clystirizare' alone from generation to 
to:generation in treating patients. The backward economists 
were blinkered, they used only those concepts which had come 
down from the puyious generation such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, 
and others. One of the most important premises of the first 
generation of the classical school of economics was to treat man 
as an abstract entity and not to consider the 'real' man and his 
well-being. Say and others adhering to these premises were blind 
to the changing attitude towards man in their time. 
How did it come about that the interest of the real man 
ignored? By the very premise of the principle of laissez-faire, 
. . . 
laissez-passer which was enunciated by Chernyshevskii as follows: 
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"Economic activity of individual persons must be guaranteed complete 
freedom. Society has no right to impose any restriction on them. The 
state has no right to pursue any of those activities which can be 
performed by the power of individual persons. The state exists only 
for guaranteeing security of individual persons and for removing 
restrictions which prevent the fullest development of individual 
activities. In other words, the concern of the state lies only in 
that which cannot be attained by activities of individual persons; 
unconditional freedom of activity of individual persons is the 
supreme principle of society and the state should act only to safe-
guard this supreme principle. In other words, as far as activities 
of the state are concerned the ideal is that they should be reduced 
to nil, and the closer this can be approached, the better for 
society."(6) This"is in brief the principle of laissez-faire 
laissez-passer, the principle of automatic adjustment. 
The advocated freedom of economic activity and non-interference 
of the State in such activities, then, caused the oppression of the 
common man in this scheme of things. Such economic activity 
includes not only the enterpreneurial activities of the capitalist 
but also the struggle of the workers, both rural and urban, to 
survive. Owing to the state's non-interference in economic activity 
the weak, deprived of any help, become weaker and the strong 
become stronger because of unrestricted freedom enjoyed by them. 
Thus, according to Chernyshevskii, the masses, enjoy only the 
freedom of deprivation. "How much misery the people" of the 
Vlorld would avoid", he states, "if they understood that there is 
no freedom where the weak remain unaided."(7) Elsewhere, he states 
that as an implication of the principle of laissez-faire the 
Vlorker had the right to look for work but not the right to 
.. 
Obtain it. (8) This inevitably led to an unhealthy competition 
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between workers for work. Some succeeded, othersdid not. Those 
who were not fortunate enough to succeed had to remain in misery 
because the theory implied that their misery would lead to the 
maximum prosperity of the nation, while the government,could not 
as a matter of principle, intervene. 
Chernyshevskii endeavours to trace the origin of the laissez-
faire principle and examines whether the way it was interpreted 
by later economists and implemented by the governments of his 
time was in accordance with the original spirit of the principle. 
He maintained that Gournet's purpose in proclaiming the principle 
of laissez-faire;was to counteract the body of doctrines advocated 
by Quesnay, with his three-class scheme and advocacy of strict 
tariff, prohibition and restraint. Since this physiocratic 
principle held sway for some time, the rising bourgeoise in 
France found its growth checked. Not only did the opening up of 
foreign markets become difficult, but also the expansion of prod-
uction in their own countries was hindered. England and Holland 
had already passed this 'barbaric' stage (Chernyshevskii's term) 
and the bourgeois was engaged in expanding factory production. 
The restraint on such production still prevailing in France due 
to the dominance of Quesnay's ideas was thought to be a hindrance 
to the growth of individualism, and so the celebrated principle 
was formulated. It was an attempt to rationalize the emancipation 
of the individual from all sorts of restrictions. (10) But what 
was the result? The suppression of the individual again. 
Chernyshevskii illustrates this point by quoting Turgot, the 
physiocrat who developed Gournet's basic idea: "A simple worker 
. . 
who does not have anything apart from his hands and his trade gets 
sOmething only after he succeeds in selling his labour to another. 
He sells it ~ith~r more dearly or more cheaply: but his price, 
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high or low' ., does not depend on him alone. It arises from the 
conditions under which he is hired. The employer pays him as 
cheaply as possible for his work~; since he has the choice o~ 
a large number of workers, he prefers the one who works more 
cheaply. So the workers are forced to lower their price in rivalry 
with one another. In all spheres of work it must and does 
happen that the wage of the workers is limited to the figure 
necessary to provide him with subsistence." (11) And elsewhere 
Turgot held the opinion that the workers were free in name but 
slaves in reality. (12) 
In his article,'Economic Activity and Legislation' ('Ekonomicheskaya 
deiatel' nost'i zakonodatel'stvo') (1859) Chernyshevskii attacked the 
principle of laissez-faire from a different angle. He tried to show 
that its basic tenet is self-contradictory. He takes up the first 
requirement of the principle, namely, "the economic activity of 
individual persons must be guaranteed complete freedom. "(*) He 
presents a hypothetical. case to show the contradiction in the premise. 
Let us assume he says, that somebody wants to open a shop to sell 
crockery~ He is free to do so. At the same time, somebody with 
enough money has the right to buy all the crockery produced in the 
same area and even has the right to make a forward purchase of all 
the forthcoming production, so that the person who wants to open 
a shop will not be able to get any stock. Both these persons have 
freedom to do business in the same field but the latter's freedom 
encroaches on the freedom of the former.(13) Chernyshevskii also 
says that the principle that "society has no right to impose any 
restraint on the economic actiVities of individual persons"(**) 
cannot be maintained without qualification. In many cases the 
(*) See page 189 
(**) See page 189 
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ownership of certain properties by certain persons becomeS 
restraint on the freedom of activity of other persons as is 
illustrated in the above example. The burden of Chernyshevskii's 
argument is really that the freedom of the mass of people is 
impossible when private property remains the dominant economic 
institution. The capitalist idea of society turns out to be an 
abstraction, although capitalists claim.to be eminently practical 
men in pursuit of eminently practical aims. They speak of the 
interests of the individuals, while ignoring individuals. A 
realistic theory, in Chernyshevskii's view, has the obligation 
to find means to remove any restraint on the freedom of economic 
activities by ordinary individuals. (14) 
If, according to the followers of the laissez-faire principle, 
the ideal is for the state to abstain from any activity, why 
he asks, does the state exist at all? According to the 'principle' 
the sta~e exists only for guaranteeing the security of individual 
persons and averting restraint which would prevent the full 
development of individual activities. If this is the case, the'state's 
aim of securing the inviolability of the individual and the aim, 
stated earlier on, of reducing itself to nothing contradict each 
other. If the state intervenes to guarantee the full freedom of 
a 
activity of individuals in/real sense,which it should do, then 
the philosophy of non-intervention looses all its point. "We 
already know," Chernyshevskii says~ "that the state exists only 
/' 
for guaranteeing security. This basic principle of the theory· 
is developed and explained by certain paraphrases with the same 
idea in view. The first paragraph runs as follows: 'in other 
words,the concern of the state lies only with that which is not 
achieved or cannot be achieved by the activities of individual 
persons.' Very well. According to this rule, the state has the 
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obligation to build an army and navy, without which there is 
no security; and these cannot be built by individuals. But 
what if I ask if it is not the right of every member of society 
to have the opportunity to live by honest labour, (this is also 
necessary for security in society because he who cannot live 
by honest labour, of necessity takes up bad ways)? This can 
be attained only by,.!the will of society (the law) and through 
social activities: not through the activities of individual 
persons." (15) 
So, according to Chernyshevskii, the state can guarantee 
security to individuals only when the people are guaranteed 
an honest means of livelihood and if such a condition is absent 
in a society, the state has the obligation to intervene. 
Chernyshevskii gives several allegories to illustrate his point 
that the state must intervene to secure the well-being of the 
people. II ': •• in the present state of navigation astronomy is 
necessary •••• To·make a catalogue of stars takes many years. 
How will the compiler of stars live until his work is finished? 
After the work is finished perhaps fifty copies of it will be sold: 
thus its publication means a large deficit, and not a profit. A 
catalogue of stars 'is useful. But individual persons taken 
separately do not guarantee proper remuneration for it. Let us 
take another example. Let us suppose that a small boy or a man 
who suffersffrom a mental illness inherits a house; let us 
suppose that this unfortunate person has no near relatives or if 
he has they are unreliable. It is clear th~the house should 
be put under trustees. Is it clear? We warn you that the con-
clusions drawn from this are quite important. Not one of the 
economists, backward as they are has yet considered refuting the 
necessity of trusteeship under similar circumstances. So the matter 
can be considered 'settled." (16) 
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Chernyshevskii tries to defend the above statements (whose 
manner is rather typical of his style of argument) that it may 
be necessary for the state to intervene in the economic life 
of a country. It is admitted that the state must act to protect 
the lives of individuals within it against external and internal 
aggression, it is unreasonable for it not to intervene to prevent 
economic oppression of some people by other people. The second 
generation of classical economists were b~ind to this necessity. 
It was Chernyshevskii's real merit to have stated this as part 
of relevant economic thinking. Plekhanov branded him a utopian. 
. . . examin il1~ .. . . 
But anyone /_ . h1S arguments against the principle of 
laissez-faire cannot but praise him for his realism. 
Ivanov-Razumnik observed that if the social conditions of a 
country was such that the -national weal t.h" and "national well-being" 
clashed, then Chernyshevskii would have unhesitatingly opted for 
national well-being. (17) "We are always ready to remain on the 
side of that party", Chernyshevskii said, "which succeeds in 
proving that its solution of the problem corresponds to national 
well-being." (18) While explaining the formation of capital in 
his article on the -Reproduction of Nat.!.£!!.al Capital ('Umnozhenie 
narodnogo kapitala'l Chernyshevskii stated that it (c~pital) 
is the embod)mentcof national well-being. In other words, an 
increase of capital in a country should imply an increase of 
national well-being, if the word 'capital' is taken in its correct 
meaning. He adds that by capital one should not mean money in 
circulation, factories, machines, goods etc., but products of 
labour which serve as means of new production. (19) This definition 
of capital anticipates the idea put forward later by Bohm Bawerk. 
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Chernyshevskii is not opposed either to capital or to greater 
production of wealth, provided they do not go against the 
interest of national well-being, In his fourth commentary on 
Mill, he shows that an increase in national wealth may lead to 
a decrease of the welfare of the people. In order to:prove this 
he presents a hypothetical case. "Let us assmne",he says, 
"that in a certain ancient Greek society, there were 1000 adult 
workers in a population of 4000; that 200 adult workers went to 
Persia in the service of a. certain Artakher~Jc,t:hat 50 of them 
were killed in war and died of other causes in a foreign land, 
and that 150 came back and each of them broughtwith him'a pood 
of gold; while in this society 25 chetverts of corn produced by 
the workers cost in all one-tenth part of a pood of gold. Thus 
everyone who came back returned as rich as an agriculturist 
of our country who has thousand dessyatins of the best land. Let 
us then examine the state of production of this society before 
the departure of the adventurers for war, then during their 
absence and finally when they came back. 
"Before the depature of the adventurers there were 1000 adult 
workers maintaining" 4000 persons. Let us assume that each of them 
produce 25 chetverts of grain; in this case every inhabitant 
got 6.25 chetverts; if for a comfortable life 6 chetverts per capita 
was necessary, then this society had some surplus: . not largeit is 
true, but noticeable.' 
"But then 200 adventurers went to Persia. There remained 800 
workers out of a population of 3800. Every worker is forced to 
maintain not 4 as before, but 4.75 (persons), that is,4workers do 
not maintain 16 men as before, but 19 in all. Producing at the 
rate of 25 chetverts per worker, society has only 5.25 chetverts 
per capita, and hence suffers from a rather acute shortage." 
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'~ow the adventurers come back. They are rich people and 
they do not want to do unpleasant hard jobs. Because of their 
wealth it is not fitting for them not only to till the land, 
but also to clean their rooms themselves and wash their clothes; 
everyone of them needs a man-servant. They do not grudge money 
and everyone is ready to abandon agriculture in order to be a 
servant to one of them. With the appearance of 150 masters 
there were 150 man-servants and for agriculture there remained 
only 650 men: they have' to maintain 3950 men '(3800 of the 
previous population and 150 adventurers who have come back); 
so everyone is forced to maintain 6.05 persons per head, that is, 
for each member society has only 4.13 chetverts of grain. The 
need became incomparably greater than before. To have only 
4 chetverts per capita instead of 6 means either that everyonezgoes 
without food once in three days or one out of three men dies of 
starvation. It would have been better if the 200 adventurers had 
perished in'the war; then 200 men would have perished, now 1300 
are going to perish.-
"This conclusion can be applied to a11 circtmlStances, when 
a nation acquires a certain amount of wealth at the expense of 
other nations: wealth acquired by her at the price of loss to 
others, becomes the source of ruin for herself. Every economist 
says that such was the influence of the great mass of wealth which 
came to Philip II and his successors in Spain from'America."(20) 
By this out-of-the way but quite illuminating illustration, 
Chernyshevskii demonstrates his persistent idea that a society or 
a nation can become richer, while at the same time its people 
become poorer, whioh Yiew' was also put forward by Marx and Engels 
but Chernyshevskii preceded them, although, somewhat ironically, 
the early Slavophils suggested a similar distinction, with 
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characteristic mystic connotation, which disabled them from 
considering its real social and economic significance. (21) 
Ivanov-Razumnik held that Cheryshevskii's reaction to 
and criticism of classical economists of the second generation 
andofthe .. laissez-faire principle in particular, marked his 
essentially "humanistic" approach, that natsia and narod were 
not economic concepts. (22) Chernyshevskii may have been or 
was a humanist: all social thinkers sympathising with the 
plight of the masses could be called that. But the interest 
lies in Chernyshevskii's fusion of economic realism and humanism. 
He was concerned with the realities of the conditions of the 
people rather than with the deductive propositions pertaining 
to the abstractions of metaphysics or, for that matter, of 
classical economy. The fusion of realism and humanism was most 
appropriate in economic analysis during Chernyshevskii's time. 
But it was similarly appropriate in political analysis. Side by 
side with the principle of laissez-faire, the whole idea of'formal' 
democracy with its advocacy of legal freedom was at stake. When 
men working for sixteen hours a day could not earn a meagre 
subsistence, the concept of democracy appeared nothing less than 
hypocricy. In the 'face of such conditions the improvement in the 
standard of living had absolute priority over consideration of 
political democracy. Humanism deepen,~d. Chernyshevskii' s under-
standing of man's economic situation and this understanding of the 
economic situation and a concern for it made his humanism socially 
It has been pointed out,by Ivanov-Razumnik for instance, that 
Chernyshevskii's economic arguments imply a notion of society 
as an additive whole, something which does not differ qualitatively 
from a mere aggregate of individuals that constitute it.(23) In 
other words Chernyshevskii was said to have presented an atomistic 
I 
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view of society. This is not correct. Or rather, he treated 
society in this way only in certain contexts. 'Society' for 
him was an ambiguous concept. He considered society as an 
aggregate of individuals when speaking of 'national prosperity' 
and 'well-being' because to him 'national prosperity' had no 
meaning unless all the individuals comprising the society 
prospered. There are many other instan~es in his writings when 
he considered society as a qualitative whole because the context 
demanded so. In his discussion on capital, (Kapital i trud) he 
categorically stated that utilisation towards the well-being of the 
people depended on the existing institutional set-up, i.e some-
thing that is not reducible to a collection of isolated persons. 
Indeed he believed that to effect real change one must alter the 
institutional set-up of a country or the entire social structure 
rather than relations between individuals. (24) While formulating 
his theory of the working class he mentioned the need or a change 
of the whole society,(25), although to say this needed indirect 
statement, circumlocution in view of the watchful censorship. 
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Chapter Two Chernyshevskii and The Scope and Nature of 
Political Economy 
A sUbstantial part of Chernyshevskii's critique of the 
different branches of political economy of his time was con-
tained in his commentary on J.S. Mill's Principles of Poli-
tical Economy. The commentary was published in two sections 
under the titles Osnovaniya politicheskoi ekonomii and 
Ocherki iz politicheskoi ekonomii (po Milliu). In the first 
of these Chernyshevskii undertook the task of translating 
J.S. Mill's famous text with copious explanatory notes and 
criticisms for the Russian reader. These critical notes 
contain many original ideas and a careful analysis of the 
notes is helpful in ascertaining Chernyshevskii's position 
vis-a-vis the political economy of his time. 
Before he attempted to define what Political Economy 
was, Chernyshevskii concerned himself at some length with 
the duality in the methodological approach of the Smithian 
School. In Adam Smith's scheme of political economy, 
'wealth' was the most important factor. It's maximisation 
was the cause of the prosperity of a nation. Historically, 
this was an improvement over the Mercantilist notion of 
maximisation of 'riches'. While making thisrcomment, 
Chernyshevskii agreed completely with Mill's criticism of 
Mercantilism and his (Mill's) contention that an absurd 
c' 
politico-economic principle was dominant for a long time. 
In Chernyshevskii's opinion, there was an ambiguity 
in the meaning of 'wealth' as developed by Adam Smith when 
he (Smith) analysed the effect of its increase in a country. 
According to Adam Smith, there are two types of wealth: 
a) relative wealth, that is, wealth of X,an individual, 
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in relation to that of Y when X and Yare two individuals 
in a community. 
b) an absolute wealth or a wealth of a nation which is 
not affected by any interpersonal, transfer of relative 
wealth. J.S. Mill's analysis of these two kinds of wealth 
is as follows: 
"This classification leads to an important distinction 
in the meaning of the word wealth, as applied to the pos-
sessions of an individual, and to those of a nation, or 
of mankind. In the wealth of mankind, nothing is included 
which does not 6f itself answer some purpose of utility 
or pleasure. To an individual anything is wealth, which, 
though useless in itself, enables him to claim from others 
a part of their stock of things useful or pleasant. Takef 
for instance, a mortgage of a thousand pounds on a landed 
estate. This is wealth to the person to whom it brings 
in a revenue, and who could perhaps sell it in the market 
for the full amount of the debt. But it is not wealth to 
the country; if the engagement were annulled, the country 
would be neither poorer nor richer. The mortgagee would 
have lost a thousand pounds, and the owner of the land 
would have gained it. Speaking nationally, the mortgage 
was not itself wealth, but merely gave A a claim to a por-
tion of the wealth of B. It was the wealth of A, and 
wealth which he could transfer to a third person; but 
what he so transferred was in fact a joint ownership, to 
the extent of a thousand P9unds, in the land of which B 
was nominally the sole proprietor. The position of fund-
holders, or owners of the public debt of a country, is 
similar." They are mortgagees on the general wealth of 
the country. The cancelling of the debt would be no de-
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structien ef wealth, but a transfer ef it: a wrengful ab-
stractien ef wealth frem certain members ef the cemmunity, 
fer the prefit ef the gevernment, er ef the tax-payers. 
Funded preperty therefere cannet be ceunted as part ef the 
natienal wealth."(1) Chernyshevskii asks which ef these 
wealths leads to. presperity.(2) In his view the Smithian 
Scheel was net clear and specific en this peint. Adam 
Smith's analysis wavered between ene meaning ef wealth and 
.the ether. (3) His fellewers, including J.S. Mill, ceuld 
net aveid this ambiguity in their analysis. "Accerding to. 
the theery presented by Mill, the cenceptien ef 'begatstve' 
(wealth) deminates everything. This werd was first used 
by Adam Smith, the founder ef the theery. 'When yeu go. 
threugh the treatise ef Smith, the first and the basic beek 
ef the scheel, yeu will co. me acress the title, 'Essay en the 
Wealth ef Natiens'. The werd 'wealth' has the same shade 
ef meaning as we have in the werd 'begatstve'; it is net 
presperity, but wealth. Let us leek mere clesely at its 
meaning. Wealth is a purely relative cencept; there is no. 
independent scale ef measurement fer it, but enly a cen-
clusien abeut superierity ever ether cemparable ebjects. 
A man's satisfactien ef his needs is sufficient er insufficient 
net in cemparisen with ethers but accerding to. him alene. The 
scale here is determined by the nature ef man himself, as it 
is in the case of health, truth, intellect and ether pesitive 
qualities and prepesitions."(4) In other werds, wealth as 
understeed by Chernyshevskii, is wealth which is preperly dis-
tributed and is net a measure ef ene's superierity ever ethers. 
"The ewners ef a few theusand dessyatins ef geed land," Cherny-
,. 
shevskii says, "is a very rich man in cemparisen with an agri-
culturist who. iills his land, but he is definitely a peer man cem-
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pared with Rothschild. _The concept of wealth is something 
accidential and external •••• But it seems to us that the 
science (of political economy) offer~, by its definition, 
an interpretation neither comparable nor relative but 
direct and positive.It(S) 
Chernyshevskii challenges Mill's contention that 
~tEveryone has a notion, sufficien~ly correct for common 
purposes, of what is meant by wealth." In Chernyshevskii's 
view this is not correct. Wealth, according to him, has 
one meaning in political economy and another in ev~ryday 
language. In the former wealth means the sum of useful 
and pleasant things which have exchange values. Conse-
the 
quently wealth refers to/quality of things (~e.~ which 
can be exchanged or distributed) and not to their qua~tity. 
When such things are numerous, wealth can be assumed to 
be sizeable; when they are not many, wealth is not great. 
In everyday language, on the other hand, wealth does not 
the 
refer to quality at all. It refers exclusively to/quantity 
of things, that is, in everyday language, by wealth only 
the relative aspect of it is understood. According to 
Chernyshevskii wealth measured in terms of quantity alone 
does not guarantee welfare and this was his concern when 
he started the discussion with the point that 'Dogatstvo' 
is not welfare but wealth. If wealth is measured in 
quantitative terms alone,~r in other words, if it is re-
lative wealth only, on Mill's own showing, possession of 
human beings as slaves (or serfs) makes one relatively 
rich. "Another example of a possession which is wealth 
to the person holding it, but not wealth to the nation, 
or to mankind,is slaves. It is by a strange confusion 
of ideas that slave property (as it is termed) is counted, 
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at so much per head, in an estimate of the wealth, or of 
the capital, of the country which tolerates the existence 
of such property. If a human being, considered as an ob-
ject possessing productive powers, is part of the national 
wealth when his p~wers are owned by another man, he cannot 
be less a part of it when they are owned by himself. What-
ever he is worth to his master is so much property abstracted 
from himself, and its abstraction cannot augment the pos-
session of the two together, or of the country to which 
they both belong. In propriety of classification, however, 
the people of a country are not to be counted in its wealth. 
They are that for the sake of which wealth exists. The 
term wealth is wanted to denote the desirable objects which 
they possess, not inclusive of, but in contradistinction 
to, their own persons. They are not wealth to themselves, 
though they are means of acquiring it."(6) This is Mill's 
criticism of the practice in some societies of regarding 
human beings as property. The logical outcome of this 
practice is enrichment of a handful of individuals by 
'possessing' other individuals and the deprivation of the 
freedom and economic security of the latter. In the words 
of Chernyshevskii, absolute wealth (which is true wealth 
according to him) will be sacrificed q" the altar of rela-
tive wealth in this situation. A perusal of Chernyshevskii's 
discussion of 'absolute wealth' leads one to think that it~ 
increase implied increase of the production of useful and 
pleasant thirigs in a country for the purpose of an equitable 
distribution to the individuals. Unfortunately, he was not 
specific in his analysis of this issue. But his arguments 
identifying wealth and welfare in his .. formu'l'atioIieil" ; on the 
other hand, is' free from any contradiction. The implication 
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of his position is that desirable distribution of wealth 
will maximise the absolute wealth of a nation and this in 
turn also implies that a deviation from this distribution 
will entail unhappiness to individuals. 
But many economists in Chernyshevskii's time and 
later held the view that .. cardinal measurement of levels 
of satisfaction (to arrive at different scales of social 
prosperity) is impossible. The feeling of contentment is 
subjective and unquantifiable. A scheme of aggregation 
of 'absolute wealth' (maximisation involves aggregation) 
is unscientific, and is not a feasible scheme for solving 
social problems. According to these critiques, the know-
ledge of every individual (so far as the consciousness of 
his own welfare is concerned) is naturally and necessarily 
restricted to his own ~xperience; so to arrive at a social 
index of this personal experience is unrealisable. This 
position is apparently sound in logic. But it challenges 
our capacity to acquire an objective knowledge of others' 
sufferings with a view to change it.(7) Welfare and misery, 
it is true, cannot be mathematically quantified, but their 
existence can always be objectively determined. Such ob-
jective evaluation has always been the basis of politico-
economic judgement. We are always in a position to ascer-
tain the depth of human misery in a certain politico-
, 
economic environment. We can also calculate mathematically 
the inequality in the distribution of wealth. So, welfare 
of the people as the main criterion of judging whether a 
nation is wealthy as suggested by Chernyshevskii is not 
so unreal. 
Chernyshevskii says: "The Smithian school is not aware 
of this duality; thus through the school's whole theory 
there runs a dichotomy of concepts and the constant con-
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fusion of one, purely scientific way of seeing things, 
which goes to the roots, with another outlook appertaining 
to the language of conversation and the superficial way 
of thinking of people not accustomed to abstract thought". (8) 
In exposing the duality between wealth and prosperity 
Chernyshevskii introduces the welfare concept of wealth. 
His definition of political econo.my is: "Political Economy 
is a science about the material well-being of man in as 
far as it depends on things and situations produced by 
labour". (9) From this definition it follows that the most 
important object of study of political economy is the 
'material well-being of man'. The latte~_-day utilitarian 
definition of economics as a science which studies the 
causes of the material welfare of man is almost an echo of 
Chernyshevskii's definition of political economy. According 
to Chernyshevskii,~, wealth and material well-being 
of man were complimentary to each other. Elsewhere Cherny-
shevskii attempts to present the characteristics of political 
economy. "The object of political economy", he says 
"according to the general decision of all economists, con-
sists in the study of the conditions of production and 
distribution of value or objects of consumption or objects 
necessary for the well-being of man". (10) This is an 
extension of his original definition (see above) and here 
again he emphasised the well-being of man as the main object 
of the study of political economy. On more than one oc-
casion Chernyshevskii used the expression, "according to 
the general decisi'on of all economists" before stating his 
own particular view. There are two reasons for his using 
this expression: the first' is that he considered the 
classical economists of his time backward and so they could 
not 
- 206 -
be counted as economists at all. Those who were opposed 
to the views of these classical economists were the real 
economists-Of whom Chernyshevskii considered himself a 
representative and theoretician. The second reason was 
that ·~Chernyshevskii wanted the censorship authorities of 
his time to think that any radical element in his writings 
was not his alone but shared by all economists. 
Since the material well-being of man ought to be the 
goal of all economic activities, it follows that the pro-
duction of material goods is necessary. "The concern: of 
political economy is that branch of labour which aims at 
the satisfaction of the material needs of human beings!'(11) 
Chernyshevskii emphasised that the material objects that 
guaranteed human welfare were the outcome of labour. He 
in fact presented a labour theory of value. He held the 
view that labour was the source of all wealth. This view 
is not a departure from the caassical political economy of 
his time. Many of the celebrities of this school from 
Adam Smith's time to his were exponents of the labour 
theory of value. "The product arises out of a combination 
of three basic elements", Chernyshevskii says "of which 
one is contributed by the human element and the other two 
by external nature; ••• When the external objects and the 
forces of external objects which have a part in the pro-
duction of goods are not created by labour but only by 
the whimsical activities of nature, they do not enter into 
economic calculations."(12) This is a reiteration of the 
position of classical economics. 
Chernyshevskii held the view that the three branches 
of political economy, viz. production, consumption and 
distribution were closely connected and analyses of these 
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three branches should not be carried out with the assump-
tion that they were mutually exclusive. He explains the 
interconnection of these three branches of political 
economy in the following manner: n ••• the distribution of 
existing values is represented as a condition of produc-
tion. Besides this/value is in itself a much more wider 
concept than that of production wnich is only one of the 
moments through which value passes; all types of produc-
tion are directed to the creation of value, but value is 
not an object of production alone; it serves also as the 
object of preservation, exchange and consumption. Let 
us add that production is not an end in itself but is 
directed to consumption, and consumption is based on the 
distribution of value; thus the basic object of a study 
of political economy is the theory of distribution; produ-
ction concerns it only as the preparation of materials 
for distribution. n (13) 
Thus Chernyshevskii not only shows an intimate connec-
tion between,·.the three branches of political economy through 
exchange but attaches the most important role to distri-
bution/because the material well-being of the masses is 
not dependent on the level of production alone but also 
on the nature of its distribution. In other words, he 
did not acce~t the position of the 'most feasible distri-
bution' of classical economists; rather he advocated the 
most desirable distribution. The utility of such a dis-
tribution cannot be challenged either from Chernyshevskii's 
standpoint or even from the standpoint of Gossen, a mar-
ginalist and a contemporary of Chernyshevskii. "The 
measure of the physical welfare of a nation", Gossen said 
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"is the degree of the enjoyment of life which every indi-
vidual belonging to the nation can procure himself!'(14) 
In Chernyshevskii's view a scheme of distribution of values 
which maximises the absolute wealth of the individuals com-
prising a society is the most desirable. The task of poli-
tical economy, Chernyshevskii insists, is not only to observe 
and generalise economic phenomena. but also to prescribe 
both curative and prophylactic medicines for economic 
diseases. "Economic science", he says "is a medicine for 
economic conditions. But apart from writing prescriptions, 
medicine has another, much more important duty: to explain 
to man the conditions which he should ~bserve in order not 
to need a prescription. The dominant theory is confined 
to pathology; the more important part of the science which 
concerns hygiene has been neglected". (15 ) 
The contention of the classical economists that the 
spirit of competition was the key-note to all progress and 
that any economic activity which did not take place through 
competition w~s alien to the science of political economy 
was challenged by Chernyshevskii. In his view such an idea 
., 
of the scope of political economy was partial and incomplete. (16) 
Here is how he views the situation. "It is said that those 
economic transactions, which are still. undetermined..by com-
peti tion .. are not fully developed and are unsatisfacto.ry 
• 
But we have seen that the most important half of economic 
transactions can in fact never be subordinated to the prin-
ciple of competition to such an extent as to contribute 
to a theory based exclusively on it."(17) Chernyshevskii 
asks the question: if a part of the economic life of any 
country does not attain such a degree of development to be 
included in economic theory,does it mean that this undeve-
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loped economic activity is not economic activity at all? 
"Thi s means ,tChernyshevskii contends, "that it (undeveloped , 
economic activity)will never fit the present day dominant 
theory; it means that this theory, however satisfactory 
it may seem to itself, must recognize unequivoca.lly that 
it is not a theory of economic life, but only of some par-
ticular forms of this life; that it is not a science, but 
only part of a science; it is related to a complete ,economic 
theory in the same way as the anatomy of the hand is related 
to the whole science known as Anatomy or as a monograph 
. ' 
on England is related to GeographY~'(18) Chernyshevskii 
evidently referred to obschchina and artel' and similar 
organisations which played an important role in the economic 
life of his country and which were not accepted as suit-
able for inclusion into the classical economic theory. 
Even forced labour, which was such an important factor 
in the economic lives of many nations at different histo-
rical periods and of Russia at that particular time, was 
not considered in the political economy of Chernyshevskiits 
time. Chernyshevskii wanted to formulate a more general 
political economy which would include such featUres. 
Method of study of Political Economy 
According to Chernyshevskii, the method of analysis 
of Political Economy is to single out important variables 
from a conglomeration of economic factors and then to 
determine the nature of interaction of these variables. 
This is, in fact, the basic method of analysis in all 
sciences. "This method of, analysis (in political economy) 
implies that when we need to determine the nature of a 
given factor we must temporarily concentrate on one 
aspect of a complicated problem~ and we must look for 
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problems of the simplest structure in which the factor which 
interests us is most clearly displayed. Then, having dis-
covered the nature of the said factor, we can discover the 
role it plays in the whole complex of problems which we are 
considering. "(19) 
This is self-evident. In all the sciences we have to 
ascertain the contributions of all the variables towards a 
certain phenomenon. But it is very difficult if not impos-
sible to understand the role of each variable when many fac-
tors are acting simultaneously. So, it is the usual practice 
of scientists to isolate some important variables and then 
to examine only their influence on the phenomenon, making a 
'ceteris paribus' assumption. This is the idea of abstraction. 
A description of the politico-economic events of history is 
not political economy, but some degree of abstraction is essen-
tial to theory building in political economy. "So, from the 
sphere of historical events", Chernyshevskii says "we must 
move to the sphere of abstract thinking, which instead of 
statistical data presented by history works with abstract 
figures, the significance of which is conditional, and which 
are determined only for the sake of convenience."(20) This is 
the usual methodological approach in all abstractions both in 
the sphere of natural and· social sciences. Elsewhere he says~ 
"These conclusions remain indisputable, are entirely mathema-
J 
tically reliable, though the figures taken by us were 'assumed' 
and simply accompanied the words, 'let us assume'. In this 
sense, politico-economic questions are solved by means of the 
hypothetical method with mathematical reliability, if only 
they are presented correctly, if only they are turned into an 
II 
equation in the correct way. (21) 
What sort of hypothetical method did Cherny-
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shevskii have in mind? Was it purely a method of a pri-
origeneralisation of the interactions of politico-economic 
variables; did such generalisations involve only logical 
consistency and mathematical nicety1'( 22) From Chernyshe-
vskii's own explanation of this method it does not follow 
that he wanted to build abstract models of politico-
economic phenomena without any r~ference to reality. 
Any abstraction needs some hypothetical base as in 
present day economics we have the ceteris paribus assump-
tion. Moreover all abstractions are some deviation from 
reality because abstraction gives a model picture of the 
behaviour of variables without concerning itself with 
factual details of any particular situation. ~th . . 
¥ er"n.se, 
as Wiener and Rosenbleuth have said, 'the best model of 
a cat would be a cat and preferably the same cat.' On 
the other hand,if ,any> one wants only to emphasise the 
reality he will have to be satisfied with merely a des-
cription of events in detail as those historians who 
eschew explanation, do, and the objective of building a 
theory will not be achieved. In constructing politico-
" 
economic theories, deductions are indispensable and so 
there is need for the hypothetical method. A theory while 
taking foundation from reality offers as conclusion a 
theoretical reality which mayor may not correspond to 
actual reality under certain circumstances. But this 
theoretical reality may be instrumental in showing the 
path and process of a change towards better in politico-
economic matters. Without this aspect of a theory no 
science can develop or progress. That is why Chernyshevskii 
.. the 
insisted on/reliability of such theories. By reliability 
he did not mean an extensive empirical verifiability, but 
- 212 
logical and mathematical reliability,not to the extent 
of reducing the theory to an end in itself but to the 
extent of making it a guide to socio-economic change. 
As an illustration of his hypothetical method, 
Chernyshevskii presented the following case. "Let us 
assume," he says, "that a society has a population of 
5000 men, which includes 1000 adult males. The entire 
society is maintained by their labour. Let us assume 
that 200 of them went to war. It can be asked - what is 
the economic connection of this war with the society? 
Did it increase or decrease the well-being of the society? 
" We have only to present such a very simple statement 
of the problem for the solution to become simple and in-
disputable, so that it can be understood easily by every-
body and cannot be refuted by anyone or by anything. 
n Anyone who is conversant with the operations of 
multiplication:;tand division can say without thinking : 
before the war every worker had to support five persons, 
and during the war when 200 workers were taken away from 
work there remained only 800 workers: they must maintain 
.. 
themselves, and 400 of the remaining population, and be-
sides that another 200 former workers who have gone to 
the war - in all 5000 persons: so every (worker) has 
to maintain 6.25 persons (in other words, formerly 100 
workers maintained 500 men, now they maintain 625 men). 
has 
It is clear that the condition of the workers/beceme more 
burdensome, and that the remaining members of society 
cannot be maintained in abundance as before. It is clear 
that war is harmful for the welfare of society. 
\I The reader can see that no importance is attached 
here to the absolute magnitude of figures: the importance 
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lies only in whether a certain proportion has increased 
or decreased on account of a change in the figure of the 
element, the nature of which we want to ascertain. Whether 
it will be more or less that is all we need to know and 
we will attach importance to it (alone). If it turns 
out to be greater, it remains greater whatever figure we 
may take; and if it turns out to be smaller, then it will 
remain smaller whatever figure we take. 
It 
For example, let us assume that there are 6,00;000 
and not 5000 men in the society; let us assume that there 
are 150,000 and not 1000 workers: let us (further) 
assume that 50,000, not 200 men went to war; the conclusion 
will be the same. 
'1 Before the war a worker maintained 4 men: during the 
war, out of 150,000 workers there remained only 1,00,000 
workers; so everyone is forced to maintain 6 men. It 
is the same as before: (the condition) of the workers 
has become more burdensome and the condition of the entire 
population has become worse. 
" We also see that the proportion by which it has 
worsened depended on the magnitude of the figures taken 
by us: they were approximate, so we did not attach impor-
tance to the precise proportions. But we can also see 
that the greater the proportion of men sent to war, the 
greater the harm brought by war to the society, and so 
we say: the unprofitableness of war to society is directly 
proportional to the number of men who go to war."(23) 
G.V. Plekhanov criticised Chernyshevskii's hypothe-
tical thinking as pure abstraction without any basis in 
reality. (24) Antonov's view on Chernyshevskii's hypothe-
tical method is as follows: "Though ••• social events are 
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extremely complex and entangled, their methods of study 
are the same; only here it is more difficult to isolate 
the influence of separate factors. But evidently social 
life represents the sum of the living events of individual 
lives; for this reason we can directly arrive at the laws 
of human nature (determined by physiology and psychology) 
and from a synthesis of them one. can obtain the socio-
logical causal connections for example, the connection 
between activities undertaken for different degreees of 
satisfaction according to the intensity of demand; or 
ithe connection between the demand for goods and their 
prices. Here, in fact the concern is not to establish 
1 
a causal connection, but only to determine the aggregate 
activity of elementary laws. As the quantity of active 
forces (demand, desire and so on) are not determined, the 
.conolu.sions"· obtained by such a deductive method cannot 
be correct. The essential method for establishing the 
causal connections of social events consists in mass 
observation of them, as carried out by statistics. It 
can determine, for example, the influence of the harvest 
or in general 0'£ economic prosperity on the number of 
... 
marriages and deciH1s; the connection between the:!nature 
of a profession and the average expectation of life, etc.; 
these inductive inferences are real and are fairly correct 
sociological laws. 
Chernyshevskii's hypothetical method consists basi-
cally of deductive inferences from definite social situ-
ations, but the special feature of this method ~as the 
numerical illustrations of these conclusions which, 
according to Chernyshevskii, give them more reliability."(25) 
If Chernys'hevskii' s hypothetical method consists of 
215 -
deductive inferences from definite social situations, 
as Antonov has pointed out, he cannot be accused of 
ignoring the social reality and his insistence on this 
method in political economy is not at odds with modern 
practice. Generalisation and inductive inference from 
a detailed statistical investigation of the workings of 
economic variables is only one pqrt of economics. 
Antonov's contention that the only reliable method of 
economic reasoning is inductive, is incorrect. Equally 
important are deductive inferences from simple models 
of the situation. An example from present day economics 
will sUffice to show that the same hypothetical method 
as Chernyshevskii used is extensively applied.· 
There is of course a difference between the ex-
pression of Chernyshevskii's argument and the expression 
of the argument in the illustration given below. 
vfuereas the former relied exclusively on numerical, 
the latter used algebraic statements. 
·See Appendix to this Chapter. 
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Appendix to Chapter 2. 
"To generalise the problem of demand, we suppose that n consumers' 
goods ,Xl' X2 , X3, ••• Xn are sold at uniform prices PI' P2 , P3, ••• Pn 
on a competitive market consisting of a fixed number of consumers with 
given tastes and incomes. Then the amount xr of anyone good Xr demanded 
by the market is uniquely dependent on the prices of all the goods on the 
market. We can thus write 
x = ~ (p , P , P , ••• Pn ) r r I 2 3 
as the demand function for the good X , a function which, for convenience, 
r 
can be assumed continuous in all the variables. 
"The number of the variables overcrowds our picture of market demand. 
It is possible, however, to select a few of the prices according to the 
particular aspect of the problem considered and to assume that all the 
other prices are fixed. In particular, we can study the inter-relations of 
the demands for two goods X and X by assuming that the prices of all other 
I 2 
goods are fixed. Then 
xl = ~1(PIJP2) and X2 = ~2(PIJP2) 
are the demand functions, each dependent on the two variable prices. Each 
function can be shown as a demand surface with heights above the horizontal 
plane OplP2 representing the varying demand for the good. The vertical 
sections of such a surface are particularly interesting. The section of the 
surface Xl = ~1(PI'P2) by any plane perpendicular to Op2 (on which P2 has a 
fixed value) is an ordinary demand curve showing the variation of Xl as PI 
varies. There is one such demand curve for each fixed pric~ P2 of the other 
good and the whole system of demand curves shows the way in which demand 
shifts as the price P2 is changed. All these demand curves are downward 
sloping in the normal case. The section of the surface by a plane perpendicular 
to Opl is a curve showing the variation of Xl as P2 varies for a given value 
of Pl. At any point where this section is upward sloping, a rise in the price 
of X2 results in a rise in the demand for Xl and the goods can be called 
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"competi ti ve", at least in a rough sEmce. If the section is downward sloping, 
the converse hQlds and the goods can be called "complementary" at the prices 
concerned." 
"Mathematical Analysis for Economists" - R. G. D. Allen. 
pages 281 - 282. 
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Chapter Three Productivity and Unproductivity of Labour 
Chernyshevskii presented a new approach to the question 
of productive and unproductive labour. Considerable con-
fusion was evident in the discussion of this distinction 
by classical economists from Adam Smith to J.S. Mill. In 
spite of the fact that the controversy concerning the 
classification of labour as eith~r productive or unproduc-
tive was mainly a matter of definitions, it occupied an 
important place in the political economy during this time. 
The distinction between productive and unproductive labour, 
which can be traced to the physiocrats, became an important 
issue with Adam Smith. He presented three definitions of 
productive and unproductive labour. "There is one sort· 
of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon which 
it is bestowed: there is another which has no such effect". 
This first definition by Smith is simple enough: any labour 
which creates valuewae productive (1). The second reads: 
" .... the labour of a manufacturer adds generally to the 
value of the materials which he works upon, that 6f his own 
maintenance, and of his master's profit"(2). In the third 
, 
definition Smith treats all labour spent on producing 
services as unproductive. Thus any labour spent by indi-
viduals for improving the moral, intellectual or spiritual 
condition of a nationwaa not productive. According to John 
Stuart Mill, all labour which is employed in creating per-
manent utilities, whether embodied in human beings or in 
any other animate or inanimate objects is productive.(3) 
Mill departs from Smith in treating as productive the 
potential of human beings such as skills as wealth. In 
Mill's scheme the labour of an instructor teaching skills 
to his students is productive, whereas Adam Smith considered 
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all services unproductive. 
Mill stated that there are three kinds of utility 
which are produced by labour: "'first, utilities fixed and 
embodied in outward objects 'by labour employed in in-
vesting external material things with properties which 
render them serviceable to human beings • ••• n "Secondly, 
utilities fixed and embodied in h.uman beings; the labour 
being in this case employed in conferring on human beings 
qualities which render them serviceable to themselves and 
others. To this class belongs the labour of all concerned 
in education; not only schoolmaster, tutors and professors, 
but govenmments, so far as they aim successfully at the 
improvement of the people; moralists, and clergyman, as 
far as productive of benefit; the labour of physicians, 
as far as instrumental in preserving life and physical or 
mental efficiency; of the teachers of bodily exercises, 
and of the various trades, sciences and arts, together 
with the labour of the learners in acquiring them; ••• n 
"Thirdly, an,d lastly, utilities not fixed or embodied in 
any object, but consisting of a mere service rendered; a 
pleasure given, an inconvenience or a pain averted, during 
a longer or a shorter time, but without - . . a permanent 
leaving 
acquision in the improved qualities of any person or 
thing; the labour being employed in producing an utility 
directly, not (as in the former cases) in fitting some 
other things to afford as utility. Such, for example, is 
the labour of the musical performer, the actor, the public 
declaimer or reciter or the showman ••• : 
"We have now to consider which of these three classes 
of labour should be accounted productive of wealth, since that 
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is what the term productive, when used by itself, must 
be understood to import. utilities of the third class, 
consisting in pleasures which only exist while being en-
joyed, and services which only exist while being per-
formed, cannot be spoken of as wealth, except by an 
acknowledged metaphor."(4) 
Chernyshevskii criticised the above classification 
of labour by Mill. He asked how the labour of a sculptor 
or an artist could be considered productive when that of 
a musician was considered unproductive; both endeavour 
to produce the same - to offer pleasure, the difference 
between them being in form only.(S) Chernyshevskii adds 
that by designating the labour of a sculptor or artist 
as productive, Mill puts him in the same category as plough-
men, which is a mistake. (6) If one examines Chernyshevskii's 
own system of the classification of labour the relevance 
of this criticism will become apparent. 
Although the controversy concerning productive and 
unproductive. labour was one of the most important issues 
in classical economic thought, in retrospect this con-
troversy appears to be not more than an exercise in 
scholasticism. Adam Smith's main criterion was the pro-
duction of material objects. Mill's criterion was labour 
that left a surplus of production over consumption. J.B. 
Say, on the other hand,considered any labour which produced 
a benefit or pleasure worth the cost as productive. He 
saw both labour used to produce material objects and that 
used to give services as equally productive. Say regarded 
as productive all activities which create utilities, as 
evidenced by their ability to command a price in the market. (7) 
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In Chernyshevskii's view, there are two kinds of goods 
that are produced in any economy: (a) the objects of pri-
mary necessity and (b) objects of secondary necessity, 
that is, objects of luxury. He does not make a further 
classification of objects of' secondary necessity into 
material objects and services. Objects of primary nece-
ssity include food, clothing, sh~lter, etc; in other 
words, objects that are essential for men for their 
survival. Any labour that was spent on producing goods 
of primary necessity was productive and labour spent not 
on producing goods of primary necessity was unproductive. 
Since his main concern was the well-being of man, his 
departure from the classifications of the traditional poli-
tical economists is quite consistent. To prove his point, 
Chernyshevskii explains how a disequilibrium in the material 
well-being of society can occur if there is a shift of 
emphasis from objects of primary necessity to objects of 
luxury. "Let us assume," he says, "that a society 
consists of 4000 men, out of which 1000 are adult males 
and the entire society must be maintained by their labour. 
Let us suppose that every worker pursuing agriculture half 
the year or 150 working days produces 20 chetvert (of 
crops)per annum. In this case, to produce 8000 chetvert 
of crops, 400 menlare needed, who will be engaged in pro-
duction half the year, which is the same as the number of 
days that 200 workers will remain engaged if they work 
every day in the year. Let us suppose that for the pro-
duction of other types of food (meat, milk, vegetables) 
necessary for nutrition, the same amount of time, that 
.-
is, the annual labour of 200 workers, are needed. Let 
us suppose that the same amount of labour (of 200 workers) 
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is necessary to maintain and repair houses and to keep them 
wa!l'!l; the same amount of labour for producing necessary 
clothing and small essential agricultural instruments. 
All this labour is directly employed on objects of neces-
sity. Apart from this, a certain amount of productive labour 
of an indirect nature is necessary to support this direct 
labour. Let us suppose that for protection, 50 labourers 
are necessary and the same number are required for other 
types of indirect work (maintenance of instruments etc.). 
This entire labour is applied to the production of objects 
of primary necessity; so, we find that the following number 
of annual units of labour are necessary for the society 
(or the following number of workers who will work all the 
year with 300 working days per man) to keep a supply of 
objects of primary necessity in the necessary quantity to 
satisfy the needs of the entire society. 
"So there remains 100 units of labour or 100 adult 
males on all other occupations apart from those engaged in 
the production of objects of primary needs."(S) In the 
above scheme the entire labour force of the community, 
. apart from the "residual 100, are employed in productive 
labour, since that is necessary to. secure the people a mini-
mum standard of well-being. Consequently, according to 
Chernyshevskii, this is the optimum allocation of labour 
into production of the two types of objects. In his 
hypothetical example, these additional 100 units of labour 
were the maximum amount that society could afford to spend 
on producing goods of secondary necessity. Chernyshevskii 
asserted. that the society of his day was blind to the 
needs for such a rational allocation of the two types of 
labour, and consequently there was a growing imbalance 
between the two sectors (productive and unproductive), 
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resulting in greater and greater shortages of goods of 
primary necessity, which in turn caused greater ineffic-
ielloy in the use of labour. Here is how Chernyshevskii pre-
sents the picture: "We need (1) a theatre - this requires 
20 men. We need (2) an orchestra-this requires another 
20 men. We need (3) bronze decoration - this requires 
yet another 20 men. We need (4) ornaments of gold (5) 
silk curtains and wall papers (and) (6) various other 
sorts of articles of different types; at 20 workers for 
every object altogether 120 workers (are necessary). 
All these are for seeing and hearing, but why are we 
not thinking of the stomach? We need food for dinner. 
Let us suppose that at least 40 workers are necessary for 
this. It is quite a modest estimate; fine wine is nece-
ssary - so another 40 men (are required); therefore, the 
total (number of men required) for gastronomic pleasure 
is 80 and for other objects of luxury, 120 men - in all 
200 workers. 
"It is clear that there remain only 800 workers for 
objects of primary necessity instead of 900, who are nece-
ssary in order to produce such objects in sUfficient 
quantities. It is clear that to many members of a society, 
these objects will be insufficient and there will be much 
more scope for the increase of theft and other forms of 
loss. To protect society from this, more labour is nece-
ssary; instead of 50 workers (as estimated before) 100 
are necessary. What will become of the direct. production 
of objects of primary necessity? From the gross total, 
by deducting 200 workers for objects of luxury, 100 for 
protection and 50 for indirect production of other types, 
there remains 650 men for the direct production of objects 
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of primary necessity instead of the 800 required~I(9) 
The consequence of such an allocation of labour will de-
prive society of the ability to provide for the mimi mum 
needs of its members; while .at the same time some of its 
members will have the privilege of consuming expensive 
objects of luxury, including worksl.of art. Hence Cherny-
shevskii's conclusion; " ••• political economy says that 
if in any society unproductive labour is applied to 
production of objects of luxury where there is a short-
age ·of goods of primary necessity, this society suffers 
from a wasteful economy incompatible with its demands and 
its means of the distribution of labour between different 
types of occupation."(10) Anything short of the optimum 
allocation of productive labour in society is harmful 
because the material well-being of the people is not then 
secured. 
Chernyshevskii does not want to argue that there is 
no need·for producing objects of art and other goods of 
luxury. Rather, he emphasises the need to change the 
economic structure in such a way as to enable the citi-
zens of a country to appreciate the objects of secondary 
necessity for what they are. If someone""was able to in-
dulge in luxuries, while othemremained in misery, such 
indulgence was socially and economically destructive. 
When misery had been eradicated he would enjoy luxury 
all the more fully and creatively. Comparing the imbalance 
between production of primary and secondary necessities 
in the existing society with his own rational scheme, 
Chernyshevskii writes: "In the present still unsatisfac-
tory state of many spheres of moral science, it is possible 
to say that it is better to admire a painting by Raphael 
4 
than to have wholesome food. It is necessary to say 
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however, and it will be generally accepted that poverty 
I 
hinders the development of man's dignified life, that 
the higher pleasures become accessible to him only after 
the satisfaction of lower necessities. For example, 
philosophers and astronomers can engage in their pursuits 
with success and satisfaction only when they are to some 
extent free from material depriv~tion. From this it would 
follow that even he to whom the interest of art, abstract 
science, painting or sculpture, philology or archaelogy, 
theatre or poetry appear more attractive than the material 
well-being of society - even he would be bound to find 
a distribution of occupation better if it provides the ·mater-
ial needs of the society - because in a condition of 
material well-being. science and art will develop more 
fully than in the absence of it."Cll) 
Evidently Chernyshevskii does not accept. the classi-
fication made by both Adam Smith and J.S. Mill. He does 
not follow the distinction of material objects and ser-
vices. In ~hernyshevskii's scheme material objects and 
services can be productive or otherwise depending on 
whether they piay or do not play a ,role in satisfying 
the primary needs of the people. Even the services pro-
tecting the objects of primary necessity from damage 
are seen as productive labour. 
In Chernyshevskii's time it was commonplace to util-
ize the labour of many for the profit of a few.(12) That 
being the case, the few individuals had enough surplus 
spending power, after meeting their primary needs, to 
spend generously on goods of luxury and thus to encourage 
production of luxury goods. This created a steady demand 
for and supply of goods of secondary necessity, even while 
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goods of primary necessity were insufficient for the 
people at large. The solution to the problem of optimum 
allocation of the two kinds of labour, according to 
Chernyshevskii, lay in doing away with a system of pro-
duction which fostered this state of affairs.~ Only a 
system of production where every individual gets a fair 
share of the total production in a country can guarantee 
a proper allocation of productive and unproductive labour. 
Such a system of production, Chernyshevskii contends, is 
only possible under socialism where the fruits of man's 
labour are enjoyed by the producer himself and where 
there is no national wastage of efforts through misdirec-
tion of labour. (13) 
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CHAPTER FOUR ClIERNYSHEVSKII ANn HALTEUS 
One of Chernyshevskii's important contributions to .economic 
thought was his criticism of the Malthusian theory of population. 
In 1797, Malthus published An Essay on the Principle of Population 
as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society. Since the day 
of its publication, economic and social thinkers have been divided 
into two groups: one supporting the contents of the ~ssay'and 
( 
looking at the future of mankind pessimistically, and/the other 
championing the growth and progress of civilisation which are 
capable, according to. them, of combating population growth. 
Chernyshevskii's contribution lies not simply in his criticism 
of the arguments of the ~ssay: but in his championing of the view 
that mm was capable of solving his problems with the resources 
and the know-how at his disposal. As will become evident in the 
course of this discussion, the philosophical optimism of 
Chernyshevskii underlay his criticism of the 'Essay'. Chernyshevskii' s 
optimistic theory of population as a criticism of Malthus was the 
first of its kind in the history of Russian economic thought. 
Strangely enough, this contribution of Chernyshevskii has not 
until now been recognised by Western economists. In his criticism 
of the 'Essay' he also pointed out its class content. Subsequently, 
Marx, of course, dealt with this aspect of the 'Essay', but 
Chernyshevskii's contention that the population theory of Malthus 
by implication supported the supremacy of the landowning class 
was the pioneer attempt to interpret the class content of the 
Malthusian theory. 
Immediately prior to the publication of Malthus' 'Essay', 
the ideas of freedom expounded in the French revolution caught 
the imagination of progressively minded Englishmen. Hopes rose 
high of ending, the social and economic stagnation of England. 
Optimistic thinkers abounded, and not all of them avoided naivety. 
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A singularly striking example of such an optimistic thinker 
of this period was William Godwin, a minister and pampleteer 
who was dismayed by the cruel and vulgar world around him. 
But he did not lose faith in the future. In his Political 
Justice (1793) he envisaged a distant future where "there 
would no longer be a handful of rich and a multitude of poor •• 
There will be no war, no crime, no adminis tl rat ion of justice, 
as it is called, and no government. Besides this there will 
be no desease, anguish, melancholy, or resentment."(l) These 
lines are of course the epitome of utopianism. Chernyshevskii, 
in spite of Godwin's utopianism, accepted him as a champion of 
progress. Chernyshevskii time and again singled out individuals 
or groups of thinkers and used some of their arguments to 
justify his own scheme even if he did not agree fully with their 
views. Especially when he needed support for his criticism of 
the old social order against its defenders, he resorted to this 
method of selecting opinions to his own advantage. So, he found 
in Godwin an important thinker to oppose Malthus. Here is how 
Chernyshevskii characterises the "moderate liberalism" of Malthus: 
"The old institutions never had a lack of defenders. But the 
political tendencies of that part of Eng~ish society whose 
publicist was Malthus, were such that all the previous objections 
against revolutionery ideas seemed to it unsatisfactory; they 
seemed to be unsatisfactory to Malthus himself; he belonged to 
the party of moderate liberals, who discuss very freely matters 
referring only to second grade institutions, are very fond of 
personal and respectable progress and become conservatives only 
when the revolutionaries in society become more aggressive, not 
confining themselves to criticism of unimportant details but 
aspiring to change the very basis of the existing order. Formerly 
the only opponents of democratic ideas in England were the 
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supporters of stagnation, defenders of medieval institutions; 
their objections against the democrats were based on 
reactionery principles which led towards proclamation 6£ the 
justice and usefulness of medieval institutions; the party to 
which Malthus belonged was inimical to those peculiarities by 
which the 13th century was distinguished from the 18th; it· 
considered those principles good on which the social order was 
based in all the previous periods of advanced social development. 
The arguments of the reactioneries defended not the essence of 
these principles but their medieval forms; for the moderate 
liberals there was the need of another theory which would disown 
the oppressive medieval details, would show the necessity of only 
basic principles and would only admit a certain progress in their 
development. Such a theory appeared to be the result of the 
res~arch of Malthus !'(2) 
Chernyshevskii points out as an extension of this view that 
according to Malthus the miseries of the poor did not arise from 
human institutions against which the radicals revolted. The 
miseries with all their consequences were produced by a law of 
nature whose actions were not strengthended but,on the contrary, 
eased by the institutions based on private property. Equality 
and socialisation of property would only mean giving greater 
rein to the natural law which in its turn would bring poverty to 
the people of all classes of society. 
The cardinal point of the above position of Malthus, according 
to Chernyshevskii was the rate of human.reproduction and the idea 
I 
of 'doubling' ~ (3) In Malthus' own words, "i f any person will 
take the trouble of making the calculations, he will see that if 
the necessaries of life could be obtained without limit, and the 
number of peop~e could be doubled every twenty five years, the 
population which might have been produced from a single pair since 
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the Christian era, would have been sufficient, not only to 
fill the earth quite full of people so that four should stand 
in every square yard, but to fill all the planets of our solar 
system in the same way, and not only them but all the planets 
revolving around the stars which are visible to the naked~e, 
supposing each of them... • •• to have as many planets belonging 
-
to it as our sun has."(4) Attempts to eradicate human miseries 
would only aggravate the problems by offering more comfort to the 
people and thus helping them to reproduce at a greater rate. 
By implication, deaths by starvation, epidemics and natural 
calamities were far more welcome to Malthus than social progress 
aimed at preventing these things. 
Chernyshevskii first examined the basic premise of Malthus 
that the population of any country doubled itself in 25 years. 
Chernyshevskii considered the data on population growth in France 
during the 50 years from 1790. In that year the population 
of France was 25 million and in 1840 the same popUlation stood 
at 35 million, not 100 million as it ought to have been according 
to the prediction of Malthus. But Chernyshevskii had omitted to 
consider one vital point. He did not show that the deviation 
of the population figures of France from the Malthusian estimate 
was not due to 'positive' checks (to use Malthusian terminology). 
Perhaps a significant proportion of the popUlation perished before 
their time due to famine, desease, pestilence and war. In fact, 
Chernyshevskii. did not account for such a low rate of nett growth 
of the popUlation of France during the~ fifty years. Subsequent 
analysis of French popUlation growth,however, has proved that 
Chernyshevskii was correct in taking up the population growth of 
France as a basic criticism of Malthus. The causes of this 
, 
stagnation of population growth in France have bot been attributed 
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by economists to any of the elements. which,according to the 
Malthusian scheme,could make the population growth of a 
country stagnate. A recent survey of French population from 
1801 shows that it was 28.2 million in 1801 and 40.6 million 
in 1901, but only 39.2 million in 1921 and again 40.5 in 
1946. (5) 
A single example does not invalidate a general theory but, , 
Chernyshevskii was also able to raise strong doubts whether 
the Malthusian theory is born out in the U.S. This is particularly 
important because the population data for th~t country was the 
basis of Malthus' theory. Going.through the data of population 
. the . 
growth of/United States, Malthus came to the conclusion that the 
population of a country doubles every 25 years.(6) 
Chernyshevskii raises two important questions on this position 
of Malthus, viz. (a) was the 'doubling' of the U.S. population due 
to nett reproduction rate alone, and (b) assuming; the Malthusian 
hypothesis of the 'doubling' of population within a certain period 
was true, did it follow from this that his prognosis of the future 
of mankind was correct? 
In answer to the first question Chernyshevskii tries to 
separate out the components of population growth. The first, 
according to him was the rate of reproduction and the consequent 
/ 
nett addition to population, that is, the nett growth of the 
original inhabitants of the United States. The second component 
which was also important in the United States was immigration 
from other countries of the world. According to Chernyshevskii, 
it has been observed time and again in history that new colonies 
show a tremendous rate of growth of population due to the influx 
of new settlers from far and near. So he raises an important 
question, that is, which of these components contributed most 
towards doubling of the population of the United States in 25 
/ 
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years? According to Chernyshevskii, and rightly so, Malthus in his 
study failed to distinguish between the two forces that were acting 
simultaneously towards the increase of population of the United States. 
The followers of Malthus were conscious of this weakness in the 
Malthus' theory. They tried to show that the influence of immigration 
on the growth of population in the United States was alight. William 
Godwin, on the other hand, believed that· immigration was the major 
factor in the U.S. population growth. Chernyshevskii assesses the 
various arguments as follows: 
"Malthus took the 25 year period for the doubling of the population 
from the population census of the United States. Similar census 
in the new colonies show a doubling of the population in much 
shorter periods. But in new colonies the size ".of the population 
increases much more from the flow of the settlers than ~rom natural 
reproduction and, in the United States, resettlment constantly 
played a significant part in the increase of the population. When 
formulating his theory Malthus completely forgot this circumstance 
and attributed the whole increase in· population of the "United 
States to natural reproduction alone. Such an extreme view 
provoked another extreme view. Subjecting the North-American 
population data to a very detailed analysis, Godwin came to the 
conclusion that the entire increase iIi population in the United 
States undoubtedly arose from the addition of new people from 
other countries; and if one were to draw any conclusion about 
the capacity of people to reproduce on the basis of North-American 
census, then one would have to conclude that this capacity was 
extremely poor, in fact scarcely visible. But the followers of 
Malthus tried to show that if Malthus made a mistake, having com-
pletely forgotten about the influence of resettlment, this 
influence was not great in comparison with the influence of natural 
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reproduction; and excluding all additional inhabitants due 
1 
to resettlement, there remains such an increase through 
natural reproduction in the United States as to double the 
population in 29 years." (7) 
In these lines we have a clear view of the two extremes 
mentioned by Chernyshevskii. Neither Godwinnor the followers 
of Malthus could show by evidence that their positions were 
justified. Chernyshevskii's critical strength lies in the 
fact that though he welcomed Godwin's optimism as opposed to 
the pessimistic predictions of Malthus, he did not uncritically 
accept the former's position on the cause of the increase of 
population in the United States. 
Chernyshevskii then takes up the second question, that is, 
whether the Malthusian prognosis was correctly deduced, assuming 
his premise was true. The idea that the growth of food production 
would lag far behind the growth of popUlation in the future, 
creating a calamitous situation for mankind had dealt a stagger-, 
ing blow to the hopes of an age ~oriented towards self-
satisfaction and a comfortable vista of progress". People had 
begun to accept the Malthusian theory as if it were beyond dispute. 
Between the extremes of utopianism and Malthusian pessimism the 
golden path could,in Chernyshevskii's time, six decades after 
the publication of the famous 'Essay' be hardly discernible. In 
, , 
this situation Chernyshevskii's scathing criticism of the 
Malthusian assumption that food production could not be increased 
sufficiently to match the increase in population was very timely. 
. As the first weapon for his criticism, Chernyshevskii used 
the results of contemporary research in agronomy. He tried to 
show that ,the whole idea of slow growth of food production was 
a myth. He advanced the views of Gosparen, a leading agronomist 
of his time, who stated that if a new type of crop-rotation 
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system could be introduced, the total area of arable land 
in Great Britain and Ireland could feed a population of 230 
million. In 1860 when Chernyshevskii wrote his critique 
of Malthus, the population of Great Britain and Ireland was 
only 29 million. So~if the results of the research of Gosparen 
was applied in Great Britain, food production could be i.n.cre.a.~ed 
by about eight times. This claim wa~ evidently a formidable 
attack on the Malthusian assumption of a static productivity 
of agriculture. This claim was also one of the foundations 
of the attack on Malthus by the latter day-optimum population 
... . amollg . 
theorists, notable I ~- them being Edwin Cannan. Chernyshevskii 
used the same arguments as they did some decades later. "Still 
more interesting", he states "is his (Malthus') conception of 
a subject which is closer to him - the English agriculture. He 
had an exaggerated idea that agricultural production in England 
cannot be doubled in 25 years. This is naive, and people who 
read present day books on agronomy would smile at this. In 
Great Britain and Ireland, there are 6li million acres of land 
suitable for agriculture." (8) Then he quotes the views of 
Gosparen and argues that given sufficient time, say, 25 years, 
the food production could be increased by 9 times. "Thus the 
inhabitants of the British Isles, could increase their present 
agricultural production ninefold if they introduced better methods 
of cultivation. Is 25 years enough for the introduction of a 
rotary system of agriculture on land that already had an 
agricultural system much better than the simple 3-field sys;em? 
We leave everyone to judge this for himself. It is clear from 
modern books on agronomy that if England wanted and needed to 
increase her agricultural product in 25 years not 2-fold but 5 
or even 9-fold, it would not be at all difficult in the present 
state of agricultural knowledge. Have we not the right to say 
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that the ideas by which Malthus was influenced, imagining that 
he was making a great concession in suggesting the possibility 
of doubling England's agricultural production in 25 years, 
were too naive."?(9) 
The Law of the Increase of Agricultural Products 
In these lines an attempt will be made to present Chernyshevskii's 
analytical criticism of the Malthusian assumption of the rate of 
growth of agricultural production. It will be evident that he 
, 
undermined the entire foundation of Malthusian prediction. In 
fact."he presented an original theorem on the trend of the growth 
of agricultural production. To proceed with his analysis 
Chernyshevskii first assumes the Malthusian assumption that a 
population of a country doubles itself in 25 years. He also takes 
it for granted that the supply of food cannot be increased in the 
same proportion. Consequently, there will be a food-supply lag. 
As is well-known Malthus predicted that this gap will become 
increasingly larger in course of time because of his hypothesis 
that while the rate of growth of population follows a geometric 
I 
progression that of food production follows an arithmentic progression. , 
The cause of this gap is according to Malthus the constancy of 
/ I 
supply of land.", Any attempt to increase the food supply based on 
this constant factor invariably leads to a diminishing productivity 
of labour. The assumption of Malthus, therefore can be presented 
I 
as follows: 'Other things (level of technology and supply of 
land) remaining constant the productivity of labour would diminish 
, 
in proportion to the increase in population. Chernyshevskii 
pointed out that since the fertility of land varies widely from 
region to region, the rate at which the productivity of added 
labour falls must vary according to the fertility of the soil 
on which the added labour works. "What is the extent of this 
decrease in pr?ductivity of agricultural labour with the gradual 
cultivation of new inferior land, or with an increase of labour 
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on former lands? Clearly everything here depends on circumstances 
which differ from region to region. On one soil the doubling 
of labour can give almost a doubling of product; on another soil 
a much smaller increase. In one region the second 200 dessyatin 
produce only 3 chetverts perdessyatina, when the first 200 
dessyatin produce 5 chetverts perdessyatina, while in another 
region the second 200 dessyatin are almost as good as the tirst 
... . ... 
and produce only slightly less than' 5 chetverts per. dessyatina". (10) i:' 
After mentioning this disparity in the productivity of agriculture, 
Chernyshevskii challenges the empirical validity of the notion . 
of a decreasing rate of productivity of labour in the face of an 
addition to labour force. He criticises the· economists for their 
failure to produce sufficient evidence to support their picture 
of the situation. " ~ .. . "Up to the present, he says, th1s has not been 
done •. It is strange but true that for very many decades the 
economists have been repeating Malthus, speaking of the progressive 
decrease in productivity of agricultural labour; and yet not one 
'of them has been concerned to collect any statistical dat~,relating 
to this decrease. No one has even realised that it was necessary, 
that until it was done one could only argue at random (naobuljt .) 
., 
as Malthus argued and as people argue up to the present about the 
decrease in productivity of agricultural labour." (11) 
In spite of this absence of empirical evidence for the 
Malthusian hypothesis on the productivity of labour in agriculture, 
Chernyshevskii assumes it to be true. He then derives algebraically 
Malthus' conclusion that as population growsgeomebically, prod-
uction of food increases only arithmetically. Mathematically, 
the assumption is: 
Productivity of labour added ina given period = 
Original productivity 
Original population 
population at beginning 
of growth period 
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The arithmetic can be presented in tabular form: 
(25 year) period 
Population at begin-
ning of period 
Population added in 
period 
Productivity of added 
population 
1 
A 
2 3 
2A 4A 
A 2A 
Q !Q 
4 5 
8A l6A (Population increases geometrically) 
4A 8A 
1/4Q iQ (Original productivity is Q) 
Hence the total production in the various periods is: 
Period Production 
1 AQ = AQ 
2 AQ + AQ = 2AQ 
3 AQ + AQ + (2A) <!Q) = 3AQ 
4 AQ + AQ + (2A)(!Q) +"(4A)(1/4Q) = 4AQ 
5 AQ + AQ'+ (2A}(!Q) + (4A)(1/4Q) + (8A}(iQ) = 5AQ 
etc. 
i.e agricultural production increases only arithmetically. (12) 
If these equations are correct then, the problem of offsett-
ing the effect of increased population by an increase of food 
production seems formidable. As has been pointed out earlier, 
the above relations point out the fact that the gap between the 
increase in the, production of food and the rise in the population 
will assume a fearful proportion in the course of time. To 
counter-act this Chernyshevskii suggests a novel remedy. In 
order to show what the remedy is, he introduces an example of 
compound interest. If someone borrows 100 rubles at 5% compound 
interest and leaves the interest unpaid, he will have to pay 
238 rubles and 64 kopeks after 25 years though the principal is 
only 100 rubles. This means that a rate of 9.55% simple interest 
is payable for the entire sum. But what happens if the borrower 
pays ~ack 5 rubles every year as interest? Then there is no 
need to differentiate between the simple and the compound interests. 
The borrower is burdened only with 5 rubles per annum and nothing 
more and nothing less. (l3) 
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Similarly if the gap between the increase of population 
and the increase in the productivity of agricultural labour 
is allowed to widen sufficiently, the prognosis of Malthus 
may come true. But what would happen if the annual or 
periodical gap (if any) is bridged? In the theorem of 
Malthus, the constancy of supply of land has been correctly 
assumed. But what about the level of technology? It need 
not remain constant and Chernyshevskii has this notion in 
mind when he proceeded with his analysis with the help of 
hypothetical numerical examples. Here is how he presents his 
arguments: "Let us suppose a total population of 1000. Let 
us say that 4 chetverts of wheat per person are necessary for 
subsistence: then in all 4000 chetverts are needed. Let us 
suppose that adult male agricultural workers fonn one-tenth 
of the"population, that is, there are 100 workers on the land. 
Let us suppose that each of them produces 40 chetvert of wheat , 
in all 4000 chetvert of wheat will be produced. The population 
will have sufficient food. 
1\ . . . .' 
After twenty f~ve years the population and the number of 
" 
workers have doubled. The productive force of the new workers 
has decreased in the same proportion as the number of workers 
has increased, that is, two-fold. Thus if the first 100 
workers produce 40 chetverts each, in all about 4000 chetverts, 
then the 100 new workers produce ~nly 20 chetverts each, in all 
2000 chetverts. The total quantity of corn for 2000 mean will 
be 6000 chetverts; that is, for each inhabitant there will be 
only 3 chetverts instead of the former 4 chetverts. The 
quantity of food will be insufficient. ,Because of this shortage, 
vice and crime will arise. To avert this' deficiency with its 
disastrous consequences it would be necessary to introduce 
agricultural ~provements during these 25 years. What is the 
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extent of improvements necessary? 
It is clear that agriculture must improve sufficiently to 
increase the production from 6000 chetverts to 8000 chetverts. 
Agricultural productivity must increase by 4/3, (14) 
Proceeding with this rate of growth Chernyshevskii calculates 
the increase in productivity that will be necessary during a 
period of 100 years to offset the gap between the increase of 
population and the increase in food production. 
1eriod or 
.1860 1885 1910 1935 1960 the years 
level of 1.00 (4/,) 1.33 (4/3) 1.77 (4/3) 2.37 (4/3) 3.16 agriculture 
From the above figures it can be seen that Chernyshevskii pre-
supposes a 3.16 times growth of food production in the next 
hundred years after 1860. Chernyshevskii considered that if the 
rate of technoligcal progress in the previous century (1760-1860) 
was a fair precedent, then it was not at all unreasonable to 
growth 
presuppose a 3l6%/in agricultural productivity in the next 100 
years, which is only 3.16% per annum. 
He goes .j on to argue that even a much slighter increase in 
the general level of . technology will suffice to prevent the 
Malthusian gap ever:: occuring. 
"Let us asstnlle that the population on January 1st of the 
first year was 1000, and that the agricultural workers of this 
population produced a certain amount of corn, sufficient to 
feed all the 1000 people reasonably well: that is, 1000 annual 
portions which we call cart-loads. Thus according to us, 
a reasonable annual provision for each man is a cart-load of 
corn. Let us assume that there were 100 agricultural workers 
among this population. It is evident that for the population 
to be well provided for, agricultural labour needs to produce 
etc. 
etc. (15) 
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10 cart-loads of corn per worker. 
Let us assume that with such an abundance of food, the 
population grows annually by 3% (this proportion is rather 
higher than that which doubles the pppulation in 25 years). 
Thus by January 1st of the second year, the population will be 
1030, and if the proportion of agricultural workers remains 
the same, there will be 10:l)of them. -- If for 1000 men 1000 
cart-loads of corn were needed, for 1030 men, 1030 cart-loads 
are needed. But according to Malthus' theory, the productivity 
of labour of additional workers will be less than that of the 
original workers. Malthus assumes that the reduction in 
productivity of the new labour is equal to the percentage of 
the growth of its quantity: or, if the proportion between the 
number of agricultural workers and that of the population is 
constant, to the percentage of the growth of the population. 
Thus the productivity of the new labour is related to that of 
the old as 100:103. According to this, what quantity of corn 
does the additional worker produces, if the original one produced 
10 cart-loads? 
X:lO = 100:103; this.gives us X = 9.7087. 
'f, • . 
Thus 3 additional workers will produce only 3 times 9.7087 = 
29.1261 cart-loads instead of the 30 cart-loads which would 
have been necessary according to the previous measurement and 
in the second year for 1030 men, instead of 1030 cart-loads 
of corn there will only be 1029.1261. 
'\In order that instead of 1029.1261 cart-loads, the second 
year's harvest should give 1030 cart-loads, the productivity 
of the original workers must be raised above its pr~vious 
quantity of 10 by as much as the required harvest, 1030 is 
greater than that of 1029.1261 which is obtained without improvements."-
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In other words, XtlO = 1030 : 1029.1261 
From this we get X = 10.00849 ••••• "(16) 
This means that the required level of improvement is 0.000849 or l/llth 
part of 1 per cent which would not only be easy to attain but could be 
surpassed to a very great extent with the improvement in the level of 
technology. 
The mathematically minded reader will perhaps see that~ere is an 
error in these arguments. Chernyshevskii rightly admitted that" his 
mathematics was weak. 
Because of mathematical error,Chernyshevskii could not prove his 
point beyond any reasonable doubt and to an Ynpartial reader it appears 
that these arguments assume what Chernyshevskii wants to prove. 
In the last two arguments, Chernyshevskii is assuming that the 
productivity of added labour diminishes in the following manner: 
Eroductivity of labour added in a given Eeriod 
average productivity of labour at the beginning 
of that period 
= pOEulation before addition 
population after addition 
This formula should be contrasted with the formula glven above which 
leads to Malthus' conclusion that production increases arithmetically. 
The new formula leads in fact to a geometrical increase in production, 
albeit at a slower rate than the population increase. The shorter the 
period over which the formula is applied the more n~arly the rate of 
increase of production reaches that of population. 
If the formula is applied on a 25 year basis, the production growth 
of the first 4 or 5 periods is not very different from that given by the 
old formula. It would however greatly out-strip the former in later 
periods, since the increase is geometric, increasing by ~ factor of 3/2 
in each period.(17) 
- 242 -
25 year period 1 2 3 .;4 5 
-. 
Population at beginning 
of period A 2A 4A 8A l6A 
Addition to population 
in period A 2A 4A 8A 
Productivity of added 
population ~Q 3/8Q 9/32Q 27/l28Q 
Mean productivity in 
period ~Q -< 9/l 6Q 27/64Q 8l/256Q 
Production 3/2AQ 9/4AQ 27/8AQ 8l/l6AQ 
Production (decimals) AQ 1.5AQ 2.25AQ 3.375AQ 5.o625AQ 
If the formula is applied on an annual basis, it amounts to an annual 
increase of production only 1/11% less than that of the population as 
Chernyshevskii points out. 
But this does not 'refute Malthus'. It simply shows that an 
apparently slight change in the mathematical formula for the way 
productivity diminished as population changes is in fact (because 
of the nature of compound interest) a major change. The only valid 
conclusion to be drawn from all the arithmetical calculations given 
by Chernyshevskii is that the rate at which production increases 
depends critically on the exact way in which the productivity of the 
added population falls. Since, as Chernyshevskii has pointed out, 
there was little evidence as to.what this relation was, Malthus' 
argument has no sound empirical basis. 
Events later in history have proved that rate of growth of food 
production exceeded, sometimes manifold, the rate of growth of 
• 
population. Chernyshevskii, therefore, in spite of some logical con-
fusion in his calculations was able to raise many doubts about the 
validity of Malthus' arguments. The pessimism contained in the analysis 
of Malthus was so all pervading in his time that people started to 
believe that they had nothing to live for. This pessimism was the main 
target of Chernyshevskii's criticism. His arguments were not only 
an attack on Malthus but also on the,social 
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Darwinism which succeeded the Malthusian theory. Latter.day 
economic theories of population, though more logically presented 
I 
contained many of the arguments first put forward by Chernyshevskii 
in his critique of Malthus.By this extremely enlightening 
analysis, pointed out above, Chernyshevskii wanted to show that 
the entire theory of Malthus was in support of a society which 
was stagnant and which would remain so. If society showed 
signs of progress by any means, then the people would show a 
tendency of mUltiplying beyond~all proportions. That would make 
the earth too small to accommodate such a vast population in the 
future. On the other hand, if . '." society. remains static and the 
population increased it would be immediately offset by deaths 
due to poverty,desease etc. 'The improvement of society or a 
thorough change of it was outside the scheme of Malthus. 
Society at the time of Malthus was predominantly feudal. The 
industrial revolution was, of course, making a considerable 
headway and the age-old feudal structure was showing signs of 
cracking. Malthus' 'Essay' appeared in this period of transi7 
/
0 r be ing -
tion. Chernyshevskii therefore accused Malthus .:. .. a reactionery, 
since the latter was afraid of a social change. (18) So, 
according to Chernyshevskii, the function of the Malthusian 
theory was to provide a new rationale to support the interests 
of the landed gentry. 
Chernyshevskii also took pains to show that the growth of 
. . .. . . . 
population that Malthus .> •• ~~~~sa~~~~ :.~ in the rural areas to 
exhaust the productivity of land, in fact changed its centre 
of gravity from the rural to urban areas." . "In reality, the 
course of events was always of an opposite character. The 
urban population always increased more quickly in developing 
countries than the total population and at the same time the 
number of people pursuing non-agricultural occupation~ or not 
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pursuing any occupation at all grows more rapidly than the 
total number of agricultural population. The proportion of 
agriculturists in the composition of the population every-
where decreases with the increase of population and growth 
of civilisation. Let us look at ourselves. In the villages 
the proportion of people living by trade and not by tilling 
the land are increasing all the time.· In small towns greater 
and greater proportions of inhabitants who were exclusively 
occupied with cultivation before are going over to other 
occupations. In general the city population is growing more 
rapidly than the total number of inhabitants of the empire. 
In all the countries which entered on the path of economic 
progress, the things went constantly in this way." (19) 
After making this statement, Chernyshevskii showed by another 
set of numerical calculations how the deficit in the food 
production could be off-set in the face of increase in the 
number of urban poputation. For brevity's sake and because 
I 
of the fact that Chernyshevskii arrived at the same t¥pe of 
generalisation as in the earlier analysis, the calculations 
have been .left out.* 
(*) See Page 245. 
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(*) Chernyshevskii himself admitted his lack of competence in 
mathematics when he was in exile in Siberia. (Chernyshevskii v 
Sibiri. StPetersburg 1913, page 140-141) There was a con-
troversy between Plekhanov and Antonov on the mathematical 
mistak~s contain~d in Ch~rnysh~vskii's analysis of Malthus' 
argument. In his book N. G. Chernyshevskii published in 
1909, aekhanov quoted Chernyshevskii's own admission of his 
error in the num"." erical calculations in the above analysis. (In 
one of his treatises on Economics, 'Ooherki iz politicheskoi 
ekonomii - po Milliu', Chernyshevskii admits that even a student 
of a higher class of a school would know better mathematics 
than he did. (N. G. Chernyshevskii - Pol. sob. soch. Vol 9, 
page 743). But Plekhanov did not go into details concerning the 
mathematical soundess of Chernyshevskii's conclusions. One is 
inclined to think that Plekhanov avoided this issue, as the 
chapter in which the above quote was given dealt mainly with 
Chernyshevskii's life in Siberia. (G. V. Plekhanov - Izbrannye 
" filosophskie proizvedenya, Vol. 4 - Moscow - 1948, page 408). 
Antonov on the other hand accepted all the mathematical formula-
, ~ 
-, 
tions of Chernyshevskii as absolutely correct: any criticism 
of them was unthinkable. Whether this was due to his anti-
Marxist position or to his complete faith in Chernyshevskii cannot 
be inferred. He.referred to Plekhanov as a man who showed a 
"shameful ignorance of arithmetic" (postydnogo neznania arifmetiki) 
(M. Antonov - N. G. Chernyshevskii - Sotsial' no~£ilosofskie 
etiudy, Moscow 1910 - Page 252). According to another Soviet 
commentator the mistakes in the calculations were first pointed 
out to Chernyshevskii by none other than Dobroliubov, his friend 
and collaborator. (Chernyshevskii - Pol. sob. soch. Moscow 1950, 
Vol. 9 page 919) 
Chapter Five 
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Chernyshevskii on Different Social 
Formations~with particular reference 
to Capitalism 
This chapter will be concerned with Chernyshevskii's 
critical remarks on slavery, feudalism and capitalism with 
special emphasis on his discussion of capitalism. An ana-
lysis of his arguments shows that his critique was intended 
to be a mere introduction to his own politico-economic 
theory of 'the toiling masses'.(l) 
Slavery, according to him, was the most disadvantageous 
economic system in the whole history of human society. He 
identified any form of forced labour with slavery. "Anyone", 
he said "who has some familiarity with political economy 
knows this very well and so there is no need for us to dwell 
on this matter"(2). His reason for identifying these con-
cepts was that in any social formation where there was forced 
labour (he had of course Russian serfdom in mind) the en-
tire product belongs to the master. The master is in con-
trol of all,three factors of production: land, capita~ and 
the person who toils to make production possible. The slave 
does not receive any share of the produce and stands in the 
same relation to the master as his cattle.(3) According to 
Chernyshevskii the same is true of serfs under feudalism. 
The position of the share croppers is quite different. 
This class is free and has definite rights to a portion of 
its produce. 
In many of his arguments in political economy, 
Chernyshevskii emphasised the right of the producer to the 
fruits of his labour. He condemned slavery because this 
right was absent. In one of his well-known works on poli-
tical economy he expressed the view that slavery cannot be 
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beneficial to society. (4) Gorlov, an economist and a con-
temporary of chernyshevskii, had once expressed the view 
that slavery was beneficial for production under certain 
circumstances and, to prove his point, Gorlov had pointed 
out that after the abolition of slavery in the West Indies, 
the planters suffered heavy losses due to the diminished 
productivity of the emancipated workers. In reply to this 
argument, Chernyshevskii emphatically asserted that it was 
not the abolition of slavery but the lack of rational eco-
nomic calculation which was the cause of this economic 
decline. "The poverty, of which the French planters com-
plain was produced not by the emancipation of the negroes, 
but by the unreasonable conduct of the planters themselves 
in opposing emancipation and thus irritating the negroes~(5) 
Consequently, Chernyshevskii says, the planters had no right 
to complain about the lazyness of the negroes. By their 
opposition to emancipation the planters placed themselves 
in a position in which they could not expect the slaves to 
work harder. Where the masters had not shown any inimical 
attitude towards emancipation, as in western Europe, there 
had not been under-utilisation of labour to any great 
extent. (6) According to Chernyshevskii, the downfall of 
slavery became imminent as soon as the masters realised that 
owning the three main factors of production was disadvan-
tageous to them. Due to a gradual change in the productive 
processes, slavery became irrelevant. While describing 
feudalism, Chernyshevskii followed the physiocrats in de-
Signating the class of landlords, as the highest in society. 
But the similarity ends here. 
According to Chernyshevskii, in feudalism it became 
accepted that ,the landlords amassed wealth by force. The 
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theoreticians of the time idealised the application of 
such force. In Chernyshevskii's opinion, this caused 
external relations always to be relations of conflict dur-
ing feudalism. At home the landlords enjoyed their rights 
to property by exercising their right to person: this was 
the essence of serfdom. "The nature of this condition 
(feudalism)", Chernyshevskii says "did not allow of high 
economic development and the science of economics was little 
developed ; but nevertheless, this period had its own econo-
mic theory. It (the theory) was expressed in the (assertion) 
that free men (the feudal landlords were the only ones who 
were free in the present understanding of the expression 
'free men') should not pursue agriculture. They should only 
remain as consumers."(7) So, according to Chernyshevskii, 
every period (to be precise every social formation) has its 
own theory which,in,the case of feudalis~ justified the 
parasitic existence of the landlords. 'Accordingly, from 
the very logic of feudalism, all other people apart from 
the masters were destined to produce goods primarily for 
the consumption of the:' masters. The institution of feuda-
lism was based· on the principle of "take everything but do 
not give anything in return", which was mercantilism on the 
individual plane. Ultimately, the very foundation of feuda-
lism started to disintegrate due to the increasing influence 
of the capitalists ('the middle class' in Chernyshevskii's 
terminology) in matters of state. In the meantime a re-
volutionarychange in the productive processes was taking 
place and the 'middle class' was taking leadership in this 
transition to a better form'of economic organisation in 
many countries of western Europe. 
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Chernyshevskii on Capitalism 
Capitalism, according to Chernyshevskii, became domi-
nant by the middle . and became very strong by the end of 
I I 
the 17th century. "From the end of the 17th century", he 
says, "the tenpo of progress became quicker, because civi-
lization, which already had become more solid and success-
fulthan before started to fight. against conditions which 
I 
were preventing its development".(8) According to him, 
feudal dominance, while declining politically in England, 
remained a powerful force in France, though both these 
countries had embarked on the capitalist mode of production 
at the same time. Speaking of the implication of the growth 
of capitalism in any country Chernyshevskii observes that 
I 
with the advent and growth of capitalism, a new theory in 
political economy was developed; at the same time the old 
theory which at one time was thought to be the only theory 
conceivable was abandoned. The new economic order . was 
characterised by large scale production? trade and commerce 
on a massive scale, the establishment of large factories 
and other business establishments, and an extended role 
for banking and credit. Production under capitalism, 
according to Chernyshevskii, was distinguished from pro-
duction under feudalism by the dominance of the market by 
a few large firms. These large concerns were capable of 
producing goods cheaper than the small scale ones because 
of the fullest division of labour, better machines and im-
proved techniques of production •. (9) '. . ~ . . . 
This wa.s obviously a better situation than that prevalent 
in the days of feudalism; but Chernyshevskii adds that 
the main business of the new" -, order was to increase the 
size of industrial establishments and to develop exchange. 
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In Chernyshevskii's opinion this is a concern of the people 
who dominate ~ others in civilised countries, and, there-
fore, the theory upholding such a state of affairs was 
serving the cause of the inequitable accumulation of wealth 
in the hands of the few. (10) He adds further that the 
theoreticians of political economy of his time attached an 
exaggerated importance to exchange and distribution, like 
the mercantilists of the preceding era.(ll) 
But Chernyshevskii was quite emphatic about the pro-
gressive role of capitalism. In the feudal economy the 
landlords' whims were the deciding factor in the planning 
of production but in capitalism the advantage to the owner 
was the principal consideration. This was a more rational 
system. Capitalism also paved the way for large scale 
manufacture, thanks to the widening of markets and the rise 
of financial institutions like banks to help the expansion 
of production. Such development was unthinkable in the 
feudal era.(12) Chernyshevskii openly criticised those 
opponents of capitalism who advocated the merits of the 
ancient patriarchal regime and condemned competition and 
miserable conditions of the workers in capitalism. He. 
asserted that the ancient order had its merits, no doubt, 
but that one has the duty to ask whether the system that is 
being condemned is inferior to that which is being eulogised.(13) 
There is no doubt in anyone's mind, he adds, that hired 
labour, which is the only form of labour under capitalism, 
is definitely an improvement over slavery. So, whenever 
one dreams of a utopia based on the revival of the 
ancient regime (14), one is actually thinking of a social 
order based on slavery. He also considered that competition 
Was a definite'improvement over production for consumption 
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by the masters where no attempt was made to pursue pro-
ductive activities rationally. If it is the concept of 
competition itself that is causing misery, as he argues, 
it will not do any good to attempt to remove the miseries 
without altering the form of the economy. One will have to 
remove compe:·.tition itself. According to Chernyshevskii, 
capitalism reached its zenith of.development towards the 
end of the 17th century. Feudalism had reached the same 
stage of development in the 11th century. From the 13th 
century feudalism started to show signs of stagnation and 
in Chernyshevskii's view the same was true of capitalism 
in his time.(15) By comparing the development of feudalism 
with the development of capitalism, Chernyshevskii endeavours 
to refute the current opinion that capitalism was there to 
stay. 
Chernyshevskii explained the relationship in capitalism 
between the landlords (the highest class), the capitalists, 
(the middle class) and the workers. The landlords were in 
possession of land, in his opinion, the most important fac-
tor of production. The capitalists, on the other hand, 
owned ,the working or circulating capital and dominated the 
sphere of industrial production. But the most important 
part in production was carried out by the workers (the 
'simple people'::.to use Chernyshevskii's expression) who, 
in his opinion, bore the brunt of the struggle between the 
landlords and the capitalitso(16) The cause of this struggle 
can be traced, according to Chernyshevskii, to the different 
attitude of these two classes towards the two important 
factors of production, land and capital. Whereas the 
highest class considered land the all-important. factor, 
the capitalists did not attach importance to land and 
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considered capital the principal agent of production. This 
struggle was resolved historically in favour of the capi-
talists. n ••• Firstly, " Chernyshevskii says, "if the middle 
class has not yet completely destroyed the independence of 
the highest claus and has not completely absorbed it, if 
they have to carryon the struggle against th~, they at 
least feel that they have the decisive superiority over 
them; every year in every country the middle class has been 
winning economic victories and has often brought defeat to 
its opponents."(17) 
But the capitalists, according to Chernyshevskii, did 
not want to destroy the class of the landlords because they 
shared common interest. He clearly asserts the view held 
by many social and economic historians that in the first 
stage of the rise of the bourg~oisie as a class, the interest 
of this class and that of the landlords coincided in many 
ways. For example, some of the landlords became capitalists 
because of the new opportunities available to invest their 
accumulated wealth in the industries. Also many capitalists 
showed genuine interest in agricultural production. 
Cherpyshevskii' also pointed to family links and personal 
relations as a reason for the fusion of interest between 
these two classes.(18) 
But Chernyshevskii states that despite this unity of 
interests there was also antagonism as to which class would 
dominate society. There was however, no hostility in the 
I 
sphere of distribution: on the contrary there was a marked 
alliance. The feudal landlords received rent without offer-
ing anything in exchange; the merchants, traders and factory 
owners acquired wealth through the market. The'latter class 
transformed raw materials into finished products by the 
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application of labour and sold the goods on the market. 
The only function performed by the capitalists in this 
process is the investment of money. (19) 
There is an apparent difference, in Chernyshevskii's 
opinion, between a capitalist and a landlord in the fact that 
the former compensates labour by money payment whereas the 
latter utilises forced labour. . BUt in both cases the fruits 
of other's labour~re appropriated unjustly. The owners of 
the factors of production, land and capital, enjoy an income 
far exceeding the value of their contribution to the process 
of production, (20) which value is in fact vested in the 
activity of the worker-producer. In the absence of any 
restriction, the capitalists and the landlords both attempt 
to acquire as large a share as possible of the value.pro-
duced in a country at the expense of a natural distribution 
of income. In this respect, there was not the slightest 
clash of interest between the upper and the middle class; 
their interests coincided to form a bulwark against the 
workers. ( 21) 
From the above observation, one can see that Cherny-
shevskii explicitly states the inevitable conflict of inter-
est between the master and the worker in the capitalist 
form of production. He asserts that in a capitalist society 
there are two classes of people; the first grabs as much 
as it can of the fruits of the labour of the second and the 
second has no choice but to surrender a SUbstantial portion 
of the value produced by his own labour. Chernyshevskii 
elucidates this as follows: "A factory owner in England," 
who, for example, earns an income of a thousand pounds a 
year, belongs to the class of smaller factory owners; but 
the labour of'ten or twenty workers is needed to earn a pro-
fit of a thousand pounds. So, in respect of distribution 
of value, the society is divided into two groups, the economic 
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position of one of them is based on the fact that each mem-
ber of this group acquires values produced by the labour of 
many persons of the second category; the economic position 
of persons of the second category is such that part of the 
value produced by the labour of each of its members falls 
into the hands of persons of the first category". (22) 
Having pointed out the reason of a clash of interest be-
tween the master and the worker Chernyshevskii concludes 
that the outcome can only be a continuous struggle between 
the two classes. "It is evident." Chernyshevskii says "what , 
the relation of the interests of these two groups should 
be; one will want the increase and the other the decrease 
to zero of that part of the value which passes from persons 
of the second category to those of the first category". (23) 
He adds that this struggle of the workers to get their due 
share is a cause of the closer identification of interests 
between the capitalists and the landlords. 
In clear and precise terms Chernyshevskii has put for-
ward the reasons for class conflict in a capitalist society. 
He has also explained the economic basis of exploitation 
of the workers' in such a society; it is, he asserts~ in 
the interest of the owners of the means of production under 
capitalism to deprive the workers of their legitimate share 
of the fruits of their labour. The capitalist is in a 
perpetual state of war with his workers to increase his 
gain. The workers have no alternative but to fight cease-
lessly to reduce capitalists' gain. 
Chernyshevskii's criticism of the classical political 
economy of his time is a logical extension of his view of 
the class-nature of the society. The.;dominant economic 
theory, according to hi~, concerned itself with capital 
and wealth, and not with how these are acquired in a par-
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ticular form of production. That is why, according to 
Chernyshevskii, this theory overlooked the conflict between 
the classes, and remained silent about the plight of the 
workers in capitalism, knowing full. well that workers 
alone produce value. (24) "We have seen", Chernyshevskii 
says, "that in political life up to the present the common 
people have served simply as the-instrument of the upper 
and the middle classes and have not had solid independent 
significance; in the same way the dominant economic theory 
regards the labour of simple people only as an instrument 
for the utilization by the master for the increase of his 
property and circulation of capital. We have seen that 
the upper and the middle classes have a direct interest 
in. reducing the share of labour in the distribution of 
values, because their own share consists of a sum of pro-
ducts less the sum given away to the labour; hence the 
theory (ehernyshevskii refers to the political economy of 
his time) also says that products must belong to the owners 
of property and circulating ~apital and the workers should 
be given for SUbsistence only that part of the value pro-
duced by them which will be found possible, bearing in mind 
the interests of property and circulating capital under 
the influence of competition". (25) 
This argument in support of the theory that the workers 
are engaged in a perpetual struggle with the capitalists, 
because they are deprived of the legitimate share of the 
value they produce,and his critique of the political 
economy of his time, have a close resemblance to the ana-
lysis of Marx,especially with respect to his theory of 
surplus value. Like Marx, Chernyshevskii points out that 
a worker's wage does not amount to the full value of the 
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produce of his labour. Whereas Marx examined the process of 
creation of surplus value by partitioning the labour time 
of an individual worker into time for earning his wage and 
time for creating surplus value for the capitalist, Cherny-
shevskii took the total value produced in a country at a 
given period as the starting point of his discussion. So 
Chernyshevskii's theory of explo~tation is macroeconomic 
whereas that of Marx is microeconomic. Both were adherents 
of the labour theory of value and both stated implicitly 
or explicitly that this theory could be derived from the 
teachings of Adam Smith and Ricardo (with necessary modi-
fications and corrections). The difference between the 
formulations of Marx and Chernyshevskii is in the emphasis~ 
Whereas Marx had made a detailed analysis of the process 
in the formation of surplus value in production, Cherny-
shevskii's treatment of the subject is brief but illuminating. 
Antonov, while supporting Chernyshevskii's theory of 
exploitation, has put forward a rather unusual criticism of 
Marx's theory of surplus value. After explaining Marx's 
theory of how surplus value is created, Antonov says: "In 
. 
these arguments Marx supposes that a worker employs his 
labour for his wage only part of the working day and the 
rema!ning part for the capitalist creating a surplus value. 
So, Marx starts from the fact of exploitation of workers. 
Of course, this exploitation present in unearned income or 
surplus value is an undisputed fact, but it does not de-
pend on the labour theory of value; on the contrarY,the 
labour theory of value is based on the fact of surplus 
value. For this reason, the theory of socialism should 
,-
and must start not from the labour theory of value but from 
the indisputab'le fact of exploitation of workers by the 
owners of the means of production". (26) According to 
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Antonov,Chernyshevskii's theory of'socialism evolved directly 
from the concept of exploitation and not the· other way 
round. (27) But this is incorrect, for Chernyshevskii on 
more than one occasion insisted that his theory of socialism 
(the theory of 'toilers') was a logical extension of the 
labour theory of value originally formulated by Adam Smith 
and developed further by David Ricardo. Moreover the idea 
of exploitation arose because of the conviction of some 
social thinkers that the transformation of raw materials 
into finished goods is possible only by the application of 
labour and hence labour is the creator of value. Therefore 
the profit of any concern is properly speaking due to the 
workers. The exploitation of the workers is a consequence 
of the creation of value by labour in particular socio-
economic formations. Therefore, a theory of exploitation 
should be developed from the labour theory of value as 
Marx and Chernyshevskii have done and not the other way 
round. Perhaps Antonov, in his overzealousness to place 
Chernyshevskii on a higher plane than Marx as the more 
acceptable the9retician of economic exploitation, confused 
the logical ideas of cause and effect which were,doubtless, 
quite clear to both Marx and Chernyshevskii. 
Capitalism and Competition 
Chernyshevskii examined in detail the effects of com-
petition in the capitalistic economy. According to him, 
capitalism and competition were inseparable. The theory of 
capitalism put great emphasis on competition as the moving 
force of all economic activities. This position, according 
to Chernyshevskii, is erroneous. "Competition gives us 
the result, b~t not the method by which the result is 
arrived at".(28) The true function of an economic theory, 
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according to him, is to be interested not only in the re-
suIt but also ~i.:". the process behind such results. 
Elsewhere he admitted that competition was a much better 
medium of economic activity than the patriarchal form of 
the past. At the same time he said that in spite of this 
advantage, competition does not satisfy the conditions of 
an acceptable theory. (29) One o,f the main defects of com-
petition is the absence of any information to the public 
about the productive process of the manufacturer,which 
is a closely guarded secret to every producer. Whatever 
information is available to the outsiders about any product 
is quite inadequate. ttU~e~.:.: competition", Chernyshevskii 
says, "practice as well as theory are guarded secrets," (30) 
The result is that one producer takes a long time to find 
out the improved technique which another producer has dis-
covered. In the market the goods of all producers arrive 
without any information to the buyers as to the improved 
or better techniques that in a given case may have gone 
into the production of the goods. In addition, cliques 
and intrigues among producers are very common because of 
economic advantage gained by keeping knowledge of certain 
productive processes secret. "So", Chernyshevskii contends, 
"under competition art is bound to be practic.Sed by unskilled 
men (and) knowledge (theory) is bound to be spread by 
ignorant people!'(31) In these observations Chernyshevskii 
seeks to emphasize that the spread of knowledge will bene--
fit society, whereas mystification will not. He expressed 
the opinion that a theory which justifies competition is 
only concerned with the exterior and not with the object 
.. 
itself. In other words, the theory of competition is not 
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so much concerned with determining a connection between the 
market price and the cost of an object (in the social sense) 
but just with the market price. " ••• But for the success of 
production it is necessary that the calculation bears on 
the cost of the object".(32) This is what Chernyshevskii 
considers to be the theoretical limitation of a theory 
based on competition. It should be borne in mind that 
'cost of an object' Chernyshevskii always understood to 
mean a socially desirable cost and not the cost calculated 
according to the advantage of the producer. 
Chernyshevskii then sets out to show the defects of 
competition in the practical sphere. The consequence of 
the application of the principle of competition, according 
to him, is economic and commercial crisis. Chernyshevskii 
outlines the reasons for such crises as follows: "Industrial 
hostilities between different countries, between different 
provinces of the same country, between different producers 
of the same province, between classes; too risky trade 
ventures which lead to industrial crises. • •• AII these 
harmful manifestations in practical life are based on the 
principle itself, on the very logic of competition". (33) 
In these lines Chernyshevskii tries to indicate the reasons 
for recurrence of economic crises under capitalism. Com-
petition, according to him, though regarded by the theoreti-
cians of capitalism as a means of healthy productive growth, 
is the cause of much harm to society. That is why Cherny-
shevskii criticises the optimism of the upholders of the 
principle of competition in the following way: "the dominant 
economic theory proclaims the supremacy of competition, 
that is, the concern of every producer is to undermine other 
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producers; but at the same time it shows that the welfare 
of every nation is increased by the welfare of other 
nations, because the richer the latter become the more 
goods they will buy from them. Similarly it shows that 
the more successful an industry is in a nation in general, 
the more advantageous will it be for every individual, 
the wider will be the internal m~rket for its products 
and the greater the well-being of the society. But, 
preaching such solicitude for foreigners and people 
from outside as consumers, the dominant politic6~economic 
theory does not see the possibility of averting ruinous 
internecine wars among the producers wh0se business is 
the same. Competition, as the instrument of this inter-
necine war takes, among other things, the form of specu-
lation, which constantly leads tO,unreasonable risks and 
commercial fraud; this attitude towards industrial and 
trading activities periodically produces economic crises 
in which a considerable part of the value produced perishe,,)~l 
and during which the wage-earners undergo terrible 
sUfferings". (34) 
The working masses, that is to say, were bound to 
sUffer in capitalism because competition was its under-
lying feature. The consequences of its development were' 
ruinous for any country, especially for his own country. 
Chernyshevskii concludes that in taking price rather 
than cost as the norm of calculation the theory of com-
petition substitutes fiction for the real thing or as 
he says, "accidental consequences" replace ~ real value 
in terms of human productive activity. (35) By "accidental 
" 
consequences" Chernyshevskii means situations in which 
compeitition really works in ensuring the employment to 
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the masses and well-being of the nation. Since economic 
. deviatio~s 
cris~s are the rule in capitalism, such! . -:: _ are accidental 
occurances only. In order to introduce a more rational 
form of calculation in economic activities, a greater 
participation of the people was necessa.ry. In the condi-
tions prevailing in Chernyshevskii's time a handful of men 
only had the privilege of planning and executing the pro-
grammes of production and the great majority of the people 
were destined to part with their labour for the benefits 
of the few.(36) The great majority was indifferent to any 
sort of calculations for they themselves entered into them 
only as manipulated objects~ Chernyshevskii asserted that 
a man could consider his work important only when he was 
able to calculate its value in respect of his own self. 
This statement implies that a worker is inspired to work 
only when he is the master of his own labour and, according 
to Chernyshevskii, a theory based on this principle has 
infinite possibilities for pcogress. 
Chernyshevskii's other conclusion in respect of capi-
talism is that,its advantages concern a social group (the 
capitalists) who, owing to its privileged position in 
society, enjoys the benefits of other people's skill, while 
lacking any of its own. According to Chernyshevskii, in 
capitalism the masters not only grab the labour of the 
workers but also their skill. In other words, the workers 
not only surrender their physical labour but also their 
intelligence "to their employers and still do not receive 
any advantage from this sacrifice. 
Chernyshevskii's critique of capitalism acquired a 
special signi~icance in mid-19th century Russia when the 
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need to free the serfs became urgent, but when it was also 
clear to many that the abolition of serfdom would lead to 
a capitalistic development of the Russian economy. For 
Chernyshevskii such a prospect spelt the substitution of 
one type of misery r<:r another. He sought to overcome 
feudalism and yet avoid capitalism. He wanted it both 
ways, and in persuing them propo'sed an alternative form 
of social relations based on the ownership of the products 
of labour by the workers themselves. In this kind of 
society alone, according to him, could rational economic 
calculation be the guide to all productive activities. 
The next chapter will be devoted to an elucidation of 
the alternative form of social relations proposed by 
Chernyshevskii. 
Chapter Six 
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Political Economy of the Working Class and 
Socialist Production 
After condemning the oppression and exploitation of 
the poor masses by the society of his time, Chernyshevskii 
always endeavoured to present a picture of an alternative 
society based not on exploitation but on cooperation which 
would necessitate a change in th~ social structure and 
usher in a new era based on justice. (1) "If the character 
of processes of production changes," Chernyshevskii says, 
"the character of labour will certainly change too and 
consequently one should not be apprehensive about the 
fate of labour in the future. Its improvement is inevitable, 
as has been shown by the very development of the processes 
of production". (2) But how long a time would pass before 
this new society, free from exploitation was, created'l , 
Chernyshevskii only claims to discern the direction of a 
historical trend but resists predicting , future historical 
events. In his opinion, there are so many factors of a 
complex nature involved in the genesis of any single 
historical event that the time of a future event cannot 
be determined with scientific precision. "In questions 
of the future," he states, "only the aim to which things 
are moving as they develop can be clearly seen, but it is 
impossible to guess with mathematical precision how much 
time is needed to attain this objective. Historical move-
ment is accomplished under the influence of so many hetero-
geneous trends that it is possible only to see in which 
direction it is going, but its speed is subject to constant 
variation. "(3) The social sciences could not give an answer 
to the question of when the existing structure will be 
replaced by a different one. Political economy could only 
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point out the eventual inevitability of such a change. 
The theory that would be associated with and would 
serve the new era was termed by Chernyshevskii as the 
theory of the working class. The main emphasis of this 
theory would be on the distribution of value. (4) This 
particular aspect of political economy was his focal 
concern, because as has been pointed out, he believed 
I 
that only a proper distribution of income could maximise 
the well-being of man, and it was this that was his main 
aim. 
While expounding the theory of the working class, 
Chernyshevskii asserted that this theory could be traced 
back to the writings of Adam Smith. "The principle," 
Chernyshevskii says, "of the most advantageous distribution, 
according to Adam Smith, is that all values are produced 
exclusively by labour and by the rule of rational thought, 
what is produced must belong to him who produced it."(S) 
In order to achieve this objective, the problem was to 
discover the means by which an economic structure could 
be established which would follow this rational pattern. 
The theory of the working class, according to 
Chernyshevskii, is the antithesis of the theory of the 
capitalists because he regarded the latter theory as 
outmoded as well as unfair. The classical economists of 
Chernyshevskii's time did not see the need for a new 
theory. They were serving the cause of the past and 
were blind to the fact that their theories had no relevance 
to the conditions which were prevalent in their time. (6) 
A new theory, according to Chernyshevskii, arises from 
the elements of the past. The rationale of the new theory 
is as follows: "As in the history of society each later 
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phase is a development of the essentials of the previous 
phase and only discards facts which prevented a fuller 
manifestation of the basic aspirations of the nature of 
man; so in the development of theory, the later school 
usually accepts the essential conclusions which the former 
school arrived at: it develops the theory further, dis-
carding conceptions contradictory to it, the incompati-
bility of which was not taken into account by the previous 
theory. "(7) Proceeding from this premise, Chernyshevskii 
contends that classical economic theory reached a point 
from where it could be inferred that the most advantageous 
system of production is where the products of labour belong 
to the workers and the most advantageous distribution of 
value was that where value was distributed more or less 
equally among all members of society. Chernyshevskii's 
'theory of the working class' takes productive labour as 
the main agent of fulfilment of these aims. He designated 
that labour as unproductive which did not produce goods to 
satisfy the primary needs of the h~man organism. The 
only way to maximise productive labour and minimise unpro-
ductive labour "was to distribute value equally amongst the 
members of the society. (8) This marked a decidedly new 
approach. In fact, none of the theoreticians of political 
economy of his time or before who championed the capitalist 
mode of production presented a scheme of the most advanta-
geous distribution of value similar to that given by 
Chernyshevskii. He thought however that his theory of the 
working class was the logical extension of classical economy. 
One might think it a sign of weakness L~ his position not 
to have presented his theory of the working class as a new 
departure from the dominant theory of his time. But, here 
too, censorship consideration might have inhibited Chernyshevskii. 
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The basic differences between a worker in a working 
class society and a capitalist would be that the worker 
will apply all his ene~gy and strength for production 
whereas a man owning capital has to rely on the labour of 
others and hence does'not get maximum efficiency from them; 
the aim of production in a working class society would be 
for each to consume as much as h~ produces, whereas the 
aim of the capitalist is to sell the products to make a 
profit. Necessity would be the measuring rod of production 
in the working class,society, whereas the size of the market 
is the only criterion of production for the capitalist. (9) 
Chernyshevskii's presentation of the essential features 
of socialist production does not contain any trace of 
utopianism. Production according to need is the instituted 
principle of production and planning in the socialist 
countries of the present day world. It is no fault of the 
economic theory of socialism that in the socialist countries 
this principle has not always been upheld. This deficiency 
actually points . ' to 'the _ need for further 
improvements in the system of production in these countries. 
Chernyshevskii asserted that the socialist economy 
envisaged by him would be superior to capitalism in that 
there would be no harmful competition amongst individuals 
who were engaged in production in different capacities, 
such as (a) between the capitalist and the worker - the 
former endeavouring to maximise his profit at the expense 
of the latter, and the latter trying to resist this attempt 
and (b) between two workers for obtaining work, where the 
adVantage of one is the ruin of the other. (10) 
In the socialist economy proposed by Chernyshevskii, 
the methods of'production would be improved by the joint 
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efforts of all the workers. Just as the capitalists are 
able to discover the means to maximise their profits, the 
workers will also be in a position to achieve maximum pro-
ductivity through experience and initiative. This could be 
done by improving the quality of the instruments of produ-
ction and raising the level of technology. (11) According 
to Chernyshevskii the workers wi~l be inspired to effect 
improvements in the techniques of production. This inspira-
tion is absent among the workers in capitalism. "Let us im-
agine a society," Chernyshevskii muses, "where 2000 dresses 
are necessary to satisfy its demands, which are produced by 
the labour of 6000 man-days; supposing that there are 300 
man-days a year, we find that 20 men should be employed 
to make dresses. Let us imagine that not one of these 
twenty men finds advantage or opportunity to increase his 
. production at the expense of others. In these circumstances 
" should he desire an improvement in the production of dressesl(12) 
Chernyshevskii emphasises the point that if one of the 
workers in a capitalistic system shows initiative in im-
proving his own production the effect on another will be 
., 
harmful because he will become unemployed if demand is 
constant. 
In an economy of the working class the situation would 
be different. In the same field of production (dress making) 
every worker will be allotted the task of finishing, say , 
50 pairs of dresses and according to the previous calculation 
6 man-days of labour is necessary for each pair of dress. 
Since the improvement in the technique of production would 
not involve ruin to the others, the workers will be interested 
in curtailing total working time through the improvement of 
techniques. The result would be that instead of, say, 6 man-
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days for making a pair of dresses, only 4 would be required 
and the remaining period could be spent on. some other new 
field of work. (13) This, in Chernyshevskii's view, is 
possible only because cooperation is in the interest of 
the workers themselves. 
• Chernyshevskii on Tovarishchestvo 
Cooperation will be the foundation on which the 
future society will rest and production will occur in the 
framework of comradeship and association. Chernyshevskii 
predicted this as well as aspired towards it. Will this 
form of production be more successful than the capitalistic 
one? To this Ghernyshevskii replies that he is not worried 
whether there will be more or less production under such 
a system. (14) His concern is to remove the inimical re-
lationship between man and man and thus guarantee the well-
being of the individual rather than merely to increase the 
production of wealth. Nonetheless, production was, accord-
ing to' Che~nyshevskii, bound to be more successful in 
these circumstances because free people always produced 
more than slave·s. (15) The relationship between capitalists 
and workers was always a relationship between masters and 
slaves. Freedom was an incentive to work harder, but in 
capitalism the workers were deprived of this incentive. 
"The success of production", Chernyshevskii says, "is 
proportional to the energy of labour, and the energy of 
·Tovarishchestvo - ComX4ad~ship~ or friendship; Chernyshevskii 
refers to an economy founded on association and cooperation. 
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labour is proportional to the degreee of participation 
of the workers in the products; so the condition most 
advantageous for production is when the entire product 
of labour belongs to the worker. The form of tovarish-
chestvo of the workers alone gives this ~~po~:t:1Ulity :to~ ~~~:m 
and thus it must be recognised as the most successful 
form of production."(16) 
The rationale of production under tovarishchestvo, 
would be proper planning of the utilisation of labour. 
If in a particular period there is a shortage of primary 
goods, then re-allocation of men and materials would be 
effected so that the disequilibrium in the supply of pri-
mary goods would be removed. As has been pointed out, 
Chernyshevskii believed that only when the demand for basic 
necessities has been met, should the society endeavour to 
produce goods for comfort or for luxury. Such would be the 
guiding principle in the production by tovarishchestvo. 
He explains this principle in the following way: "Let pro-
duction per man-day be of value worth one ruble. Let the 
primary needs of the worker and his family be valued at 
200 rubles per year. Let the society consist of 100 workers. 
Let 40 workers be engaged in the production of object of 
luxury. Then there remain 60 workers for the production of 
objects of primary necessity. They would produce value 
worth 1 ruble per day for 300 days - in all 15000rubles 
WQth of production of primary necessities, that is, for 
consumption every worker produces value worth 150 rubles, 
but the value worth 200 rubles is necessary for their 
well-being. It is clear that the workers will be in want. 
" The independence of the workers means that they work 
for their own consumption. Consequently, so long as there 
- 270 -
is not a sufficient amount of products of primary necessity 
available for their consumption, they will not carry out 
production of other goods. Let us suppose that in the 
system of tovarishchestvo the quality of labour deteriorates 
so that value worth 70 rubles only is produced in a man-day. 
On the other hand all the 100 workers labour in producing 
objects of primary necessity, th~ total production is worth 
21000 rubles in 300 days, as every worker produces value 
worth 70 rubles a day. It is clear that every worker will 
have 210 rubles worth of goods of primary necessity when 
goods worth 200 rubles only are necessary for their well-
being. It is clear that the society of the working class 
would have a surplus even under conditions of the supposedly 
deteriorated quality of labour; whereas before they had 
to suffer from want even under a supposedly better quality 
of labour."(17) Starting from a level of higher but un-
planned production in capitalism, Chernyshevskii shows that 
even if there is less productivity in the future society, 
there will still be a surplus after meeting the basic needs 
of each man. Society, according to him, does not become 
poorer if ther~ are fewer luxuries but becomeSso only when 
there are not enough primary goods. Chernyshevskii con-
tends that there will ultimately be an increased tempo of 
production in the whole society and that production will 
eventually exceed the level under capitalism. This im-
provement in the level of production will take place be-
cause the workers will be increasingly aware of the poten-
tial for producing more and will have the inspiration to 
do it. 
Chernyshevskii asserted further that workers had ex-
clusive rights ,to the products of their labour and that 
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this view was the logical outcome of Adam Smith's teaching. 
In Chernyshevskii's opinion, Adam Smith only succeeded in 
laying the foundation of this principle and the duty of 
developing it to its logical conclusion fell on the shoul-
ders of his followers. But they did not perceive the im-
plication of Adam Smith's formulation. Chernyshevskii con-
tends that according to Adam Smith, value is created by labour 
and_capital itself is the product of labour. So "if all , 
values and all types of capital are produced by labour, it 
is evident that labour is the only source of all types of 
production and every phrase about the participation of 
movable or immovable capital in production is just an in-
direct way of assigning this important role :to' labour. In 
this case labour should be the sole owner of the values 
produced. "(18) Once again Chernyshevskii tries to convince 
his readers that the right of the workers to own the means 
of production can be found in the classical teachings of 
Adam Smith. 
Chernyshevskii believed in a distinct advantage of 
socialist production (or production under tovarishchestvo) 
over capitalist production because the former precluded 
trade crises. The criterion of socialist production was 
not a market for its products but the needs of the community, 
Which are very constant. 'I "You can correctly calculate, 
'Chernyshevskii says, "how much corn is needed for a cer-
tain family per week, per month, or per year; there must 
be dinner to-day and tomorrow. But it is not the same with 
the market: to-day there is a demand for hundreds and 
thousands of chetverts of corn or bales of cotton; a week 
later perhaps not a single chetvert of corn nor a single 
bale of cotton will be needed. The market does not move 
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with even steps like consumption; it is always in a state 
of feverish paroxysm and extreme energy alternates with 
complete lethargy. Finally, it is impossible to foresee 
well in advance the time or the length of these changes or 
the intensity of each of them. For this reason the produ-
ction of capitalists is subject to continuous stagnation, 
and the entire economic order based not on consumption 
but on the market is subject to inevitable industrial and 
trading crises. As a result millions and tens of millions 
p 
of working days are lost.(19) 
Having shown the inevitability of an economic crisis 
under capitalism, Chernyshevskii insisted that in an 
economy based on tovarishchestvo this does not happen be-
cause this economy does not depend on the stabrrity of the 
market. It is superior not only in securing the material 
well-being of man but also in respect of the efficiency of 
production. The ideologists of capitalism may not believe 
that a radical improvement in the economic and social order 
is possible. Such disbeliefs were not new, Chernyshevskii 
says. (20) During feudalism, many people, mainly its up-
holders, maintained that no better social order was pos-
sible~ But history belied this.(21) 
Thus, in the historical perspective capitalism was 
seen by Chernyshevskii as superior to feudalism, and soci-
alism was in turn superior to its predecessor - capitalism. 
Similarly fuedalism was an advance on slavery. (22) This 
periodisation of the economic history of society is of 
Course, analoguous to that of Marx and Engels, although he 
arrived at it quite independently of them. Chernyshevskii 
did not however put the same emphasis on the 'class-struggle' 
as the motive force of historical change. Also he was not 
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always consistent in" his evaluation of the different phases 
of historical development, i.e. slavery, feudalism and capi-
talism. Whereas Marx and his followers contended that 
when a particular social order disintegrated, the new 
structure that evolved from the old was always more pro-
gressive than the preceding one, Chernyshevskii tended to 
discard a linear view of history and in some instances 
even saw later historical ~p~~~~~ as a step backward in 
relation to the earlier ones. In his article 'On the Causes 
of the Fall of Rome' ~O prichinakh padeniya Rima') he 
maintained explicitly that feudalism was not an improvement 
on Roman society, that, indeed, Roman civilisation even 
in its worst days was better than feudalism in its best 
days. Feudalism by its nature spelt 'robbery' and inter-
necine wars. It was responsible for the decline of civilisation~23) 
A great importance was attached by Chernyshevskii to ideas 
in human progress. "Progress is based on intellectual 
development," he says, "its essential feature consists of 
the success in the growth of knowledge ••• The development 
of mathematics precedes the development of applied mechan-
ics; and from applied mechanics evolve all manufacture and 
trade,and so on ••• Historical knowledge grow-s and with this 
growth false conceptions that prevent people from organising 
their social lives decrease and life improves... All types 
the 
of intellectual labour are developed by!power of the h~man 
intellect. As people become more educated they acquire 
the habit and the eagerness to read and hence a greater 
number amongst them learn to organize their lives in an 
intelligent and orderly fashion, which lads to an all-round 
improvement of the country's life •••• The basic force of 
progress is science~ the success of progress is proportional 
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to the degree of improvement in and the spread of knowledge."(24) 
This may sound credulous, but, as Plekhanov rightly 
ppinted out, Chernyshevskii was far from consistent in re-
ducing social progress to the spread of reading matter. 
Indeed Chernyshevskii approvingly quoted Pliny's famous 
dictum 'latifundia perdidere Italium'(25). The article 
'0 prichinakh padeniya Rima' does give the impression that 
for Chernyshevskii human opinion governs the fate of the 
world. But Plekhanov underestimated another aspect of 
Chernyshevskii's position, namely his view that unless 
the well-being of all men in society is ensured, which was 
possible only under conditions of tovarishchestvo, any in-
crease in the objects of art and culture would be self-
defeating. In the last resort, no development of any 
aspect of human life, including intellectual culture, was 
conceivable for Chernyshevskii in the absence of man's 
material well-being. As for Chernyshevskii's somewhat 
derogatory assessment of feudalism, this cou~d be seen 
as a reflection of the fact that Russian feudalism re-
presented the most regressive force in contemporary Russia. 
The New Theory and the Old Theory 
While Chernyshevskii attacked the classical political 
economy of his time 'he also formulated his own theory of 
the working masses. He branded the contemporary classical 
politico-economic conceptions as obscurantist, because he 
believed them to have little if any bearing on reality; 
and its proponents refused to admit this. But he did not 
of course attribute obscurantism to Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo. He tried to build further on the foundation laid 
by these economists. "The previous theory proclaimed", 
Chernyshevskii'says, "friendship between nations, because 
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the welfare of one nation was necessary for the well-being 
of another. The new theory applies the same principle of 
'friendship' for every group of workers. The previous 
theory states: everything is produced by labour: the new 
theory adds: therefore everything must belong to labour; 
the previous theory said: that occupation is unproductive 
which does not increase the aggregate of values in society 
by its products; the new theory adds: no labour is produc-
tive apart from that which produces goods necessary for 
satisfying the needs of the society in conformity with a 
rational economy. The previous theory speaks of the free-
dom of labour, the new theory adds to this the independence 
of the workers."(26) 
Well-being of the individual, production of goods to 
sustain it and freedom are the three constituent elements 
of Chernyshevskii's new theory of the workers. The trans-
formation from capitalism to the new order depends, accord-
ing to Chernyshevskii, on the 'morals of people' and other 
conditions which vary from place to place. 'Morals' denote 
the level of the people's consciousness of the need to 
change existing society. Chernyshevskii denied that 
socialism endangers the freedom of the individual.(27) 
Chernyshevskii believed that the dominant contemporary 
school of political economy failed to define precisely 
what is meant by freedom of the individual. (28) 
In his view, real freedom of action will come only 
in a society based on tovarishohestvo since in such a 
society alone the freedom of one group will not be a re-
striction on that of another. (29) 
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A society based on tovarishchestvo, Chernyshevskii 
held, could be brought about with the help of the 
government. (30) But he did not make it clear whether he 
thought that the Tsarist government could carry out the 
task. He held no brief for Tsarism, as is well-known he 
exposed in whatever 'Aesopian' manner, the oppressive 
policy of the Russian government, especially in regard to 
the agrarian quest'ion. Tsarism was bankrupt, morally and 
politically (although he could not say this in so many 
words). Indeed, it can be inferred from Chernyshevskii's 
writings that he did not conceive of a society based on 
tovarishchestvo, except in terms of a new kind of state, 
the 
i.e. in terms of overthrowing/Tsarist order. But at the 
same time Chernyshevskii did not ignore the fact that what-
ever economic development Russia had attained by the middle 
of the 19th century, it was to a significant extent due 
to government initiative. In England and France, the 
the 
Industrial Revolution,and/economic expansion that followed 
from it were largely the outcome of individual initiative. , . 
The government remained a relative spectator of the eco-
nomic processes that were giving shape to industrial 
society. The state's role in the industrialization of 
these countries was negligible. In Russia, the situation 
was different. From the days of Peter the Great government 
took the initiative in many spheres of economic development. 
Even the measures of an economically conservative Kankrin 
during Nicholas I's reign were inspired and carried out 
by the government. Being aware of these circumstances, 
Chernyshevskii hoped, even if he did not expect, that the 
government might see the light and appreciate the merits 
of a society based on tovarishchestvo, because if for no 
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other reason, this kind of society was an'; improvement on 
capitalism and he knew that all the recent Tsarist govern-
ments dreaded the prospect of the development of o.apitalism 
in Russia and the creation of an urban proletariat which 
it entailed. 
Nature of Tovarishchestvo 
Chernyshevskii gives a picture of the ideal cooperative 
society or tovarishchestvo which he envisaged. A tovari-
shchestvo would comprise between.' 1500 and 2000 persons. 
The If director "s consent would be necessary before one 
applied for membership. Family men would be given pre-
ference over single persons. (31) With 400 to 500 families 
there would be 500 or more working hands in each association. 
Membership would be on a voluntary basis. Chernyshevskii 
considered this to be very important. (32) He also designed 
a number of curious provisions such as the government put-
ting at the free disposal of the associations old buildings 
and assuming responsibility for their improvement. If not 
suitable for the association, new buildings could be built 
". II 
without much difficulty. Apartments for the workers would 
be arranged according to their own wishes and their own 
notions of comfort. 
Production would be carried out through planning on 
the basis of the needs of the association. Independence 
of the workers from the yoke of the capitalist method of 
production would make production more efficient, labour 
would be saved and there wou~d be more for the loftier 
activities of life.(33) Chernyshevskii dwelt at some 
length on the character of labour in socialist production. 
" ••• Labour", he says, "is an activity of the brain and 
muscle as comprising the natural, inner needs of these 
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organs(!) which find pleasure in it and its outward result 
is the application of strength ••• to the production of objects 
••• which satisfy the needs of the human organism. "(34) 
According to Chernyshevskii work does not become onerous 
because it expends energy but because of "accidental, ex-
ternal circumstances", by which he meant the organisation 
of labour in his time. Workers would enjoy working hard 
in conditions of a more equitable organisation of labour, 
ie., in production under tovarishchestvo. 
As regards non-economic activity, Chernyshevskii re-
commended a wide range of facilities, such as churches, 
schools, theatres, concert halls and libraries which would 
enable members of an association to engage in cultural per-
suits. There would also be an extended health service. 
Chernyshevskii visualised two sectors of production, 
industrial and agricutural, according to conditions of 
particular regions. MaChines and instruments would be 
bought from the funds of the association. A special feature 
of work in an association would be that each member will 
work in a i.. "" ~.'-j field Qf his or her own interest as opposed 
to being compelled to work in a certain field in the capi-
talist mode of production. (35) Each worker would be under 
the guidance of the administrative soviet of his own region 
and the soviet's consent would be necessary in all important 
matters. Chernyshevskii believed that after a year's work 
each association would gather SUfficient experience to 
administer its own units without interference of managers 
('directors'). The role of managers would be decreased 
and an association would gain in autonomy in proportion 
to the"increase in efficiency. (36) To the expected warning 
that autonomy would encourage lazyness and lack of initiative 
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among the members of an association, Chernyshevskii replies 
that an organization aimed at the association's well-being 
and the well-being of its members will inspire to work 
harder, although "some lazyness" is inevitable in any 
society, but, he assures us, it is bound to be minima~ 
in a tovarishchestvo.(37) 
Profit from any surplus produced, Chernyshevskii muses, 
would go partly towards the maintenance of churches, schools, 
hospitals and other social institutions and partly towards 
repayment of capital with interest. What remains would be 
~ept as a reserve to meet any contingency that may arise. (38) 
The main profit would be distributed as dividends among the 
members of each association. After all, in the capitalist 
form of production, the capitalist earns a huge net profit 
for himself even after taking account of interest on capi-
tal, salaries and depreciation of assets and in some cases, , 
even after expenditure on schools, hospitals, and social 
institutions prior to ascertaining the net profit. There 
is no reason, according to Chernyshevskii, why th"ere should 
not be a sufficient surplus in the more equitable and more 
efficient running of the association. (39) 
Chernyshevskii's bright vistas in no way prevented him 
from closely analysing( .. ~the special characteristics of the 
economic structure of tovarishchestvo and the principles 
underlying economic life under socialism. This principle 
is defined in terms of the equal distribution of the value 
between the members of the society, a planned distribution 
of the materials of production and a spontaneous application 
of labour to production. These measures, according to 
Chernyshevskii, could guarantee a balance between demand 
and supply.(40) Many of these ideas, it is true, appear 
utopian; yet no social plan for the future is possible 
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without a utopean element, as one author states: "no move-
ment that sets out to change the world can do without its 
Utopia". (41) Chernyshevskii's scheme marks an important 
step forward towards such change. 
~ 
Chernyshevskii's theory of the working class and theories 
of other European Utopian socialists 
One of the most interesting points made by Chernyshevskii 
was the rejection of the idea of any sort of hired labour 
in socialism. In tovarishchestvo members are precluded from 
selling the labour ~o others. This condition is absent 
. , 
J 
in the thinking of Saint-Simon, Fourier or Owen. Cherny-
shevskii and Saint -Simon both approached the economic system 
from the point of view of the producer and both regarded 
production not as an end in itself but as a means to guar-
antee social well-being. Both conceived a planned economy. 
The 'industrial system' of Saint-Simon has certain resem-
blances with Chernyshevskii's association of workers. In 
the 'organisateur' Saint-Simon had outlined an industrial 
parliament consisting of three chambers: chambers of in-
vention, examination and execution. The first was composed 
of scientists, having only the responsibility of planning 
the annual programme of public works; the second was to 
be comp9sed also of scientists but with responstbility 
of supervising the above projects and supervising education; 
the third was to consist of leaders of industry who would 
implement the projects and control the finance. Cherny-
shevskii's scheme is simpler and, in a way more realistic. 
He puts maximum emphasis on the consent of the members of 
the association in framing any policy. Saint-Simon and 
Chernyshevskii alike,. rejected the basic assumption of 
classical political economy that the interest of the indi-
- 281 -
viduals automatically coincided with the national interest. 
But Saint-Simon's 'Nouveau Christianisme' was intended to 
be a new religion; historically speaking this marked a 
step backward. Chernyshevskii's formula for a new socialist 
order was prompted by the inadequacies of the capitalist 
order in ensuring social well-being and was a radical 
corrective to this order. (42) Whereas Saint-Simon wanted 
to avert a conflict between the capitalist and the worker 
by creating a new 'organic state' based on property, Cherny-
shevskii always condemned the propertied class and asserted 
on numerous occasions that the interests of the propertied 
people and the workers were opposed to each other. (43) 
According to one author, "hOe (Saint-Simon) was a socialist 
only if socialism means the conscious direction and planning 
of the economic system from the centre."(44) Chernyshevskii's 
brand of socialism, on the contrary, was based on the prin-
ciple of ownership of the means of production by the workers. 
Robert Owen's practical experiment in New Lanark un-
doubtedly inspired Chernyshevskii in formulating his 'new 
theory'. But whereas Robert Owen's endeavour was a micro-
experiment, Chernyshevskii's theory involved the whole 
society. He wanted to establish a 'New Lanark' on a nat-
ional scale. The success of Robert Owen's scheme at a 
national level was to depend on a change of heart of the 
whole capitalistic class. The success of Chernyshevskii's 
scheme did not depend on the goodwill of the capitalists; 
he openly advocated the need of changing the social order, 
by force if necessary. 
The success of Fourier's phalanxes was also made de-
pendent by him on capitalists' generosity or change of 
the capitalist heart. Chernyshevskii, whatever the limita-
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tions in his schemes could not be said to have entertained' 
that kind of utopian dream. Saint-Simon, Fourier, Robert 
Owen all diagnosed the main social disease of their time 
correctly but their prescription for its remedy were un-
convincing. Chernyshevskii was much less utopian, more 
realistic than his forerunners. This is born out by the 
fact that he spent the last 26 years of his life in prison 
and exile at the hands of those for whom his ideas -were 
realistic enough to regard them as a real threat to the 
existing order. 
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Conclusion 
In the body of the thesis, an attempt has been made 
to present Chernyshevskii's economic views on (a) the 
agrarian situation in his time and the abolition of 
serfdom; (b) social and economic development generally; 
(c) different social formations, particularly capitalism 
and (d) socialist production. An account of the contem-
porary economic, political and social conditions provides 
the context, the relevance of which becomes particularly 
apparant because Chernyshevskii was not a professional 
economist but essentially a polemical commentator on 
the economic trends and situations of his time. 
r have endeavoured to present Chernyshevskii's eco-
nomic formulations as faithfully as possible even where 
they contain technical flaws and misunderstandings. He 
raised many important problems and in some cases offered 
solutions, . which, however unacceptable they 
may have proved to his contemporaries, must be regarded 
as a significant contribution to Russian economic theory 
and practice. But while little known outside Russia, 
the importance'of this contribution goes beyond the 
Russian scene and occupies an impressive place in the 
development of economic doctrines generally. This is 
well illustrated by Chernyshevskii's polemic against 
Tengoborskii on the superiority of hired labour over 
forced labour. Similarly, although there was nothing new 
tn Chernyshevskii's discussion of the diseconomy in the 
agricultural sector due to serfdom, he was the first to 
raise the problems of the existence of disguised unem-
ployment in the rural sector. To prove his point he used 
data collected by government officials. This shows the 
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extent of professionalism in Chernyshevskii's approach 
to economic matters. He argued that the massive indebted-
ness of the landlords in Russia was caused not by their 
over-indulgence in luxury b~t by the inadequacies of an 
economy based on forced labour. This argument is more 
revealing than those put forward by later economic histo-
rians (for example Blum) who insisted that the land-
lords extravagance was the principal cause of th~rr 
indebtedness. 
Chernyshevskii's analysis of the legal basis of 
serfdom and discussion of the landlord's practice of 
flouting the law are illuminating not only for the new 
facts presented but also in the economic argument he uses 
viz. the important argument that if the peasants in 
barshchina are forced to perform their three days labour 
for the landlord on the days most suitable for agricul-
ture, then the national production suffers and for this 
the landlords and not the peasants are to be blamed. 
Similarly, his argument that excessive obrok destroys 
the initiative of the peasants and affects national 
economy is also absolutely correct. The same criticisms 
were made by liberals like Kavelin and Chicherin, but 
they then went on advocating the abolition of serfdom with 
redemption payments for both land and person, thus reveal-
ing a fundamental inconsistency in their thinking. On 
the other hand, Chernyshevskii's various redemption 
schemes are consistent with his analysis of the conditions 
of the peasantry. If one goes through his redemption 
Schemes, it seems that Chernyshevskii darted from one 
position to another. In one instance he argues in favour 
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of a moderate scheme, in another he challenged the very 
basis of redemption by suggesting negative redemption 
payments; he characterises obrok as an excess of serf-
dom, but presents a scheme of redemption payment of per-
sons to landlords. There is no doubt that there was a 
change in his attitude towards reform between 1858 and 
1859, from being a supporter of compensation to the land-
lords (perhaps for the sake of expediency) to one where 
he questioned their right to any compensation. But even 
in articles published in 1859 (for example his 'Ustroistvo 
byta pomeshchich'ikh krest'ian - truden Ii vykup zemli?) 
he envisaged moderate redemption payments and suggested 
schemes for such payments. One must conclude that these 
conflicting utterances were a camouflage to hoodwink the 
censorship. Anyone who has some familiarity with Cherny-
shevskii's radical views and knows about his life and 
activities in the days preceding his collaboration with 
and eventual editorship of Sovremennik will understand 
. such tactics on his part. Only the naive will think 
that he also thought of the well-being of the landlords 
when formulating his schemes of redemption payments. The 
central theme in all his writings condemning serfdom is 
that the entire gentry as a class is superfluous in 
society. 
The quality of his discussion of how to avoid an in-
flationery situation in the economy due to the increase 
in the stock of money needed to supplement government 
finance to pay compensation to the landlords (chapter 2, 
part 2) places him on a par with professional policy 
economists. 
Throughout his economic writings he used only one 
criterion for the acceptability of any economic theory 
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or economic policy - the good of the maximum number of 
individuals in a society. He followed this criterion 
in all his articles on the agrarian situation or the refo~. 
when he spoke of the betterment of the conditions of the 
peasants who constituted the overwhelming majority in 
the society. One author has remarked: "He consistently 
favoured the many over the few, and he refused to allow 
general consideration of economic growth to overshadow 
a humanitarian concern for the material condition of the 
common people"(l), In his discussion on the superiority 
of communal ownership over private ownership (Chapter 1, 
part 3) his refutation of the arguments of his opponents 
(Vernadskii and the contributors in 'Ekonomicheskii 
ukazatel') was based mainly on this criterion. He did 
not deny that private form of ownership had contributed 
towards the greater technological progress ~. the west, 
but that alone was not sufficient to undermine his faith 
in the necessity of guaranteeing the welfare to the in-
dividual rather than raising the standard of the country's 
scientific and technological progress. There is no 
doubt that in presenting his views, some of the illustra-
tions that he used were too simple and naive. In fact, 
if he had not used some of these illustrations, his 
arguments would have appealed more to sophisticated read-
ers. But his journal Sovremennik catered for the layman 
and these illustrations helped the readers to understand 
his arguments. The substance of what he said is however 
exceedingly important, and any weakness in his presentation 
should be treated of secondary importance only, and in 
this way alone can full justice be done to Chernyshevskii. 
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In the period in which Chernyshevskii was brought up 
the miserable lot of the com~o~. man was overlooked. He 
understood one basic quality of any economic theory, -
i.e. that the theory is for men, not men for the theory. 
He successfully followed this principle while arguing 
against the upholders of private property. Inhis'defe~se 
of 
of the commune and/communal prop~rty, themain argument 
was that the economists of his time ('backward economists' 
to use his expression) were blind to the potential of 
the commune for guaranteeing the welfare of the people. 
Time and again he criticised J.B. Say as a p~ominent mem-
ber of this 'backward' school. The main reason was that 
Say did not believe that it was any part of the economist's 
task to suggest remedies for economic maladies. "The role 
of an economist, like that of the savant, is not to give 
advice, but simply to observe, to analyse, to describe. 
He must be content to remain an impartial spectator."(2) 
Say wrote to Malthus in 1820: "what we owe to the public 
is to tell them how and why such and such a fact is the 
consequence of another. Whether the conclusion be wel-
comed or rejected, it is enough that the economist should 
have demonstrated its cause; but he must give no advice."(3) 
The conflict between Chernyshevskii and classical econo-
mists of his time centred around the right of an economist 
to pass a value judgement. While discussing the benefits 
of the commune, Chernyshevskii, on a number of occasions, 
came to this issue and branded his opponents as people 
with preconceived ideas abstracted from reality and with 
superstitions.(4) The burden of his criticism was in-
directly recognised in the economic policies of welfare 
states in western Europe, Chernyshevskii therefore deserves 
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a mention for his insistence on an active role of an 
economist in social change, in guaranteeing the well-
being of the people of a country. 
While criticising the classical economists of his 
time" however, Chernyshevskii was outspoken in his fvaise 
for the classical economists Smith, Ricardo and even 
Malthus (though he rejected the Malthusian theory of 
population). The ideas of these economists opened up 
new paths of economic reasoning corresponding to the 
reali ty of their time, and he regarded them as pi9 .. ~er.s.: 
. -' 
in the field of political economy.c But he would not 
contend himself with the view that generation after 
generation the same analysis was sufficient. He envisaged 
a different economic theory for changed historical cir-
cumstances. 
His theory of social development in which he detec-
ted 'decisive moments' and 'intermediate moments' is 
extremely valuable. He was one of the few to put forward 
a theory of economic change which eschewed ready-made 
formulae and took account of the necessity and different 
needs of differ'ent situations. Some of his evidence re-
ferring especially to patterns of economic and social 
changes, are pertinent and interesting, although his 
illustrations from individual lives tend to be~cumbersome 
and at times off the point. 
Chernyshevskii suggested that a society can reach 
a phase of socialised production straightaway from a 
stage dependent mainly on agricultural production within 
a feudal framework. His argument was that contact be-
tween developed and undeveloped countries helps the latter 
to by-pass 'inte~mediate moments' of technological progress 
and reach a mature stage of development. He cites the 
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development of New Zealand as an instance of this. History 
has shown that the theory of social development in which 
contact between advanced and underdeveloped countries plays 
a crucial role is valid. After the second world war when 
many nations became free from colonial domination, and 
the question of economic development of these countr~s 
came into the forefront, the ideq that there could be a 
non-capitalist path of development became a matter of a 
controversy in some of these countries. The main point 
that was raised was whether these countries were in a 
position to bring about a full,fledged capitalist develop-
ment •. If so, would capitalism be able to effect the re-
organisation and improvement of these economies on a 
scale sufficient to secure the welfare of the people, 
considering that. at the end of the period of colonial 
domination of these nations the people were living in a 
miserable condition? India is a case in point. After 
independence, the ruling Indian National Congress was 
split into ~wo, one argued in favour of a non-capitalist 
path of development (Nehru gave passive support to this 
group) and the 'other believed in a free-enterprise capi-
talist economy (supported by Patel). The arguments that 
were put forward by both groups are significant. The 
proponents of a free-enterprise capitalist economy held 
that India was primarily an agricultural country and any 
plan of economic development must be a capitalistic one. 
The supporters of the first opinion held that, leaving 
aside the question of whether capitalistic development 
was desirable or not, this idea could not be entertained 
because" of the time required to bring about economic 
development under capitalism in a poor and undeveloped 
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country, where the rate of investment of capital would 
be very low and where one of the ingredients of such 
development, that is, a foreign market, would not exist 
because of competition with advanced capitalist countries. 
They advocated an alternate plan for economic development 
which was a 'socialist pattern' of growth, envisaging in 
a 
effect/mixed economy with more e~phasis on the nationa-
lised than on the private sector. The argument of the 
majority group (the supporters of a 'socialist pattern 
of society') was that India, or for that matter any other 
underdeveloped country, was no· longer isolated from the 
rest of the world. In spite of the fact that the crea-
tion of a sizeable nationalised sector was beyond the 
means of the government, other countries would come for-
ward to help them with financial aid and technical know-
how. 
Consequently, a technological base would be esta-
blished in a short time as a result of the contact between 
India and economically advanced countries. This is a 
validation of Chernyshevskii's position formulated a cen-
tury in advance~ 
As has been mentioned, Chernyshevskii assumes that 
in political economy priority belongs to concrete men 
and their well-being. He protested against poverty and 
misery; against luxury in the midst of plenty. He ad-
vocated the equal distribution of what wealth there was. 
While doing so he came up against great names in political 
economy, but this did not deter him from presenting his 
idea of what he considered true national prosperity. 
It has taken nearly two hundred years (if we take 
1760 as the year marking the beginning of the industrial 
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revolution and capitalist development) for political eco-
nomists to discard fully the idea of non-intervention and 
to come to the idea of the welfare state implemented in 
some European countries. The main reason behind such a 
change of attitude towards the welfare of the citizens 
of a country was the experience of economic crisis in 
which the ordinary people were placed in a pitiable posi-
tion. The extensive social t.. . security system in many 
European countries, introduced after the .~cond '~'lOrld 
War, is a recognition of the fact that the well-being of 
ordinary men is not safe-guarded in unrestricted capita-
lism. Chernyshevskii raised this question of the need 
to guarantee minimum well-being of the individuals in a 
society long ago and that is why he presented his theory 
of socialist production as a replacement of the theory 
of capi tali sm. 
His definition of political economy emphasised the 
need to produce material objects which should be equitably 
distributed. He agreed with Mill in condemming the idea 
accepted in some societies that possession of human be-
ings as slaves'or serfs should count as wealth. The 
accepted theories in Chernyshevskii's time regarded 
serfs as wealth to the landlords, and consequently the 
owners of this wealth had the 'wealth' at their mercy. 
His criticism of the accepted theory that forced labour 
was not a form of labour to be studied in political 
economy, is also interes~ing. If production means pro-
duction for sale then, since forced labour contributed 
to a great extent to the production of goods for the 
market and the landlords earned a considerable amount 
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of profit from it, forced labour must be considered in 
political economy. Also the 'ancestral' and 'possessio-
I 
nal' factories earned profit with the help of. forced 
labour. If this is the situation why, Chernyshevskii 
asked, should forced labar not come under factors of 
production in politico-economic discussion? He also 
pointed to the existence of a large area of production 
for self-consumption in backward countries and contended 
that this production should also come within the ambit 
of politico-economic consideration. 
Much has been said about Chernyshevskii's 'hypothe-
, 
tical method. Scholars, both Soviet and western have , 
raised doubts about its validity. There is no doubt that 
this method has need of improvement. His examples are in 
some cases used to justify a pre-conceived notion. And 
the numerical evidence which he adduces is not always 
conclusive. But it must be noted that the 'hypothetical 
method' in the main was aimed at showing the impl~ ations 
and trends of interaction of certain economic variables 
in certain situations and Chernyshevskii has succeeded 
in doing so up to a point. As has been mentioned, ironi-
cally Plekhanov has criticised him for indulging in too 
much abstraction with little relevance to reality. But 
the 'hypothetical' illustrations Chernyshevskii used to 
show that more national wealth may lead to less well-being 
of the people or production on a farm will guarantee less 
advantage to its peasants than production under communal 
ownership were by no means as irrelevant as it appeared , 
to Plekhanov or might appear to us for it reflected to , 
some extent at least real situations in the Russian 
agrarian practise. It is true however that, as he himself 
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readily admitted, he was not well-equipped with mathema-
tical knowledge to provide his theory with sufficient 
technical support. 
Chernyshevskii's classification of productive and 
unproductive labour emphasises the well-being of the 
ordinary man. He did not make a distinction between goods 
and services. Any material objec.t or service satisfying 
his criterion was treated as the outcome of productive 
labour. Chernyshevskii's choice of the criterion of pro-
ductive labour arose from the needs of his time. Today, 
many underdeveloped countries could well pay attention 
to Chernyshevskii's emphasis on the benefit of utilising 
more productive labour, when these counme:s. think of 
plans of economic growth; and his criterion of determining 
the quality of labour is.equally valid. Too much emphasis 
is now being put on the idea of 'self-sufficiency' in 
the aggregative sense in these countries, which means 
sufficient production to meet the demand for all kinds 
of goods including those of luxury. But not enough atten-
tion is paid to determining whether there are sUfficient 
goods to meet the primary need of the ordinary people. 
Moreover if a nation is economically' self-sufficient it , 
does not follow that all the individuals in a country 
will be able to satisfy their needs, because purchasing 
power may be inequitably distributed. Chernyshevskii not 
only insisted that goods of primary necessity should be 
produced in sUfficient quantity but insisted that all 
individuals must be in a position to be able to consume 
them; hence the necessity of an equitable distribution 
of income. 
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Chernyshevskii always criticised those who advocated 
the existing regime. His rejection of Hegel's political 
philosophy and admiration of Feuerbach's is a case in 
point. On the same basis he criticised Malthus' theory 
of population which led in histhview, to stagnation ra.ther tho. 
,e -
': to change. His treatment of/Malthusian theory of popula-
tion has its merits and defects. He was one of the first 
to challenge the validity of Malthus's prediction. He 
could not subscribe to the pessimistic view of the future 
contemplated by Malthus. He had always been a supporter 
and theoretical advocate of radical change. If the exist-
ing conditions seemed dismal, he thought it to be his 
duty to point to the future rather than come to terms 
with the present. But he discovered the ingredients of 
change for the better even in the desperate situation of 
the present. This was one of the main points of his 
attack against Malthus, and it occupies a considerable 
space in his Osnavaniya politcheskoi ekonomii. Another 
reason for his criticism of Malthus was that in his time 
'social Darwinism' was creating many preconceptions des-
igned to bolster up the existing order. Malthusian theory 
contributed greatly to the rise of 'social Darwinism'. 
Chernyshevskii regarded this as an ominous development 
endangering the 'real man' in the name of a spurious 
scientific theory. It may be noted however that he was 
an admirer of Malthus as an economist and believed that 
Malthus carried on the great tradition of Adam Smith. 
However, there are deFects in his criticism of Malthus' 
theory of population. Chernyshevskii's lack of mathema-
tical ability led to errors and confusions in his mathe-
mati cal arguments. 
- 295 -
In his discussion of different social formations 
Chernyshevskii did not adhere strictly to the views that 
each social formation is more preogressive than the pre-
ceding one. He did not condemn all the features of capi-
talism and recognised its positive contribution to the 
productive potential in his time. He did not of course 
believe that capitalism was a perennial or ineluctable 
phenomenon, and he was confident that it would be replaced 
by a society based on socialist principles. In fact, 
it was the one change that was inevitable in his view. 
He was not very specific in his economic writings whether 
deliberate action by the oppressed masses was necessary 
for the overthrow of capitalism, but in view of the cen-, 
sorship, this is hardly surprising. But it was clear 
to him that a conflict between capitalists and workers 
for the major share of the value of produce in the coun-
try was a fact which could not be explained away, and 
he gave a striking analysis of this conflict. He also 
pointed out ,the effect of economic collusion between the 
rising bourgeoisie and the landlords and how this affected 
the interests of the workers. More often than not he 
used the expression 'common people' to denote the ex-
ploited class; he included not only the workers but also 
the peasants and other groups of people in this term and 
Whenever he referred to the well-being of the individual, 
he was thinking of the individuals belonging to this 
group as comprising those who were engaged in productive 
work. 
Chernyshevskii dealt at length with effects of com-
petition in capitalism. He analysed the ill-effects of 
competition between employers and between workers and 
asserted that as a result of competition small firms 
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would go out of existence, and the people associated with 
them would be reduced to hired workers. Similarly, com-
petition forces workers to sell their labour at a price 
much below the desired level and does not even then guar-
antee them employment. He quoted Turgot to second his con-
clusion that the miserable condition of the ordinary wage-
earners should be sought in the competition among workers 
for work. The surprising part of Chernyshevskii's concept 
of capitalism is that he adhered to Quesnay's three class 
classification (although he attacked Quesnay for his support 
of the gentry's interest) and followed him in designating 
the landlords as the highest class (vychshee soslovie) 
but attaching the dominant role to the middle class. 
In his theory of socialist production, Chernyshevskii 
tried to show the benefits of production based on workers' 
association (tovarishchestvo,) while implying the necessity 
for economic planning in a country with limited resources. 
He emphasised the need to give the workers the incentive 
to produce more and believed that in an 'association' 
there will be more incentive to work for the betterment 
of the workers themselves and of their fellow-workers. 
He also developed a new theory of the 'toiling masses' 
as the framework for guiding the economic activities in 
a society based on association. As can be seen in one 
of Chernyshevskii's major works, Kapital i trud, the idea 
of workers' association was not conceived in terms of 
disparate units or of model cooperative but as a 
framework in which production is effected in the country 
as a wh6le. It is true, in his What is to be Done? 
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he depicted the virtues of a model cooperative, (5) re-
sembling Robert Owen I s utopian I socialist I model.·· This., 
after all, was a novel in which practical elaboration 
gave way to imaginative design. 
Looking at the plight of the majority of people in 
many underdeveloped countries where ambitious plans for 
are 
growth/formulated on the basis o~ western economic ideas, 
one cannot fail to notice the vast inequality in the 
standard of living between the privileged minority and 
the underprivileged majority of the people. The econo-
mists talk of increasing national income, maintaining 
a steady rate of growth and so forth, but the plight of 
concrete suffering men remains unalleviated. The only 
way this problem can be solved is to rely on Chernyshev-
skiils criterion for national prosperity, that is, the 
well-being of the ordinary human beings. This should be 
the first priority in any programme of economic develop-
ment in the poor countries. This is the main lesson that 
one can learn, if one chooses to learn, from a study of 
Chernyshevskii's principal economic writings. 
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